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# THE REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW

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## I.

### ADDRESS OF DEDICATION.<sup>1</sup>

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It is interesting and instructive to consider the order, and the manner, in which the "institutions of learning" of the Reformed Church came into existence. These institutions, literary and theological, have from the beginning been closely united together; but it is important to remember that the order in which, in the history of the Church, they came into being, is not just the same as that in which they are usually regarded and mentioned. It is usual and natural for us to speak of College and Theological Seminary; it is because this is the natural and necessary succession in which these institutions

<sup>1</sup> We print in this number of the REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW a series of addresses which were delivered in Lancaster, Pa., on Thursday, October 18, 1917, at the services held under the auspices of the Eastern Synod of the Reformed Church in the U. S. of A., gathered in its one hundred and seventy-first annual session, for the purpose of dedicating a dormitory, named the Walter F. Richards Hall, and a refectory, named for the late Jacob Y. Dietz, erected for the use of the Theological Seminary by the generous gifts of the constituency of the Eastern, Potomac, and Pittsburgh Synods. In connection with these dedicatory services, a bronze tablet was unveiled to the memory of the late Rev. Prof. Frederick A. Gast, and also an oil portrait of the Rev. Prof. John C. Bowman. These various addresses fitly commemorate an historical event in the life and growth of the Theological Seminary. EDITORIAL NOTE.

are resorted to and used by those who are permitted to enjoy the privileges which they afford. It is significant, however, that this is not the succession in which they were historically developed, but that, in the process of development, this order was reversed; that here it was, not first the College and then the Theological Seminary, but first the Theological Seminary and then the College. It is well for us to remember, on this interesting and important occasion, that this Theological Seminary is the first, the original, the oldest institution of learning in the Church to which it belongs, and that out of it all the other institutions of the Church, both literary and theological, have eventually been evolved. The College is the offspring of the Theological Seminary; it came as an afterthought, a corollary, an appendix, as it were; a natural, logical, necessary consequence, it is true, but, nevertheless, in respect of its origin, not of an original and independent but of a characteristically sequent and subordinate character. As far as the College is concerned, that institution, important and indispensable as it is, was not the result of a distinct, deliberate and direct attempt to establish a college. It came, not directly, but indirectly, and, as it were, unintentionally. It would seem to be an instance of that law of indirection, as it might be called, of which multitudinous instances might be given, and by which men, while aiming at one thing, are led to the accomplishment of something different.

Originally it was not a college but a theological seminary that was thought of and desired. When, a hundred years ago, the question of establishing some sort of institution of learning began to be agitated in the Church; when, exactly a hundred years ago this year, the Synod, at its meeting at Yorktown, in 1817, first "took action looking towards the establishment of a theological school of some kind, and appointed a committee to give the subject a careful consideration," it was simply, merely and exclusively "a theological school of some kind" of which the forefathers were thinking. They were not concerned for education and learning as such; they were not con-

sumed by a burning zeal for the benefits of a college education for the "rising generation"; they had no thought at all of these things; they were animated and actuated by an altogether practical purpose, the purpose of remedying an existing evil and alarming condition in regard to religion. Within its bounds, at that time, there existed great spiritual destitution. The Revolutionary War had taken place; as a consequence, in 1793, the connection of the Reformed Church in this country with the Church in Holland had come to an end, and with it had ceased that supply of capable ministers which had formerly, through this connection, been, with some degree of regularity and efficiency, afforded. In those days there were, especially in Pennsylvania, a number of small and scattered congregations of the Reformed Church; but, there being no organized means of supplying them with pastors, a large proportion of these congregations were "as sheep having no shepherd." "The hungry sheep looked up and were not fed." It was this condition of affairs that lay as a burden upon the minds and hearts of those who in those days cared for the welfare of the Church. It was their concern and anxiety for these shepherdless flocks that caused the movement for the establishment of a Theological Seminary; a movement which, after years of difficulty and struggle, finally issued in the founding, in the year 1825, of the institution in whose honor we are here to-day assembled. No sooner, however, had this "theological school" been established, than it became evident that it would be necessary to organize some sort of "classical instruction" to prepare the students for their theological studies. At first, in 1831, a "classical teacher" was appointed to give instruction within the Seminary itself. This appointment led to the organization, in 1832, of the "Classical Institution," the name of which was changed, in 1835, to that of the "High School of the Reformed Church." It was this High School which afterwards, being removed from York to Mercersburg, was erected into Marshall College, and which to-day continues

its existence, under the form now of Franklin and Marshall College, so closely associated with this Theological Seminary.

Such was the order in which these two kindred institutions came into existence; such was the practical religious motive which actuated those by whom they were founded. It was the Church that laid the educational foundations upon which the State has since been building. At an early day different branches of the Christian Church were engaged in the work of propagating the Gospel of Jesus Christ, of civilizing and Christianizing the people of a new country. They found that an educated ministry was necessary; this led to the establishment of a theological seminary. The establishment of a theological seminary logically and necessarily led to the establishment of a college. It was thus that many of the oldest colleges of the land originated; such was their original association with religion. They were brought into being, not exclusively, nor even mainly, by the desire for education and learning as such, but by the desire and the effort to supply certain moral and religious needs of the people. Inscribed on a gateway at Harvard is the following quotation from New England "First Fruits": "After God had carried us safe to New England, and we had builded our houses, provided necessaries for our livelihood, reared convenient places for God's worship and settled the civil government, one of the next things we longed for and looked after was to advance learning and perpetuate it to posterity, dreading to leave an illiterate ministry to the churches when our present ministers shall be in the dust." This, their original association with religion, seems, by some of them, in recent times, to have been forgotten, if not repudiated. It is well, however, indeed it is unavoidable, when we are considering the beginnings of the history of these educational institutions, to remember that they were of a religious origin; that they were founded in the belief, and owed their existence to the belief, that there is a constitutional and vital relation between education and religion. Into any discussion of the question of this relation we have no thought of entering



here. We would only say that the present condition of higher education in this country, the result of the attempts which have been made to dissociate education entirely from religion, and to make the educational process utterly and absolutely secular, can hardly be said to encourage the belief that it is wise or safe to undertake a permanent divorce between the two.

We have been dwelling upon the circumstance that, in the order of their development, the Theological Seminary came first and the College afterwards, not merely for the sake of the historical fact itself, but because of a certain principle which was operative in, and is illustrated by, the process of their development. It is a vital, fundamental, far-reaching principle; whoever follows it will be carried far. It is the principle of the priority of that which the Theological Seminary stands for, and the posteriority of that which the College stands for; of the priority of life over literature, of condition over theory, of the moral over the intellectual, of the spiritual over the temporal.

Indeed, so far as what we are saying on this occasion involves a retrospect, and a consideration of the beginnings and the progress of that process of development by which this Theological Seminary has become what it is to-day, we are calling attention to these things, not for the purpose of reciting the facts themselves, which are sufficiently well known, but for the sake of certain principles of which they are the expression and the manifestation, which they illustrate, of which they serve instructively to remind us. Other principles, besides the one which has been mentioned, were active in, and are illustrated by, this process. One of these might be called the Mustard Seed Principle. It is the principle laid down by our Saviour when He said: "The kingdom of heaven is like to a grain of mustard seed, which a man took, and sowed in his field; which indeed is the least of all seeds; but when it is grown, it is the greatest among herbs, and becometh a tree, so that the birds of the air come and lodge in the branches thereof." And, again, when He said: "So is the kingdom of

God, as if a man should cast seed into the ground, and should sleep, and rise night and day, and the seed should spring and grow up, he knoweth not how. For the earth bringeth forth fruit of herself; first the blade, then the ear, after that the full corn in the ear." This is the law of all true growth and development. Every genuine process of development begins as a mustard seed, and proceeds according to this order, "first the blade, then the ear, after that the full corn in the ear." This, that it takes place in accordance with the Mustard Seed Law, is one of the characteristic marks by which a true is distinguished from a false development. It is man's way to begin with much and end with little; it is God's way to begin with little and end with much. Despise not the day of small things; everything that is great was once small. Have regard to the beginning that is humble, modest, unpretending; it may be that it is a mustard seed, "which indeed is the least of all seeds." Be distrustful of the beginning that is large, loud, self-confident, boastful; it is probable that the abundance of its promise will issue in a great scarcity of performance. Be suspicious of the man or the movement that "thunders in the index." Have confidence in the man or the movement that, beginning in a small way, humbly and modestly, making no boasts and uttering no promises, is evidently bent, conserving all energy for the purpose, upon action, performance, fulfillment.

The process of development by which this Theological Seminary has come to be what it is to-day has been entirely in accordance with, and is an illustration of, the Mustard Seed Law. We discern the first small and obscure beginnings of this process, a beginning before the beginning, as it were, in a certain practice which prevailed for many years after the supply of ministers through the Church of Holland had ceased, and by which the Church, being forced by necessity to the measure, sought to supply her shepherdless congregations with pastors. It was the custom of some of the older, abler and more experienced ministers to receive theological students into their fam-

ilies, and prepare them, as well as they could, for their future work. This method, being of a temporary and provisional nature, was necessarily very defective and unsatisfactory. Moreover, the existence of it became, not only an obstacle in the way of, but to some extent the cause of active opposition to, the movement for the establishment of a theological seminary, when that movement arose. Nevertheless, let not this circumstance lead us to be unjust towards this primitive custom. There is much to be said in its favor. It was a provisional arrangement, enforced by the necessities of the times; but it was vastly better than no arrangement at all. These private theological instructors were, for the most part, capable, learned, experienced pastors and preachers; they were undertaking to teach the young men whom they received into their households the "art and mystery" of preaching the Gospel and caring for souls. There was something natural, sensible, rational in this plan. This was their occupation; this was the thing which they had learned; they now undertook to teach and train others who should follow them in the same vocation. They did this not only theoretically, but also practically. They on the one hand superintended the theological studies of the young men, and, on the other, sent them out, from time to time, to practice what they had learned, by preaching and ministering to the congregations, of which there were often a number under their instructor's care. It is quite possible and proper to discern, in these private and primitive theological schools, the humble, mustard-seed-like beginning of this institution. Each of them was, as it were, a prophecy and a beginning of the Theological Seminary as it exists to-day.

More directly and more distinctly we are reminded of the presence and the operation of this law by the experience of the Seminary in the first days and years after its establishment. When, at last, after much agitation and innumerable difficulties and struggles, it came into actual existence, the beginning of it was sufficiently small and obscure. When the new Seminary entered upon its work, at Carlisle, in April, 1825, its one pro-

fessor, the Rev. Dr. Lewis Mayer, found himself with five students under his care; later in the session the number was increased to six. Writing, under date of May 17, 1825, to his friend, Mr. B. C. Wolff, of Martinsburg, Va. (Dr. Theodore Appel's *The Beginnings of the Theological Seminary*, p. 52), he says: "My theological students, with only one exception, are raw young men. I am obliged to teach them the rudiments of their Greek, and even the grammar of their own mother tongue." There is something pathetic in the way in which, writing to the same friend three years later, he seeks to find comfort amid the difficulties and trials of his situation. He says (*Ibid.*, p. 75): "The disappointments and reverses we have suffered have been so similar to those which have marked the course of other benevolent enterprises that I take some comfort from them. The history of Protestant missions among the heathen, which were remarkable for their success at later periods, were as remarkable for their reverses in their earlier years. The most important events, too, which have blessed the earth, sprang from small beginnings, which were at first despised. Christianity had its birthplace in a manger, and the Reformation originated with an obscure monk." Such was the comforting consciousness which came, at a time of trial, to its first professor, that the institution which was being inaugurated under his care was an instance and illustration of the truth of the principle taught by our Saviour, that everything pertaining to His kingdom "is like to a grain of mustard seed, which a man took and sowed in his field."

Such, and so entirely in accordance with this principle, were the first beginnings of this Theological Seminary. In entire conformity to the same principle, also, has been its subsequent history. It has been a history of growth and progress; of growth and progress after the order laid down by our Saviour, "first the blade, then the ear, after that the full corn in the ear." Few better things can be said of a man, or a movement, or an institution, than that it is gradually, however slowly, growing. Of this Seminary it may be said that it is a piece

of reality; that it has come by a genuine process of development; that it has slowly grown, from a small beginning, to be what it has become. It has been said that "it is better to be blessed with the merciful dew of progress than to be overwhelmed with a cataract of prosperity." This institution has never been overwhelmed with a "cataract of prosperity"; it has, however, been blessed, and is still being blessed, with "the merciful dew of progress." This circumstance may well be regarded as one of the chief evidences of the real and genuine character of the process by which it has been developed.

We may be permitted to mention another evidence of the genuineness of this process of development; another significant, though perhaps less vital principle, of which its history affords an illustration. This might be called the principle of Early Intimation. Dr. John Henry Newman, in his "Theory of Developments," in mentioning the characteristic marks by which a true may be distinguished from a false development, gives this among the rest, that, in every such development there will always be found, at or near the beginning of it, some intimation of what the ultimate issue of the process is to be. It is many years since we read this volume, and we do not have access to it at this time; but we remember that the author of it gives certain very striking historical illustrations of the operation of this law. It is a principle which, it is easy to see, is grounded in the very nature of things. Nothing is more significant, in a certain sense nothing is more final and conclusive in relation to a process of development, than the beginning of it. It is just because it is the beginning, and, as such, must contain within itself all that is to follow. In a certain sense, nothing is so inclusive, so final and conclusive also, as the beginning. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to expect that, at or near the beginning of every true development, there should be found, as one of the characteristic marks by which it may be recognized as such, some intimation of what the final result of it is to be. Such early intimation was not wanting to the process of development which we are considering; and it is

with a feeling of perhaps not unpardonable pleasure that we find that it was given at a meeting of the Synod held in the church at Hagerstown in the year 1820. This congregation then had as its pastor the Rev. James Ross Reilly, one of the most earnest, active and capable of the friends and supporters of the Seminary movement. Of this Synod, composed of earnest and able men, thirteen ministers and eleven elders, Dr. Appel says: "The Hagerstown Synod did a brave thing; it started a movement which ended in a Seminary that has to this day met the wants of the Church. What greater credit could be given to a single Synodical meeting? It accomplished a great deal in arousing the Church, and in getting it to think." He says, also, however, in another place: "Whilst the action of the Hagerstown Synod was dictated by the best and purest motives, it is evident that the reverend brethren did not take in the full situation, that they had counted without consulting their host, as the sequel showed." It is true that in one sense this Synod did not take in "the full situation"; that is to say, it did not realize the situation in the immediate and narrower sense of the term; it did not sufficiently regard the actually existing and painfully restricted condition of affairs. But, in another and larger sense of the term, it may be said that it was just the "full situation" that this Synod was having in mind. It was characterized by large ideas and expectations; the men composing it were forward-looking men, who had a vision of the future. This is evident from the action which it took. It evidently contemplated an endowed institution. Its expectation was that the proposed Seminary should be "a predominantly English institution," and under English auspices. It elected a theological professor, the Rev. Dr. Philip Milledoler, and fixed his salary at \$2,000. It also prohibited the practice of ministers receiving young men under their care for the purpose of instructing them in theology. Of every one of these enactments it may be said that it was, for the time being, a dead letter. The Seminary was not established as an endowed institution, nor did it receive an endowment until

after many years. It did not come, when it came, as an English institution. The professor, when he entered upon his duties, did not receive a salary of \$2,000. The prohibited practice of private theological instruction continued for years afterwards. The sentiment of the Hagerstown Synod was followed by a reaction. Two years afterwards, at the Synod of Harrisburg, as is related by Dr. Appel, "the idea of raising a large endowment and a large salary for a professor seems to have vanished. It was now said that the next beginning ought to be made on a smaller and more economical scale. The first was out of proportion to the means and resources of the Church at the time; the second turned out to be just as unwise in the other direction." In the following year, at the Synod of Baltimore, the professor's salary was fixed at \$500. There is something almost droll in the Hagerstown idea of promising the professor a salary of \$2,000. How far this action was in advance of the times, times when a minister receiving a salary of \$400 a year was regarded as "passing rich," is evident from the fact that, for years afterwards, the salary of the professor was very small and precarious, and from the circumstance, mentioned by Dr. J. H. Dubbs, in his *History of Franklin and Marshall College*, of a tradition, "that once, at a time of unusual depression, a worthy minister was so greatly impressed by the gravity of the occasion that he rose in his seat at Synod and seriously offered to divide with Dr. Rauch his slender stock of meal and potatoes."

So premature and disproportionate was the action of this Synod of large ideas and expectations. Every one of its enactments was a dead letter from the start; nevertheless, all of them eventually passed into fulfilment. The Seminary did, in course of time, receive an endowment; the salary of "the professor" did eventually reach, though it had long to be waited for, the amount at which it had been fixed in 1820; the custom of private theological instruction ceased to exist many years ago. Instead of not taking in "the full situation," it may in some sense be said that it was just the full situation



that the members of this Synod did take in. They "dreamed dreams" and "saw visions." Their action was premature and disproportionate only as all prophecy is necessarily premature and disproportionate. And it possesses this peculiar and interesting significance for us that, by giving, at the beginning, early intimation of the nature of the ultimate issue of the process, it places upon the process of development by which this institution has become what it is, one of the characteristic marks of a true development.

There is another principle of which we are reminded by the history of this institution; it might be called the Principle of the Earned Inheritance. It is the truth which Goethe, in the *Faust*, expresses by the words:

Was du ererbt von deinen Vätern hast,  
Erwirb es, um es zu besitzen.

There are things that are inherited; but the law is that no inheritance can become a real possession except by being earned. In this world nothing is simply given and received; it is a world in which there is nothing that can be had for nothing; things can be obtained only by payment of the lawful purchase-price. The thing which thou hast inherited, whatever it may be, will be an unreality, a shadow without substance, nay, possibly even an injury, unless thou thyself, by thine own efforts, invest it with reality and substance, and divest it of its capacity for injury, unless thou thyself earn that which thou hast inherited.

It is characteristic of every true development that whatever in it is significant and vital, having taken place once, must take place continuously. The thing tends to repeat itself; the act, once performed, must be performed over and over. What our ancestors did, we must in some form do for ourselves, that it may be of value and effect for us. We have spoken of the greatness of the Beginning. It is indeed great; it is all-including; in a certain sense, nothing is more determining, more final, more conclusive, than a true beginning. Yet, in another

sense, it is conditioned, dependent, inconclusive; seeking substance and reality for itself in what shall follow from it. Great is the beginning; but great, also, is the continuation. In the history of this Theological Seminary there has been not only beginning, but also continuation. The beginning has constantly repeated itself; what was done once has been done continuously. The history of the institution has been that of a succession of efforts and struggles; remembering which one is reminded of Virgil's words:

*Tantæ molis erat Romanam condere gentem.*

The long-continued struggle to obtain an endowment; the effort to add, one after another, to the number of the professorships; the movement, not many years ago, for the purchase of the grounds for the erection, and the eventual erection, of the present beautiful Seminary building; the movement for the building of the Dormitory and Refectory, the completion of which we are commemorating to-day—what, properly understood, have all these acts been, but acts of earning? What was done in the beginning has continued to be done down to the present day. It may justly be said that the inheritance has been earned; that which their forefathers bequeathed to them succeeding generations have, by their own actions, made their own.

We must not fail to mention another principle, of which the history of this Theological Seminary affords an instance and illustration; a greater principle, perhaps, than any of those which we have hitherto mentioned. It is the principle of Faith; of faith which, or which along with hope and love, accomplishes all the great things that are accomplished in the world; of faith, the very nature of which it is to cause men to do and to obey, to venture and to dare. Whenever an act of faith is performed, there is in it an element of venture; it has been so ever since Abraham, by faith, "went forth, not knowing whither he went." Whenever a thing is done by faith, it is done in spite of formidable objections which might be

brought forward against the doing of it. When this Theological Seminary was established, the act was one of venture; the step was taken in spite of many reasons capable of being alleged, and actually alleged, against the act. It was an act of faith, of faith greater than we of to-day can well realize, when the forefathers resolved to establish this institution. It was an act of faith when, at the Synod of Bedford, in 1824, the result of the vote proving to be a tie, the Rev. William Hendel, the president of the Synod, gave the casting vote in favor of the Seminary. It was an act of faith when the Rev. Dr. Mayer accepted the theological professorship to which he had been elected at that meeting of Synod. The feeling under which he acted is evident from a passage in a letter, written by him in this same year, to his friend, Mr. B. C. Wolff. "If no one," he writes, "accepts the professorship until it is a safe and profitable office, the Seminary will never get into operation; and the principle on which this plea of rejection is founded, if it were correct, would have justified the Reformers, the Apostles, and even Jesus Himself, in shrinking from the destination to which they were appointed." These words express that venturing quality which is always found wherever faith is found, and indicate the nature of walking by faith as distinguished from walking by sight. When the Rev. Mr. Reilly, travelling on horseback, on a cold winter day, from Hagerstown, Md., to Martinsburg, Va., the impulse coming to him suddenly, as he was crossing the Potomac, resolved to go to Germany in behalf of the Seminary, it was an act of faith that he performed. By faith the Seminary was opened at Carlisle; by faith it was afterwards removed to York; then to Mercersburg; finally to Lancaster, where it now is. Every forward step that has since been taken in its history, the struggle to secure an endowment, the effort to increase the number of professorships, the movement for the erection of the main Seminary buildings, and now, finally, the movement, the consummation of which we are celebrating to-day, for the erection of a Dormitory and Refectory, has been taken in faith.

These things were all done by faith. It is thus that we are reminded on this occasion of the momentous principle of faith; of that faith in God without which no really great thing is ever accomplished, and that faith in man, also, which is, as it were, a part of, which is at least always found associated with, faith in God. Those by whom these things were done trusted in God; they trusted, also, in the people, and trusted not in vain.

Finally, among the principles of which this occasion serves to remind us, there is one which is suggested more especially by the significant ceremony in which we are at present immediately engaged. It might be called the Principle of Association; it is the law of the Household or Family. It is said in God's Word that "none of us liveth to himself." It is written, "God setteth the solitary in families." God delivers men from their isolation and loneliness; He gathers them out of "the wilderness and solitary places"; He gives them "a city to dwell in"; He causes them to dwell together as members of one household. The principle of which we speak is this: that, where a common work is to be done, those who are being prepared for the doing of it ought to be prepared in common. They ought to live together; they ought to form one company; they ought to breathe the same atmosphere daily; they ought, by living a common life, to become animated by a common spirit and purpose. It was on this principle that our Saviour taught and trained His twelve disciples. They formed a household; they lived together; together they sat at their Master's feet; they were daily companions to each other. This common life was evidently no casual circumstance, but of the very essence of their preparation for their future common work. It is hard to see how, by any different method, their Master's purpose in regard to them could adequately have been attained.

Of this principle a striking illustration is found in the biography of that remarkable man, Cecil Rhodes, who at one time had a distinct intention of making use of it for the purpose of

carrying out his long-cherished scheme of uniting together and animating by one common spirit all the various commonwealths of South Africa. In a speech delivered at the annual congress of the Afrikaner Bund, at Kimberley, he told how, at a meeting of the same body, at Bloemfontein, he had been deeply impressed by the oneness of spirit characteristic of all those members of it who had been educated together at the Grey Institute. This suggested to him the idea of establishing, in Cape Colony, a teaching university, in which young men might be gathered together from the Orange Free State, from the Transvaal, from Natal, and from other regions of South Africa, and in which, by living and being educated together, they might acquire, and then carry away with them to their respective countries, that common spirit and purpose which he felt to be one of the greatest needs of South Africa. The plan was a favorite one with Cecil Rhodes, and one long cherished by him. He had his architect in England prepare and send to him in Africa elaborate plans of the beautiful buildings of his own College, Oriel College, Oxford, of which it was intended that the proposed university, so far as buildings were concerned, should be an exact replica. The plan was not carried out because the Dutch community of Cape Colony just then established a training-college, and Rhodes feared that his plan, if carried into effect, would militate against the success of this institution, and so give offense to its founders. It is easy, however, to recognize, in this unfulfilled project, the germinal idea of the Rhodes Scholarships, which Cecil Rhodes afterwards established by his will, and by means of which, using this principle, bringing together, from England, from America, and from the British colonies throughout the world, young men representing the different branches of the Anglo-Saxon race, and causing them to live together under the same influences at Oxford University, he hoped to create, especially for England and America, that unity of spirit which he had witnessed amongst the students of Grey Institute, and which he had desired and expected to create, for South Africa, by the establishment of his contemplated university.

In the time of the beginnings before the beginning of this Theological Seminary, the principle of which we are speaking had a place and exercised its appropriate influence. Imperfect and unsatisfactory, and necessarily destined to pass away, as was the system of private theological instruction by ministers in their own households, it possessed this one advantage, that under it the students who were being prepared for the ministry formed a company, household or family, living, learning, laboring together, from day to day, under the same roof. The present occasion reminds us, in an interesting manner, of those now far-distant times; we are to-day, in fact, reviving and restoring this one peculiar feature of that system of private and household theological instruction which was much spoken against when the Seminary movement began, and which the establishment of the Seminary caused to be eventually superseded and discarded. We are reviving it under circumstances which serve to remind us of, and indeed to place us in direct connection with, the days when the Church was obliged to depend, for her supply of ministers, upon the imperfect but important method, then prevalent, of private theological instruction. This Dormitory, we understand, is to be known as the "Walter F. Richards Hall," in recognition of the generous contribution towards the erection of it made by the widow of Mr. Richards, Mrs. Eliza Richards, and her daughters, Ella and Clara. Mr. Richards was a life-long member of the historic Zion's Reformed Church, which was served, for almost a century, by the Rev. Charles Herman and his son Alfred, descendants of the Rev. Lebrecht Herman, of the eighteenth century. It is thus that this Dormitory connects the institution with, and is in a certain sense a memorial to, the Rev. Lebrecht Frederick Herman, D.D., who was educated at the University of Halle, who came to this country in 1786, who served congregations in Eastern Pennsylvania for about sixty years, and who was one of those educated and able ministers who gave theological instruction in their own households, preparing thus for the ministry, in addition to his own

five sons, such well-known, able and useful ministers as John Guldin, Benjamin S. Schneck, Thomas Leinbach, Joseph Dubbs, Peter Fisher, Abraham Berge, Richard Fisher, and David Young. It is interesting to remember the direct association in which this Dormitory thus stands with one who, more than a hundred years ago, followed a method which we to-day, by the dedication of it, are restoring and reëstablishing.

The advantage of this method was afterwards again enjoyed by the theological students when first a special building was erected for the Seminary at Mercersburg, and the institution was removed to that place. Evidently a peculiar character belonged to the life of the Seminary during its years at Mercersburg, and a peculiar influence was exerted upon its students, by reason of the fact that they were then, during their theological course, associated together, living their lives and doing their work, from day to day, under one roof, as members of one household or family. Since the removal of the Seminary to Lancaster, its students have not until now possessed this advantage. They have lodged and lived apart; they have labored separately and individually; they have had, properly speaking, no common life. During these years, this Seminary has, we believe, been alone in the matter of possessing no Dormitory and no Refectory. This great want has now at last been supplied. The students have been gathered together; they have been brought out of individualism into collectivism; they shall no longer dwell in the "solitary places," but shall henceforth be members together of one household, lodging and living under one roof, breaking bread at one table, spending in daily companionship with each other the three years of their course of theological study. The erection of these additional buildings, the restoration to its students, after so many years, of the advantages of a common household life, is a great and memorable forward step in the history of this Theological Seminary.

I may perhaps be permitted to make this one personal remark. I did not want to deliver this address; for certain rea-



sons I asked to be excused; I was not excused; I have endeavored to perform the duty assigned me in such manner as was possible. I make the remark simply for the sake of adding that, perhaps, after all, it may not seem unmeet that these words should be spoken by one whose father was a student in this Seminary almost in its first days, at York; who, thirty-odd years later, was himself a student in it at Mercersburg; and whose son, thirty-odd years later, became a student in the same at Lancaster. Representing thus, in some sense, the past, the present and the future, it may perhaps be considered appropriate for such an one to extend congratulations, on this important occasion, to those to whose labors and cares the Church is indebted for the accomplishment of this great work, and to all the friends of the Seminary who to-day rejoice in the accomplishment of it; to the members of the Board of Trustees of the Seminary; to the members of its Faculty and its Board of Visitors; to these, especially, to whom was specially committed the work of carrying out the plans proposed, and who gave so generously of their time and labor for the fulfilment of them; to all who contributed of their means for the erection of these beautiful buildings; to the architect, contractors and workmen, to the work of whose minds and whose hands they will stand as a noble monument.

May this Theological Seminary, now fully equipped for its work, continue, by the faithful performance of that work, to be, in the future as it has been in the past, a blessing to the Church to which it belongs. May it never forget its humble beginnings, nor the practical purpose for which it was established, nor the labors and sacrifices of those by whom it was founded. May it never cease to earn what it has inherited. May it hold fast its faith in God and its faith in the people. May it magnify its office, maintaining the necessity, the dignity, the honor of the great work of theological instruction. May it teach a sound theology; but may it never make the mistake of substituting theology, the philosophy of religion, for religion itself. May it always remember that theology exists

for the sake of religion, and not religion for the sake of theology; and that its students are sent forth, not to make theologians, but simply to make Christians, of the people to whom they minister.

Thus, animated by the spirit and purpose by which the founders of it were actuated, and deriving new life and inspiration now from this auspicious event in its history, may this Theological Seminary go forward in its beneficent course, and, being blessed of God, may it, in its relation to the Church to which it belongs, be a blessing, more and more, from generation to generation.

HAGERSTOWN, MD.

## II.

### ELDER JACOB Y. DIETZ.

JAMES CRAWFORD.

Under the authority of the Board of Trustees of the Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church, it is my privilege to name this beautiful Refectory "Dietz Hall," as a memorial to the late Jacob Y. Dietz, a soldier of the Civil War, merchant of Philadelphia, elder in Christ Church, a Christian man.

It is fitting that the name thus given to it should meet the approval of the friends of the Seminary, and command the respect of the professors and students who will gather here, that the personality and estimable qualities of the man should be identified with his name; that it should foster ideals for exalted strivings.

The master-builder, architect and artist have here created a monumental work of art—a thing of beauty to be a joy forever, but,—and here I am reminded of that familiar Ascension hymn, left unfinished for a time by its author as if its completion had been beyond his power, when a friend by chance reading it took his pen and gave it "the finishing touch" when he wrote:

Clapped their triumphant wings, and cried:  
"The glorious work is done."

And so at that point where the builders ceased their work and could go no farther, the Board of Trustees put "the finishing touch" to it, when they gave it a name which breathed into this Refectory the breath of life, creating the sense of a living presence, of a personality, character and example for the ennobling of the young men of our Seminary.

At the funeral of the late President McKinley the minister who interpreted his character said that it could only be appreciated by those who entered into the interior of his life. This, too, must be our point of view in estimating the character of the man who is here honored to-day.

It has been said that in the texture of the ropes used in the naval service there is always a peculiarly colored thread visible which indicates them as the property of the Government. In like manner throughout the career of Jacob Y. Dietz a single trait of character was conspicuous, somewhat as we speak of the loving John, the impulsive Peter, the doubting Thomas, the guileless Nathanael, or to come to our own times, of the humor of Lincoln, the silence of Grant and the irascibility of Stanton. The one trait which distinguished Jacob Y. Dietz was *conscientiousness*, which stamped the labors of his life with the marks of sincerity, steadfastness and thoroughness. If the man after whom this Refectory is named could speak to the young men who will frequent this hall (and through his name he will speak), he would urge them to render conscientious service in the privacy of their studies, in the classroom, in the use of their time, and in the formation of their habits. Those whose mission it is to teach and train others ought themselves to be receptive to the admonitions of men who have proved themselves to be safe guides. Throughout his life he rendered honest service. For example: In early life, whilst his companions in service idly lounged waiting for the coming of customers he busied himself making the goods for sale attractive to them when they did come. There was no taint of politic calculation in his service. He could not do otherwise.

The feeling which characterized the young clerk became the ruling passion of the soldier's service, and in recognition of his merit as a soldier he returned to the duties of private life as Major Jacob Y. Dietz.

When, as a young man scarcely possessing a dollar to his name, a friend spoke of a promising vacancy in a downtown business firm, it was natural for him to say: "For me it is im-

possible," since thousands of dollars were requisite as the needed capital. "But," said his friend, "give me your note for the amount; that will be sufficient." Offers of that sort are rare, but his friend knew that it was offered to an unusual young man. It was timidly but gratefully accepted. The firm which he entered became and is now one of the largest manufacturing corporations in the country, of which he became the principal and most honored member.

Upon the transfer of his membership from the First to Christ Church, he became superintendent of the Sunday School, a teacher of the Young Men's Bible Class and elder of the congregation, serving acceptably in these positions to the day of his death.

"This one thing I do," said St. Paul, and in the doing of it he has filled the Christian world with his fame. In recognition of the faithfulness based on that one thread of character, our friend's name is crowned with honor through this memorial henceforth to be known as "Dietz Hall."

PHILADELPHIA, PA.

### III.

## REPLY TO THE ADDRESSES OF DEDICATION BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES.

JOHN W. APPEL, ESQ.

There is great cause for congratulation and rejoicing in these dedicatory services.

They mean that the hopes and aspirations of a half century have been realized.

"Hope deferred maketh the heart sick, but when the desire cometh it is a tree of life."

It is this tree of life, back of brick and mortar, that we are consecrating to-day; and we have a just right to rejoice and be glad. And I verily believe, that, as we engage in these services, we are compassed about by a cloud of witnesses in the heavenly world who are rejoicing with us.

It is now only about a year and a half since work was commenced on these new buildings.

Ground was broken on Thursday, May 11, 1916. The contract was signed on October 4, 1916, providing for the completion of the buildings by July 15, 1917, at a cost, not including heat, plumbing and electrical work, of \$61,487.00. Notwithstanding war prices and difficulties in transportation of materials, the entire group of buildings is now approaching completion, at a cost of from \$110,000 to \$115,000. It was a stupendous undertaking because it involved not merely the matter of the construction of the buildings, but practically also the raising of all the money therefor.

I am perhaps giving away a secret when I tell you that when the ground was broken, aside from the subscription of \$1,000 by the graduating class in the Seminary, there was scarcely a dollar in sight, and the same conditions prevailed even when

the contract was signed. The work was begun in faith; but, like the man who prayed for fair weather but took his umbrella with him, we provided in the contract that it should "be deemed executory only to the extent of the moneys available."

But our confidence in the Church was not misplaced; and as a result we have before us to-day a group of buildings unsurpassed by any of their class anywhere. And the money has all been raised, or pledged, except about ten or fifteen thousand dollars.

There never was a more popular project before the Church. There were some large and generous gifts, but the money has been raised mainly by small contributions, a fact which sufficiently attests the interest of the people generally in the movement.

Forty of the fifty rooms in the Dormitory have been paid for by individual persons and congregations, at prices ranging from \$1,000 to \$1,500. These individual gifts, each and every one, are highly appreciated.

The "Lounge," a most attractive room on the ground floor of the Dormitory, was generously donated by Mr. and Mrs. F. W. Biesecker, of Somerset, Pa.; the fireplace and the tile floor are the gift of Salem Church, Doylestown, Rev. L. V. Hetrick, pastor.

The Arcade connecting the Dormitory with the Refectory is the gift of St. John's Church, Shamokin, Pa., Rev. Charles B. Schneder, pastor.

The very rare and handsome Bible mantel in the Refectory was designed and contributed by Dr. Henry C. Mercer, of Doylestown, Pa. It is one of the most unique and interesting features of this building, and deserves, as it receives, our sincere gratitude.

The rooms in the Library Extension and the large bronze tablet to be placed at the entrance are the generous gifts of a number of individuals and congregations, whose names they will bear.



The Refectory has been most appropriately named "Dietz Hall," after one of the sainted dead of our denomination, whom no one knew but to love.

The largest contribution received was the gift of \$25,000 in the form of an annuity from the widow and daughters of Walter F. Richards, of Maxatawny Township, Berks County, Pennsylvania, in recognition and appreciation of which the board of trustees have most fittingly named the Dormitory the "Walter F. Richards Hall." This gift coming at the time it did made the building of the Dormitory an assured fact.

For these and all other gifts, both large and small, the board desires here and now to make public acknowledgment and to express its thanks and appreciation.

I should fail to express my own personal feelings, however, as well as those of the board of trustees, if I did not at this time say a word in recognition of the invaluable, self-sacrificing labors and services of the man who has been the acknowledged Atlas of the whole Dormitory movement, the man whose name is deservedly upon every one's tongue on this day of jubilee—(need I name him?) Dr. John C. Bowman, the beloved President of our Seminary. His was the faith that never faltered, his was the hand that never lagged, his were the zeal and inspiration that made these beautiful additions to our Seminary possible. That he may live long to enjoy these fruits of his labors, is the wish of his old friend and companion.

Neither should we fail to call attention to the work of his co-laborers, the Rev. W. Stuart Cramer, and Rev. W. F. De Long, and of the members of the faculty; and the pastors and laymen generally throughout the Church, as well as friends outside of the Church.

Appreciative mention must also be made of the untiring labors of the building committee under whose supervision and care the work has been so successfully brought to completion; and last, but not least, we desire to express our gratitude for their very efficient services, to the contractor, H. L. Wiant, and the architect, Hugh McLellan, of the firm of Dillon, McLellan

and Beadel, of New York. These men both have taken a deep personal interest in the enterprise from beginning to end. To the architect, especially, are we indebted for many of the artistic designs and finishings of the buildings.

From this day forth these buildings stand consecrated to a most holy cause—the cause of the Christian ministry.

We now have the rooms; let it be the effort of the Church to see to it that they are filled with students. There never was a time when the call was as loud for students for the ministry as at the present. The Werewolf is abroad in the world and he must be crushed. Our best young men are needed in the Theological Seminaries as well as in the trenches. The army of Christ is fighting for the cause of human freedom as much as the armies of the nations. And if these buildings, dedicated to-day, serve to stimulate the enlistment of more of our young men into this army of Christ, as we pray they may, then indeed they shall not have been builded in vain.

LANCASTER, PA.

#### IV.

ADDRESS DELIVERED IN CONNECTION WITH  
THE UNVEILING OF A TABLET IN MEMORY  
OF THE REV. PROFESSOR FREDERICK  
AUGUSTUS GAST, D.D., LL.D., SANTEE  
HALL, LANCASTER, PENNSYLVANIA,  
OCTOBER 18, 1917.

CHARLES B. SCHNEDER.

The unveiling of this memorial tablet in honor of the distinguished scholar, the faithful teacher, and the dear true friend whose name is inscribed thereon, and its presentation to the Board of Trustees of the Seminary, constitute an event so interesting and so important that its memory and its message should long linger with us for inspiration and unselfish devotion to the interests of God's Kingdom.

The event is of great interest because in the placing of this tablet we honor the memory of one who, by his sound learning, by his unselfish devotion and service, by his unwavering faith, and especially by his Christlike simplicity of life, brought great honor, not only to this Seminary, but to our Church as a whole, and, in a degree, to the entire Christian world.

Moreover, this event is of interest because it is an expression of high regard and genuine affection. Dr. Gast was held in high regard by us because we knew him as a man who earnestly sought after truth in a broadminded, manysided way. He sought after truth for its own sake and that he might apply it honestly and wisely in relation to the unfolding life of God's Kingdom.

We had a high regard for him as a teacher, for he always gave us the best and the latest that research and scholarship could furnish in reference to the subjects under consideration.

He was kind and patient. The subjects which he taught were not always popular with all the students, but we always felt that *the man was vastly larger than the subject taught* and therefore always worth our while.

Strong as he was as scholar and thinker, able as teacher and preacher, there was that in his life in the presence of which high regard rose to genuine affection. *We loved him, for he was a lovable man.* Of him we can say as has been said of the distinguished Horace Bushnell, "In the sanctuary of his inner self, there ever dwelt a prayerful, magnanimous, loving spirit toward God and man." To this loving spirit in him our hearts were compelled to give response, and we were all made richer and better through it. That this spirit of loving response has not been quenched in our hearts is evidenced by the fact that in more than a hundred letters written by as many alumni in connection with the placing of this tablet, reference is made to Doctor Gast in kindest and most loving terms. And invariably the reference is to that which he was *as a man and a friend.* This does not indicate depreciation of his eminent learning, his manysided accomplishments and broad culture; but it does indicate that beauty and consistency of life and character are more highly regarded than intellect, and that what a man *is* counts for more than that which he can *do*.

This event, however, is not only interesting; it is likewise important. Its importance lies first of all in that it is a beautiful recognition of the self-sacrifice, the loyalty and the devotion of Doctor Gast in his relation to this Seminary and to the Church under whose authority it was founded. He lived his life into this school, and made it his beneficiary at his death. The sacrifices which he made for its interests were equalled only by the loyalty and devotion with which he fulfilled his mission in its life and history. There were times when conditions were very discouraging. Salaries were small, needed buildings were slow in coming, and equipment was conspicuous on account of the want of it. He might readily have secured other and better positions had he chosen to do so. But

he chose to remain with our own beloved school, and it is an act of simple justice to honor his memory by placing this tablet as we are doing this day.

This event is important, too, in the sense that in it there is a message of encouragement and inspiration. It calls to mind the life and the love of our sainted teacher and friend. The precious influences of the hours spent in his classroom and home are renewed, and in it all there is a call to renewed consecration to the interests of God's Kingdom at this time of world turmoil and confusion, so that to the very utmost we may magnify, as he magnified, the life and the abiding truth of the Gospel of Jesus Christ.

In placing this tablet in sacred memory of Doctor Gast we therefore are simply striving in a modest, yet appropriate way, to give permanent expression of our thankful appreciation of what his life and ministry meant for us who were privileged to sit at his feet and learn of him; for our beloved Seminary in days that were dark and difficult; for our Church in her mission and ministry; and for God's Kingdom in its wider aspect.

Wherefore, now, on behalf of the alumni of the Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church in the United States, I present this memorial tablet to you, its Board of Trustees, in the hope that you will accept it at our hands, and that to you, to all its professors, and to coming generations of students it may signify, at least in a small degree, our grateful appreciation of the beautiful life, Christlike character, and self-sacrificing service of our sainted teacher and friend, Rev. Frederick Augustus Gast, D.D., LL.D.

V.

ADDRESS OF ACCEPTANCE IN CONNECTION  
WITH THE UNVEILING OF THE GAST  
MEMORIAL TABLET.

IRWIN HOCH DELONG.

In the name of the board of trustees of the Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church in the United States I accept at your hands this memorial tablet which you, as the representative of the Alumni Association of the Seminary, place here, in Santee Hall, to the memory of a universally beloved teacher, the Rev. Frederick Augustus Gast, D.D., LL.D.

In accepting this memorial tablet I am reminded of the fact that Dr. Gast was connected with this Theological Seminary for a period of little more than forty-five years, from November, 1871, to February, 11, 1917, the date of his death. This is a period of professorial service longer than that of any of his predecessors. In this connection I am also reminded that it was a peculiar satisfaction to Dr. Gast, in his later years, that it was given to him to serve the Seminary for so long a period of time. Forty-five years of service is truly a long period of service. To bring this just a little more vividly before us who are here assembled, I call attention to the fact that when Dr. Gast was appointed a tutor in the Seminary, in the year 1871, two members of the present faculty had not as yet seen the light of day, while a third was still an infant in his mother's arms. These three, however, as well as the other two members of the faculty, passed through Dr. Gast's classroom as students of his. Truly, Dr. Gast served the Seminary for a long period of time.

But now, in the second place, Dr. Gast served the Seminary not only during a long period of time, but also by giving

liberally of his limited means to the support and furtherance of the work of the Seminary. For example, by his last will and testament he not only gave his valuable library to the institution but he also endowed two alcoves in the Library, of one thousand dollars each. The income of these funds is to be used to purchase books on Old Testament subjects. And in addition to this he bequeathed a sum of money, amounting to about fifteen thousand dollars, to the general library fund. It is a fact therefore that Dr. Gast is one of the largest individual contributors to the Seminary throughout its history hitherto.

I am reminded, however, not only of his long period of service and of his financial contributions, but also of the distinctive character of his service as a teacher and as a scholar. He was Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Science. In the history of Old Testament Science he is and ever will be an acknowledged pioneer of the new method of the study of the Scriptures in this country: Lower Criticism and Higher Criticism. In our own Church and more particularly in this Seminary he is accredited with having led us, without any perturbation, from the old view to the new view of the Scriptures. He helped us to see what the Old Testament really is, that it is indeed what, for example, a New Testament author said about it, "profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness: that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works." He helped us to see, as we never had seen it before, that it stresses with powerful emphasis, as one of the essentials of religion: Do justly, love mercy and walk humbly with God at all times and in all places.

In the fourth place I am reminded of the outstanding characteristics of Dr. Gast as a man: he was humble and modest and a lover of his fellowman, regardless of race, color, rank or station in life.

By an influential minister in one of our sister denominations Dr. Gast is said to have been humble and modest almost to a fault. I myself have said more than once, in public and in private, since he is no longer with us, that whenever I think of



Dr. Gast I am reminded of what was said of the man Moses, in the Old Testament book of Numbers, by a later writer: "The man was very meek above all the men which were upon the face of the earth." As the Old Testament, the book which he taught us, enjoins, Dr. Gast himself walked with God, through life, humbly, modestly, devoutly.

Then too he was a lover of mankind, the like of which I never knew. He loved us his students. That no one ever questioned. We all felt it. But his love was not limited to his students. For some years I was intimately associated with him officially, commensally and in other ways, perhaps as intimately as it is possible for two men to be associated, and so I came to know him not only in his relations to his students and to his colleagues, but also in his relations to his fellow-men in general. I saw him make friends easily and naturally with all classes of people, regardless of their rank, station, age, color or race. He seemed to be no respecter of persons, nor of the common social distinctions as such. To him there was apparently neither Jew nor Greek, barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free, but in each and every one he saw the image of his Maker and a brother-man in the real sense of the term.

May this memorial tablet, which you place here to-day with loving hands in the name of the Alumni Association of the Seminary, and which I now accept at your hands to be henceforth the property of this institution, pass on to future undying generations of professors, students and friends of this Seminary not only the memory of the length and character of the service of a universally beloved teacher, but also the memory of these noble qualities of his soul and life to the everlasting good of this Seminary in particular and of the Church and the Kingdom in general! And may we of the present generation lay to heart also in this connection the thought of the quotation from Goethe, quoted just now by Dr. Kieffer in his dedicatory address in another connection: "Was du ererbt von deinen Vätern hast, erwirb es um es zu besitzen." God grant it!

LANCASTER, PA.

## VI.

### THE ADDRESS AT THE UNVEILING OF THE PORTRAIT OF PROFESSOR JOHN C. BOWMAN, D.D.

W. STUART CRAMER.

In unveiling and presenting to the Theological Seminary the portrait of Prof. John Calvin Bowman, D.D., it is both remarkable and fitting that it be exposed to view by Mr. D. S. Rench. Mr. Rench enjoys unrivaled distinction in his representations here to-day. He is the only surviving elder of the Reformed Church in Shepherdstown, W. Va., where the subject of our portrait began his Christian ministry. He is the only living link between the beginning of this Theological Seminary and the present. He was a pupil of Dr. Frederick A. Rauch, who was the first instructor of theology when the Seminary was removed from York to Mercersburg in 1837. He was baptized by one of the most zealous friends of the Seminary, Rev. James R. Reilly, who visited Europe and solicited the first endowment fund of this institution, in 1825. One of the most liberal contributors to that fund was Frederick William III, King of Prussia. Mr. Rench represents the town in which lived Rev. J. C. Beecher, who succeeded in collecting a large sum of money for the Seminary in this country, at a critical time in the institution's life.

Mr. Rench, in the ninety-sixth year of his life, is therefore most appropriately assigned the task to-day of lifting the veil from the portrait of the man who is a worthy successor of the pioneers of the past, and to whom belongs the credit, as to no other, for these beautiful buildings which are the occasion of these inspiring services, Professor John Calvin Bowman, D.D., President of the Theological Seminary of the Reformed

Church in the United States, and Professor of Practical Theology.

This portrait is the gift of the late Harry S. Williamson. I have been appointed by his family to represent him and them in presenting it to this Seminary. Mr. Williamson, a member of the Presbyterian Church, maintained a relationship to this community greater than denominational limitations. Every worthy endeavor in behalf of religion and civic and social betterment enjoyed his liberal patronage. Our own Franklin and Marshall College, as well as this Theological Seminary, were among his many beneficences. He was a public-spirited man who always enjoyed doing any thing that would represent the spirit of this city, to which he was devoted.

Now, in the gift of this portrait of Dr. Bowman, he would represent this city, in an expression of appreciation of the high value which this community places upon the presence here of the Theological Seminary of our Church. Mr. Williamson thought that this sentiment could not better be expressed than through the gift of the portrait of the man who has poured out the oil of his life in the noble service of both leadership and practical work, in establishing this institution on a sound financial basis, and extending its equipment to the present magnificent proportions.

This institution is a great asset to this community—materially, in the light of its substantial endowment, and the men whom it brings to this city where their money is invested in education; artistically, as is evidenced by the presence here of beautiful representations of pure architecture in its buildings; morally, as the influence of its idealism in religion and conduct permeates the general life of the community; and socially, by the contact of professors and students with the homes and institutions of the city.

The thinking people of this city are not unmindful of the great advantage of such an institution. Mr. Williamson would represent that in the gift of this portrait.

Dr. Bowman, the worthy subject of this portrait, began his

active interest in this institution's equipment when, twenty-six years ago, he was appointed the chairman of the committee of the Potomac Synod to raise an endowment fund of \$35,000 for a Potomac Synod professorship. At that time he was the pastor of Emanuel Reformed Church, Hanover, Pa. One fourth of the \$35,000 fund was the gift of his own congregation.

A while later, Dr. Bowman with Dr. Cyrus J. Musser and Dr. J. H. Pannebecker and others succeeded in raising sufficient money throughout the Church to purchase these grounds and erect the beautiful Seminary building which has graced this spot for about twenty-five years. It was at that time that the Potomac Synod called Dr. Bowman to the chair of New Testament Theology. In recent years he was elected to the chair of Practical Theology by the Pittsburgh Synod.

Since his identification with this institution as a professor, through his leadership and enthusiasm, the endowment fund has been increased three-fold. These buildings, old and new, with their equipment, are the fruit of those gifts of the Church which his genial leadership inspired. I am happy to testify to-day, after about six months of service to this Seminary, under his personal direction, in soliciting money with which to build this dormitory plant, that Dr. Bowman had been in previous financial campaigns in nearly every community where I labored; I found multitudes of members of our Church who had given money to the Seminary through his solicitations; and I did not find one man who ever regretted a gift made to the Seminary, and in all cases the highest words of praise were spoken in his behalf. It seemed indeed that wherever he secured the greatest amount of money and where he solicited money most frequently, he was most highly regarded.

It has not been without reason, therefore, that Mr. Williamson, representing this city, resolved to express its appreciation of this institution through the gift of this portrait of Dr. Bowman.

In such a gift as this it could not have been otherwise than that we should have selected one of the foremost portrait artists of the state, Helen Miller Wellens, who is displaying marked talent and perpetuating, in a significant way, the artistic service of her noted ancestor, Jacob Eicholtz, our celebrated portrait painter; and her own father, Wm. H. Miller, who has the distinction of having painted the remarkable portrait of the late William U. Hensel. We regard this product of her brush as a happy and adequate portrayal of the man we delight to honor on this occasion.

The portrait mantel was conceived by H. C. Mercer and designed for this particular use. He was happy in the choice of the Biblical symbolism of the oil as the decoration of the mantel. The pouring of oil out of the rock of flint is a figure of abundance. Dr. Bowman was abundant in his life service to this great cause. This symbolism also represents our own feelings to-day, as suggested in that beautiful passage in the Psalms which speaks of the "Oil of gladness," and Isaiah who speaks of the "Oil of joy."

We indeed are all happy to participate in this particular feature of the Dormitory dedication, because our sentiments are in complete accord with those that are represented.

LANCASTER, PA.

## VII.

### ACCEPTANCE OF THE PORTRAIT.

JOHN W. APPEL.

It is with great pleasure, personally and officially, that I accept this beautiful portrait of the President of the Seminary on behalf of the Board of Trustees. It is worthy of the place assigned to it, both from the standpoint of artistic merit and the person selected for this honor.

Mrs. Kieffer, wife of Professor John B. Kieffer, once, upon meeting a man whom she knew as a boy, said: "I am glad your boyhood features have not changed; they have only matured." That is how I feel in regard to the portrait. The artist has caught the ideal of the man and I see in it the same bright eyes and clear-cut features of John Bowman, the school boy of Mercersburg, the minister of the Gospel, and the young professor, entering upon his work in the Seminary. The features have not changed, they have only matured. The exquisite color, the contrast of light and shade and the harmony and symmetry of design, make the portrait a notable one and reflect great credit upon the talented artist, Mrs. Wellens, the daughter of a distinguished portrait painter, and granddaughter of the great Eicholtz.

Somehow or other, the name of Dr. Bowman is associated with all the buildings on these grounds. It was his initiative that secured the grounds, that started the erection of the main building, Santee Hall, the Library, and now this Dormitory and Refectory. When we came to break ground for the Dormitory, we felt as though we were guilty of false pretense, and we remarked to Dr. Bowman that it did not seem right to commence this operation without any money in sight. "Oh!" he said, "we must go ahead, it will not cost anything to break

the ground, and if the Church does not respond we will let the matter lie until it does." It was his optimism that assured the erection of these buildings.

But there is another greater reason why this portrait of Dr. Bowman is appropriate in this place, namely, because of his fidelity and loyalty to the Church. From the time he pledged himself to the Church at Mercersburg, he has never faltered in his loyalty to it. No desire of money or fame could ever tempt him into other fields; and he has always been found at his post here; and the best that was in him he always gave to the Church. Knowing this, the generations of boys to come, who will meet in this room, will receive inspiration from that portrait.

I desire to congratulate Dr. Bowman upon this honor. It is an honor. And I also wish to express heartfelt thanks for, and appreciation of, the gift. The donor has passed to the great beyond. We miss his presence here to-day. His name will always be linked with that of Dr. Bowman through this portrait. He was not a member of our Church; but there was never a breach in the line anywhere in any of our educational institutions here in Lancaster that he did not fill in if he knew of it. The Church will long remember his generous benefactions to our various institutions. I accept the gift in the name of the Board of Trustees with a grateful heart.

LANCASTER, PA.

## VIII.

### "THE COMPLETION OF HUMAN LIFE THROUGH JESUS CHRIST."<sup>1</sup>

Col. 2:10.

THOS. H. LEINBACH.

The greatest fact in the history of the world is the fact of the human life of Jesus Christ. And the greatest force in the human life of the world is the religion which He founded. Upon the basis of this fact, and through the exercise of this force, life's highest ends may be reached and life's greatest possibilities realized.

St. Paul in his letter to the Colossians assures them that in Christ and His religion is the fullness of the power required to bring about their being to its full and perfect completion. That life's completion is found and must be sought for in no other than in Him who is Life's Author and Exemplar.

The immediate purpose of Paul in addressing the Colossian Christians is to refute certain errors that prevailed among them. False teachers were inducing them to live after the traditions of men rather than after the Gospel of Christ, to live according to the rudiments of the world and not according to Jesus. The perils of ritualism, spiritualism and asceticism were destroying their simple faith and trust in Christ.

Many among them believed they were filled full of God when they observed with regularity and ceremonial exactness their feast days and fast days and the Jewish rites.

Others believed that the universe was full of good and evil spirits, the former to help them, the latter to harm and punish

<sup>1</sup> A sermon preached at the opening of the annual Spiritual Conference in Lancaster, Pa., July 23, 1917, by the Rev. Thomas H. Leinbach, of Reading, Pa.



them. Life became a thing of visions and a crude form of spiritualism prevailed.

Still others—and this formed perhaps the largest class—endeavored to live their religious life after severely ascetic rules. Regarding matter as evil they sought to exalt the soul at the expense of the body.

To these varied false religious tendencies and practices Paul refers. He warns against the ritualists who are forever insisting on the rite of circumcision and are placing unwarranted value on their new moons and Sabbaths.

He warns against the spiritualists, who in their system of belief placed man very low and God very high and filled the vast gulf between with a long chain of angel mediators.

But the great Colossian heresy against which he proclaimed was that form of false teaching which was enticing men back to the trammels of an outward asceticism, back to the fetters of a former religious bondage. Men substituted various ascetic abstinencies for trust in Christ. They thus practically denied the dignity and saving power, the lordship and sovereignty of Christ.

Over against all this Paul with great earnestness and much zeal unfolds to them the Person and work of Christ. He endeavors to persuade them that the ideal for Christian life and practice is Jesus.

In Jesus' life we have the perfect model of goodness. In His teaching we find the highest wisdom. In His works there is manifest the deepest love. In His glorification appears the truest revelation of man's destiny—"Ye are complete in Him."

In the consideration of our theme we are confronted with two great fundamental truths of revelation. The first is that man in his natural state is incomplete. The second is that Jesus Christ is the one perfect complete life. Our purpose is to inquire how can man imperfect and incomplete in Christ be made complete and whole. Nothing less than this is the aim and purpose of God.

The natural life of man is sinful, vain and empty. That life hid with Christ in God is to have new meaning and real content. For this Jesus came into the world that he might give life and give it more abundantly. The religion of Jesus Christ is not subtraction from but an addition to life. It is intended to make life richer, fuller, freer, nobler.

Perfection and nothing less is the end of Christianity. The perfect man of the New Testament is the man of full growth, of rightly developed manhood. Perfection of character is the minimum demand of the New Testament. And this demand can be supplied in and through the one complete and perfect man of the New Testament. Jesus himself says: "Ye shall be perfect." Whether this word is a command or a promise matters naught. I believe it is both—a command that challenges obedience, a promise that shall be fulfilled. But the fulfillment of the promise will depend upon the spirit of obedience by which we endeavor to rise unto the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ—"Ye are complete in Him."

1. Jesus makes possible life's completion by giving us first of all a right conception of life itself. Life is the gift of God. He hath made us and we are His. Life comes from God and is intended to flow back to God. The great Revelation of life is Jesus Christ. The true interpreter of human life is the Man of Nazareth. He reveals unto us life's true aims and purposes and possibilities. He understands life's meaning. He gives us life's perspective, estimates life's value. Our viewpoint of life must be derived from Him.

Whence is this life of mine? What is it to be? Whither must it tend? The answer to questions like these must be determined according to Jesus, who is the life and light of men.

Men sometimes speak of life as a tragedy. Now there may be tragedy in life, but to picture life as tragedy is to speak of it as something that moves on toward calamity.

Dante's great epic is called a comedy because it closed in a glorious vision of God. But in tragedy we move through love and hate and passion and joy and sorrow to death. The end

of life in the thought of God is not death. It is life, the higher life—nay the highest life.

And yet the mood or temper that speaks of the tragedy of life abounds on every hand. It is popularized in many of our modern novels. It is portrayed on the moving-picture screen.

Human life thus depicted with hopes blighted, and faith gone, with the actors on the stage of human existence going out in dark despair, is not life as interpreted by Jesus. The belief that the world is hurrying into the darkness, that man is the instrument of fate, a helpless pawn on the chess-board of the universe is inspired by Him who kills and destroys, not by Him who creates and completes life.

2. In the second place Jesus makes possible life's completion by giving us the true purpose of life. Life is for service. The end of a man's existence is not in himself. The end of a man's existence is found in the fulfillment of the purpose for which he was created. Thus man becomes complete. A thing is complete when it serves the purpose for which it was made. The Christian man is man at his best. That man is at his best who does his best for the life of the world.

Jesus tells us the story of a man who was more than ordinarily successful in his life. And yet his life is amazingly empty and incomplete. So much so that Jesus brands him as a fool. The man was industrious and honest. He knew how to make money. He understood farming, but he did not understand life. He had a calculating mind, but in making his calculations, he failed to take into account life's true end or purpose.

3. Jesus makes possible life's completion by giving men power. He is not only the surest revealer of God, the greatest Exemplar of man of the perfect complete life, but also the best dynamic for its attainment. In Him who is all fullness of power we are made strong. Hence Paul says: "I can do all things through Him who strengtheneth me."

The great ocean rolling in upon the indented shore-line fills the creeks and bays until every little indentation and crevice

and creek along the coast is filled with the ocean tide. And so the great ocean of Christ's might and power fills men's lives, and makes every man who hungers and thirsts after the living God, able to will and to do His good pleasure.

If, as Phillips Brooks says, "the building of the perfect man is the noblest work man can do," we must summon to the task His own divine power. We must be like Him, but we cannot be save as He makes us. The willing mind and the loving heart are His inspiration. We can do what He would have us do by His might and power. We can be what He would have us be by His grace and help.

God's undoubted purpose is to purify and make perfect the human soul. Hence He gave His Son that He might redeem us from all that is evil and make us to be partakers in all that is good.

We are sometimes reminded that Jesus was the great Teacher. But the Apostles never gloried in that. He is presented to men's thought as a great reformer, philanthropist, martyr, and He was all that. But the Bible refuses to characterize Him thus. The distinguishing mark put upon Him by this Word of God is that of Redeemer. What Matthew, Mark, Luke, John, Paul and all the writers of the New Testament insist upon is that He died and that He died for our sins.

The Lamb of God died to take away the sin of the world and make possible the completion of the world's life—which completing process moves forward in the degree that the vitiating, destructive power of sin is taken away. The Second Adam appears more completely as the first Adam disappears more fully. In Him our sins are forgiven. In Him we are quickened unto a new life. In Him we find the realization of the perfect complete life. In Him we have the perfect sacrifice for our redemption and the perfect life for our imitation.

Our modern Christianity needs an awakened sense of faith in a Christ—not simply who was nor shall be, but in a Christ who is; a Christ who is more than a memory or an expectation; a Christ ever present and active in the world of affairs

and of men; a Christ by whose power the world is being brought under the dominion and power of the most High God. In the temple of the believer's heart Christ dwells. There He works the work of God, crucifying our self-will, regenerating our being, purifying our affections, completing the soul. This is the Christ of the Gospel, the Christ of St. Paul, the Christ whom we preach, that we may, in the language of St. Paul, "present every man perfect in Christ."

We turn our attention now briefly to inquire what is meant by the phrase "in Him." "Ye are complete in Him." When may a man be said to be in Him? It is needless to say that to be in Him means far more than simply to be in His Church, to observe the Christian rites and sacraments. Ye are complete not in these things but in Him. Some seek the completion of their lives by a process of education, others by some system of self-regulation or self-government. All these help no doubt to complete, to round out, to make full and useful a man's life. But all these apart from Him leave life incomplete, unfilled and unsatisfied. The real completeness of man is to be found in the complete man Jesus.

This great truth of making Christ supreme in our faith and our practice comes home to us with renewed emphasis in this four hundredth anniversary of the Protestant Reformation. In Him, not in any ritual or ordinance, not in any man or set of men, not in any creed or theological formula, not in a book nor in an institution, however good the book or holy the institution—but in Him the believer is made complete. To this I am sure we all give ready assent. And yet I wish to raise the question in passing whether the Church in this completing process of human life in the world receives the emphasis she deserves and the recognition she merits?

Again is there not too much thought of the Church in our day, as something separate from and independent of and sometimes even unrelated to Christ? Has the Church lost her rightful claim as the one great agent of the Christ in the spiritual development of the world's life? So some say. Has the

need of the Church been outgrown? So some would have us believe. We humbly but fervently protest. The separation of Christ and His Church in thought or practice is productive of much harm. To divorce the Bride from the Bridegroom does not make for righteousness, but does produce many spiritual orphans.

To be complete in Christ requires that we be completely in Him. We do not believe that any one can consistently claim to be in Christ who is persistently indifferent and even hostile to the Church. As some one said, "A man can be a Christian outside the Church, but not a very good Christian." The Church is divinely pledged to bring the life of Jesus into saving relationship with the life of the world. She is the manifest expression of the principality and power of which He is the Head. She is the chosen vessel by which God, through His Son, would pour forth His own divine life, that human life may become more divine and complete.

For completing the mind we have the school, for completing the body the gymnasium. Shall the Church be assigned an inferior place in the God-given task of completing the souls of men?

It is the great work of the Church to endeavor to personally relate the individual man in a personal way to the personal Christ, and to do this until every man shall make the service of Christ the business of his life, Christ's will his law, Christ's presence his joy, Christ's glory his crown. Thus the world's life will be saved, made whole, completed.

If "the Reformation in Germany was the spiritual biography of Luther writ large, a spiritual experience materialized in institutions and intellectualized in confessions," is it too much for the believing Christian to hope for a world-wide reformation and a complete Christianization through the compelling, constraining, consecrating power of Christ applied to the life of men and of nations. May we not indulge in the hope that even now the world at war is passing through the death-pangs of a new birth?

"It is clear," said President Wilson, "that nations must in the future be governed by the same high code of honor that we demand of individuals."

The completion of the world's life can not take place until the completing process of Christ's life permeates more fully the life of nations.

Henry Churchhill King, in his recent book on *Fundamental Questions*, tells of an international social gathering of the Y. W. C. A. of Boston. At the meeting some one said, Can we not sing something together? How can we, replied another, when we all speak a different language? But, suggested a French girl, the tunes are the same and there ought to be a tune we all know, even if we have to sing different words. Everybody knows "Holy Night," said a woman of large musical ability, born in Russia, of English and German parentage, and with near relatives in each of the three armies. She sat down at the piano and began to play the song. An American concert singer with a rare voice stood by and led. One after another the others joined, till French, Swiss, German, Austrian, Belgian, Pole, Russian, Italian were all singing together the same message to the same music but each in her own tongue.

If all the nations of the earth start from Christ, the nations will come into harmony, and out of the present discord will come the sweet concord of a new civilization. For that new civilization we fondly hope and fervently pray. But that new civilization will only come and be complete and lasting when the nations of the earth shall be brought into universal peace under the banner of Christ and when human life and all nations and all governments shall have become more completely and genuinely Christian.

READING, PA.



## IX.

### APEX OR BASE?

BERNARD C. STEINER.

No problem of political science is greater or more difficult of solution than the establishment of a stable state. How shall men organize a government which shall endure? How may a nation become a permanent entity? How shall an end be put to the long roll of "empires" "of old that went and came"? Are the governments of the earth perpetually to be in a state of flux, as the philosopher of old time taught all nature was? Must each existing nation look forward to the prospect of some of Macauley's New Zealanders, considering the political organizations of to-day, as we look back upon Carthage and Tyre? These questions are not completely answerable, nor is the problem one which can accurately be solved, but it is surely of value to gaze back upon the past and see what a philosophic study of history may teach by examples from former times. The matter is all the more surprising and difficult, because men have again and again considered that they had established a stable state and that their workmanship would endure, yet a later age has seen the results of their efforts crumble into dust and oblivion.

Another cognate question also presses for solution. We may grant that no state may be assured of ultimate stability, that the seeds of disintegration may have been sown already in a political organization, though it seems strong and flourishing, that the biological analogy of youth, manhood, and old age is as true of the state as of the men who are its subjects or citizens. While we may admit this natural law in the political world, we would ascertain what form of governmental organization has most promise of permanence, and how the com-



ing on of old age may best be postponed. If we dare not be dogmatic and say that thus and so may a permanently stable state be formed; nor prophetic enough to proclaim that any existing form of government, or any modification thereof, will endure as long as man exists on earth; we may at least make our guess, on the bases both of theory and experience, that certain ideas have more solidity and promise of permanence within them than others have. The great centripetal forces bringing men together may surely be applied, in some way or other, so as to offer the maximum possible resistance to the marvellously strong centrifugal forces, whose pull has been so strong as to disrupt the powerful states of the past.

Before we set forth any theory of a stable state, let us glance at some of the answers which men have given in the past to the question. We shall find that, just as Aristotle made certain basic divisions of forms of government, which classification modern schools have modified but not cast aside, so the ancient attempts to solve the problem of a stable state embrace almost all the main theories which are held to-day.

Half a dozen ancient nations made as many different attempts to establish a stable state. The Egyptians based theirs upon a hierarchy. They combined religion and government, placing power largely in the hands of a priestly class, who were the intermediaries between the common people and the gods they worshipped. For centuries, even for millenniums, this state continued, protected by the geographical position of the land, as well as by the careful organization of the people, but it finally fell before the march of Alexander's legions. Its success was possible only with an ignorant and superstitious people.

Assyria attempted to found an empire upon a military despotism and learned that, while a despot is one of the strongest of rulers, no one can secure an unlimited succession of strong despots and that such an autocracy has less promise of endurance than a hierarchy, where the college of priests is recruited from a group of families, rather than from one family

alone, and where, consequently, there is more probability of finding a succession of able men to administer the state. The Assyrian tried, by a policy of frightfulness and by an extensive use of deportation of the inhabitants from countries occupied by his army, to render his rule complete and his state stable. He abandoned the policy of a self-contained state, such as Egypt, and initiated the idea of a world empire. He failed, as have all his successors in this attempt. His pyramid of government was erected on too narrow a base. It balanced a while on its apex and terrified the earth, when Sennacherib "came down like the wolf on the fold," but then it toppled over with a crash, foretold by the prophet Nahum. Who that has read them can forget his terrible denunciations and the absolute truth of their fulfillment! "And it shall come to pass that all that look upon thee shall flee from thee and say: Nineveh is laid waste, who will bemoan her, whence shall I ask comforters for her?"

The Jewish solution seemed more hopeful. The state was to be a patriarchal theocracy with the Lord Jehovah as the ruler, but the people's religious life was not sufficiently steadfast, nor their moral life sufficiently high, to make the carrying out of the theory a successful one. The sad formula of the writer of Judges tells us of the failure, more clearly than any other writer has done. "The people served Jehovah all the days of Joshua and all the days of the elders that outlived Joshua, who had seen all the great works of Jehovah that he did for Israel. . . . And there arose another generation after them which knew not Jehovah, nor yet the works which he had done for Israel. And the children of Israel did evil in the sight of Jehovah and served Baalim. . . . And the angel of Jehovah was hot against Israel and he delivered them into the hands of spoilers that spoiled them and he sold them into the hands of their enemies round about. . . . Nevertheless, Jehovah raised up judges, which delivered them out of the hands of those that spoiled them." Though they have been called a people with a "genius for religion" above that possessed by

other nations, the Hebrews, after some centuries of alternations of repentance, restoration to Divine Favor, and declension to a lower ethical and religious level, asked a king, in the hope that they might have a more stable state. Although the institution of monarchy, undoubtedly, gave additional cohesion to the tribes and enabled them to overcome their enemies round about, the ruler's position changed, so that, from being merely Jehovah's vice-gerent, he became an oriental potentate, differing little in power and authority from the rulers of the neighboring nations. The kingship was a centripetal influence, tending towards stability in the Jewish State; but the centrifugal forces which led the Jews away to worship the deities of Moab and Sidon were also strong. Again, the kingship did not even hold the whole of the tribes together. Under Jereboam, the main part of the country broke away from the rule of David's grandson. The northern kingdom was the larger and stronger, but its lack of stability was shown in its changes of dynasty and its vacillating religious and foreign policies. The Southern kingdom had more stability, keeping the Davidic line upon the throne and falling away less often and less completely to the worship of Baal and Ashtaroth, but it failed to maintain a high moral standard and a consistent devotion to Jehovah and passed away amid the Lamentations of Jeremiah. That prophet, however, had the prescience, in the midst of the downfall, to enunciate the new principle that "the soul that sinneth it shall die," that the "fathers shall not suffer for the sins of the children, nor the children for the sins of the fathers." In this principle, lie the seeds of toleration of individual opinions as to worship and of religious liberty.

The Jewish theory is as little likely to be tried again as is the Egyptian. The generality of men do not feel the nearness of God to man and do not have the sense of of immediate dependence upon him, which are needed for the establishment of a theocratic form of government.

The Greeks essayed another solution. Their states were to be stable, because they were city states. They called them

democracies, but, with the population of slaves far exceeding that of freemen, they had almost as much of an aristocratic aspect as of a democratic one. Each state should be small enough in area for all the voters who constituted the governing body to come together in frequent periodic meetings, not only for the election of officers, but also for the determination of matters of governmental policy. The Athenians attempted to found their empire on the basis of this city state, but the failure of the Delian confederacy showed that the foundation was too narrow for a stable superstructure and, in the next century, the work of Philip of Macedon proved that the city state had not enough stability to enable it to resist a powerful exterior aggressor.

Alexander the Great well deserves his name. He had watched the empire of the Persians, which had inherited the Assyrian tradition, he had studied the Grecian city states and had enjoyed the privilege of listening to the teachings of Aristotle. He planned to combine the Assyrian and Greek theories and so to found a stable state. Instead of deporting reluctant subject peoples, he transported willing Grecians to form subordinate city states throughout his conquered lands, over which cities and states he and his successors should rule securely. He died and his empire crumbled, while his successors, ruling in its fragments, yielded to the influence of their surroundings and became oriental despots.

In the end, Greece itself, in the Achæan and Ætolian leagues, began to abandon the city state as the ultimate solution, to adopt a federal system, to conceive of an organic union more perfect than that of the old Delphic sentimental one. The experiments were hopeful, but the might of Rome overthrew them before permanence was obtained.

Beginning with a group of patrician clans and adding to the number of the governing class by successive changes in her internal government, Rome had become a city state, with a complicated system of checks and balances in government, supplemented by dictatorships in times of need. A virile, self-

respecting people, the Romans always insisted that the dictator return the power to the republic, as soon as the emergency for which he was created had passed. The people were magnificent soldiers and had a wonderful sense of law and order. Through the system they evolved of allowing some individuals in conquered lands to receive Latin rights, and so to possess personal privileges under the Roman law, and others to receive full citizenship, with all the political advantages which came with it, they broadened the base of the pyramid. Thus they made Rome far more stable than any Greek city. Then too, by the planting of colonies of Roman soldiers in conquered lands, they made their rule firm, and extended the scope of their culture and law, while they still further completed the permanence of their sway, by securing the contentment of the peoples of the various countries within it. This contentment was secured through the superior justice of their officers in comparison with the agents of the former governments, through the preservation of order, and through the permission of the native population to use their own local laws and customs, whenever these did not contravene those of Rome. Through the prætor's edict and the conception of the *jus gentium*, there came into the *jus civile* a constant infiltration of new and wider legal concepts, making the municipal law a firm foundation of the state. Could there be a universal empire stable in its reliance upon force and law? Men long thought so, but the structure had great inherent defects. Political privileges could be exercised only at Rome, the base was too narrow for the Republic to endure, save in name, and the Empire followed. Its armies broke in vain waves against the Germans in their forests and the Parthians in their mountains, but the provincial organization was so excellent that the Empire stood for centuries, before the onrush of barbarians destroyed it in the West, and for a millennium in the East, before the incursions of Crusaders and Ottoman Turks overthrew it. This attempt to found a stable state, which seemed a success for centuries, finally failed. Rome

Left a name at which the world grew pale,  
To point a moral or adorn a tale.

China is the only other nation whose ancient attempt to form a stable state demands our attention. The theory of that people was that the state is to be based upon the family, upon an observance of a strict and enlightened ethical code, upon a quiet, firm insistence on right. "Her strength is to sit still" was the ground of the Chinese success and the meekness of that people seemed for thousands of years to assure their inheritance of the Middle Kingdom. The last half century has seen, however, the breakup of the theory upon which the Chinese had so long based their attempt to secure a stable state. The contact with countries whose governments were organized in modern fashion has shaken the Chinese from their age-long self-satisfaction and they are turning to Western lands to gain therefrom ideas which shall restore stability to their state, so sorely shaken by the results of the friction with men from Europe and America.

The Goths and Vandals, while still in a tribal condition, came down upon the lands of the Mediterranean from the North and wrested the rule of the settled country from its former possessors, and attempted to found stable states in yet another fashion. Law to them was personal, not territorial. They obeyed their Barbarian Codes, not because they lived in Gothland, but because they were Goths. Hence it was easy for them to adopt the conception of personal law and say that the Goth is to be judged by Gothic law, the Roman by Roman law. This position was the easier to assume, because the Roman law itself had held a somewhat similar position, before the privileges of Roman citizenship, including the whole *corpus* of the Roman laws, had been extended by Caracalla to all the inhabitants of the Empire. The Gothic attempt had something of hopefulness in them, but, in practice, it did not work out successfully and the states built upon it soon vanished.

The Mediæval Western Church, through its Papacy, tried to found a great temporal state on the stable base of Chris-

tianity. The pope was God's vice-gerent on earth and the election as popes of tried men of full age removed the dangers to hereditary successions from weak sons and from minor rulers. The power of the keys and that of excommunication gave a spiritual sanction to the papal decrees more potent than any earthly one. The Jewish theocracy and the Roman world empire were combined. The successors of the judges, of the high priests and of the emperors strove to rule the world from the City of the Seven Hills. That City may be eternal, but the temporal power of the popes was not. This temporal power was weakened by the Renaissance, which made the pope in Italy the head of only one of a number of contending petty states. It was deprived of its power over half of Europe by the Reformation, and of most of its strength in the part of the world that remained nominally Roman Catholic by the growth of the modern idea of statehood. When the pope became "the prisoner of the Vatican" in 1870, the last remnants of the temporal power passed away.

Feudalism took still another road to establish a stable state. It based government on military service, which was paid the state because of the occupancy and possession of land. By a carefully arranged and elaborately articulated organization of "fiefs," by a minutely developed scheme of services, it fixed the position of every man in the community—as serf, vassal, mesne-lord, or over-lord. To the men who lived under this system for generations, it seemed to be a permanent method of securing government, but it was too complicated, produced too much friction, and finally fell, when wealth became important in the community from other sources than land.

After the Reformation, we find the feudal system falling in ruins. Power had, in most cases, gravitated toward the rulers of the state. Absolutism was increasing. A sharp division occurred in the religious faith of Western Christendom. The conception of a temporal ruler, the emperor, and a spiritual ruler, the pope, which, though shadowy, had been



very influential throughout the mediæval period, had now been cast aside. Two measures were proposed. One of these stated that the ruler should determine the faith of his people—*cujus regio, ejus religio*. This was no sound basis for a stable state. The mass of the people might not agree with the ruler in his faith, he might change his belief, or the crown by descent might come to a man of another faith, while the people continued steadfast in their acceptance of their former belief. Also there was no recognition of any right in a minority.

The second principle was that fully recognized at the Peace of Westphalia, but practised for a century and a half before, namely: that the civilized European countries constituted a "family of nations," the members of which should conduct diplomatic negotiations among themselves and which should preserve an equilibrium in respect to each other, keeping the balance of power so adjusted that one country should not intrude upon the rights of another. Very unstable, indeed, has that equilibrium been and although the principle is still recognized by the peoples of the whole world, since American and Asiatic nations have been received into the family, no one considers that stability is secured to this group of states.

Holland, revolting from Spain, preserved its old provincial governments, called its federal state, the United Netherlands, and allowed freedom of religious faith and worship. First of nations, it combined federalism, representative government and religious freedom and then instituted a government resting upon the consent of the governed.

In the middle ages, the over-lord of the feudal state, in selecting delegates from his tenants to confer with him as to taxation and other governmental concerns, had given rise to representative government. This was a discovery of vast moment, the most important political contribution ever made in addition to the ideas of antiquity. From the days of William the Silent to this year of grace, the question has been, whether a state can be constructed so as to remain stable, when founded on these four basic ideas: a government resting upon



the consent of the governed, religious freedom, representative government, and federalism. When the thirteen British colonies on the continent of North America broke away from European rule and became the United States, the founders of our republic paid the closest attention to the history of the past and, concluding that the principles of universal justice were best preserved and that the probability of forming a stable state was greatest through adopting these principles, they made them the corner-stones of the edifice which they erected.

Autocracy and a purer democracy have both been set up as preferable to the American system. Louis XIV of France upheld the principles of uniformity of worship, and of a consolidated autocratic state, based on military power, but the *ancien regime* passed away and the instability of France for a century showed how mistaken he was.

Prussia also has for centuries tried to uphold an autocratic state, based on a bureaucracy and an army, and is just now at a death grapple with most of the world as a result. Those who accept the faith of the fathers of the American nation must believe that her ultimate failure to secure permanent stability upon that basis is assured. The lesson of history seems manifest and plain and the probability of success now is much less than it was when the Assyrians first made the attempt, on the road along which the German Empire, dominated by the Prussians, is following them. To oppose these measures, temporary resort to autocratic methods may be necessary. Dictatorships may be established, so that "the Republic take no harm," as the Romans said. George Washington, in a dark hour of the Revolution, for a time received great authority, Abraham Lincoln exercised war powers, Lloyd George has been put at the head of a war council; but the power is so conferred only for a brief time and, when the emergency is passed, must again be returned to the people who gave it.

The very fact of the occasional necessity of such dictatorial power is a strong argument against the truth of a phrase now often heard in the mouths of those who distrust the adequacy

of the foundations laid in the Federal Constitution—"the cure for the evils of democracy is more democracy." By this is usually meant the abolition, in greater or less degree, of all checks and balances and of the representative features of government, and the reference of the decisions of all questions to the direct determination of the voters. There are evils in the United States, there will continue to be evils in all forms of government administered by imperfect, erring men, but the sure way to remedy these evils is not to destroy the structure of government in order to get rid of them. Let us not burn the barn to kill the rats, but rather let us buy rat traps and employ ferrets and rid the barn of the vermin.

The true cure of the evils of democracy is found in a return to the principles of the founders of the Republic. On certain great principles of government—clear cut, easily defined, much thought about by men—a direct appeal to the electorate is of value and that fact is recognized in the reference of constitutions and constitutional amendments to the voters. But the vast mass of governmental determinations are not of this class and, to obtain the best results, these determinations must be made by men especially set apart to make them, who may carefully weigh considerations and compromise between two conflicting ideas, taking those features of each which seem best and most practical. The cure for the evils of democracy is better leadership, a higher standard of qualifications for official position, and a confidence in the eventual success of representative government. When the people choose fit representatives and hold them up to a high standard of moral and intellectual excellence, when men resolve to make that righteousness which exalteth a nation the aim of their government, when they insist that in the dealings of man with man, of government with citizen, and of one government with another government, there be a steady effort to secure that justice which is the constant and unvarying desire to give every man what is due him, and when, in fine, every man adopts the Golden Rule and loves his neighbor as himself, there will be a vast change in conditions

and yet, even with this change, will not the foundations of our government still endure? None of the four principles which have been enumerated would be out of place in Utopia.

It has been said by a member of the United States Senate that, in his opinion, the best hope for the coming of a world state upon a permanent basis was the existence of a model state somewhere in the world, which should have so established its stability that it could, in a manner, be a pattern to which the world state might conform. We may not dogmatize upon the future, but taking the lamp of experience as our guide and judging from the history into which the past politics of the world have solidified themselves, may not we have some grounds for hope that certain conceptions must be embodied in a state's organization to secure its stability?

Adopting the Aristotelian classification of governments we find that a monarchy may well be compared to an inverted pyramid, resting on its apex and having its equilibrium very unsteady, because it depends upon one man alone.

An aristocracy again may be likened to a pyramid resting upon a truncated apex, more stable than a monarchy in its theoretical equilibrium; but yet with its center of gravity too high for the greatest safety.

A democracy of the old pure type forms no pyramid of large size at all, for its blocks have not sufficient cohesion and there is no structural skill in its builders.

A representative republic is a complete pyramid, resting foursquare on its base and so constructed that it meets the sky at one point. It has the greatest possible stability, for its center of gravity is at the lowest possible point consistent with its height. The best hope to a state for stability seems to consist in its becoming such a "star-pointing pyramid," possessing as its four foundations: the consent of the governed, making the government democratic; a representative system, giving the people intelligent leadership by the men whom they have chosen; religious freedom, so that men may worship as they will the deity in whom they believe, or may take the

responsibility to themselves of refusing to worship any deity; and federalism, which enables local interests to be cared for by local legislative and administrative bodies, while it gives matters of broad scope to central authorities, who may devote their full attention to national affairs, and so makes possible the existence of a state covering a wide area.

BALTIMORE, MD.

## X.

### SACRED SONG IN WORSHIP.

J. HAMILTON SMITH.

Sacred song is the union of two of the noblest arts, music and poetry. It has always been thought that poetry has in it something of divineness; and the ancient myth that music was the gift of the gods to establish communication between earth and heaven has in it a measure of truth. Certainly music is one of the agencies through which we approach God.

Every Christian communion has made use of sacred song in approaching God. The only exception is the Quakers, and even the Quakers are beginning to make use of it. Indeed, the yearning to worship God through music seems to be one of the original endowments of the Creator. "There never has been a land so barbarous nor a people so polite, but have always approached their gods with the solemnity of music and expressed their devotions with a song." We are all agreed that worship is not complete without music; but there is the widest difference in the music of our churches, ranging all the way from noble music and skilled expression to music that is of little worth and wholly secular in style and flavor.

Two things, it seems to me, we ought to insist upon: the first is that the words of the hymn be genuine poetry, and the second is that the music be sacred in character.

The Hymn Book of the Church represents the experience of the Christian centuries. It is here that the Christian heart finds its fullest and sweetest expression. No words can properly express the debt which the Church owes to the Christian poets. They are the prophets of the heart, and have been as truly set apart by God for a holy ministry as the heralds of the faith. In their moments of intense feeling they see the

invisible life, the interior life from which all things spring. They see and portray this life and make us see it, and by portraying it and making us see it they make us share it. They uncover the human heart; they give definite form to the shadowy visions of our souls; they voice what we feel in our best moments, and lead to holy aspiration and voice heavenly desire. The best Christian poetry touches the heart and inspires to praise; it lifts on the wings of aspiration; it strengthens our faith. Faith, desire, praise—these are the gifts of sacred song and they are likewise important elements in genuine worship. The ministry must cultivate a true poetic taste as a help to the devotional spirit. We must see to it that we choose hymns that are more than the metrical version of devotional thought, rather hymns that are the poetic expression of religious sentiment.

It is right here that we would offer our most severe stricture upon the tons of "stuff" that are annually dumped upon the Church. It is not simply that the music is secular and sometimes wholly sensuous—though this is often true enough—it is that the words are inane, vapid, meaningless. "The singing of the Church," says Washington Gladden, "ought to be an inspiring and elevating exercise. To this end the words and the tunes sung must be poetry and music, not sentimental doggerel and rhythmical ding dong. The kind of trash which many people are condemned to sing can have no wholesome effect upon their minds and hearts. The effusive silliness of the verses is often repulsive to the mind of an intelligent child, and the manner in which words which represent great thoughts, and which should always be reverently uttered, are caught up and tossed into the air, and pitched about in the shuttlecock and battledore movement of some hymns is enough to make fools laugh and the judicious grieve. Yet so long have our Sunday Schools been fed on this kind of musical provender that it is difficult to introduce anything of a higher nature. The boy who has been reading penny-dreadfuls for a few years is not at once interested in good books." Yet my own

experience has been that when a leader of intelligence and enthusiasm for good words and good music takes up this task with a hearty good-will, the people will learn these nobler hymns and sing them with spirit.

It is well sometimes to have a choir or a school or a congregation, if they are at rehearsal, read over the words before a single note is sung. The writer has often used this method with gratifying results. It serves to make the singers grasp the meaning of the words, and will make them realize the shortcoming of the type of hymn which we have been condemning; and, indeed, it may be a revelation to the minister himself. That communion which restricts the singing in the Church service to words from the Scriptures, the Hymnal or the Prayer-book is unfortunate in that it misses some of the splendid hymns of modern writers; but it escapes the evil of the silly doggerel to which we have been referring.

The first requisite is that the words shall be genuine poetry. The next requisite is that the music shall be sacred. The office of music is not less important than that of the hymn. Music is the interpretation of a life which can be interpreted in no other way. It oftentimes springs from a life which cannot find expression in words, and stirs a life which transcends all that eye hath seen or ear heard or heart conceived or tongue spoken. Music is oftentimes more subtle and powerful than poetry in touching the feelings. It seems to lay hold on the very life of the spirit, and so has to do with the spiritual condition of worship. It serves not only to express emotion; but serves to intensify it as well.

Music in public worship has therefore a twofold function: that of expression and that of impression. Expression is first and foremost—the expression of religious feeling, adoration, thanksgiving, longing, the voice of the people to God, the voice of a glad, triumphant faith and hope. The function of impression is the minor one in music, but still of great importance. It is that of attraction, making sensitive the will and conscience through the emotions. When impression is made the

sole function the case is analogous to that of the minister preaching to his people through his prayer. It is true that the prayer of thanksgiving and petition will oftentimes create as great an impression as the sermon and it is likewise true that the music of expression vibrant with tender feeling will make the deepest impression on the listener. Nevertheless the sermon is the primary place for impression.

If the major function of Church music is the expression of religious feeling, it follows that the music should be sacred in character, and further that there should be a correspondence between the music and the hymn. And yet secular melodies are often wedded to sacred words, and men seem to think that the sacred words and the sacred place will sanctify the secular music. "Don't let the devil have all of the good tunes" is the common argument. The answer has been well given by Dr. Hoyt, of Auburn, that if they are his tunes he should have them. This joining of sacred words and secular music is certainly a very superficial view of Church music. Every piece of music worthy of the name has a motif, an essential spirit, exactly fitted to the ministry it was intended to perform. If it is filled with a sensuous, pleasure-loving spirit it will fail of its final effect, even though it be set to "Jesus Lover of my Soul" or "Rock of Ages." The fact is that all music worthy the name is the expression of some special and intense spiritual state, the whole quality and force of which is breathed into the composition, and communicated to the listener with varying intensity and definiteness, according to his sensitiveness and culture, but affecting every one after the same fashion, and swaying his thought and feeling into essential accord with it, whether he will or not. According to this principle the insertion of the "Barcarolle" from the *Tales of Hoffman* to the words of "Holy Night," or the insertion of the most sensuous part of *Samson and Delilah* into a Christmas service cannot minister to anything but that which is sensuous and pleasure-loving in the congregation.

Next, the selection of words and music should be germane



to the spirit of the occasion. Who is it that does not love Handel's famous Largo? While it was written originally as secular music, its motif is essentially religious. The Church has adopted it and made it her own, and by association the Largo has become distinctively sacred music. Yet with the vast quantities of good music clustering about the Christmas festival, music which is new to many of us, one wonders if it is wise to ignore this music, in order to introduce something else which has an entirely different setting, even though it be as beautiful and as sacred as the Largo. In this connection we recall the advice of a prominent organist to his pupils: "Never use in your Church service anything which has secular associations." This is a good rule. It is not a law, for too close adherence to it would rule out a great deal of good music which vibrates with the spirit of worship and belongs to the Church. But it is a good rule.

There is another element which may enter into the selection of the music of the sanctuary, and which may in a measure modify the foregoing principles. We refer to the social element. Lest we be misunderstood, let me say that when this is made the predominant element, the element of worship is weakened if not obliterated entirely. Anyone attending the Billy Sunday meetings would have been filled with delight or with aversion with that part of the service before the sermon, according to the degree in which he recognized the social element as legitimate in worship. Those who have been present will remember what I refer to. The trombonist came in and then we brightened a corner here and one over there and one back yonder until after a while we had the whole tabernacle brightened. Was that the worship of God? It certainly was not. Had it therefore any legitimate place? It certainly had *in that meeting*. Its purpose was social. It was meant to create a sense of fellowship in that vast audience, and it did. It served to unite those people in feeling, gave them a sense of kinship with one another. There may be times when this is legitimate in the sanctuary. We repeat, however, that this

element may be emphasized to such an extent that worship is obliterated.

The selection of music is a matter of importance, but may be outlined in a sentence. Nothing foreign to the theme of the service should be introduced and there should be growth in the music of the worship. The beginning of the service should be adjusted to the spiritual condition of the average person who wishes to commune with God. The first hymn should be an inspiring hymn of praise, general in character, with music that the people will love to sing. Then the service should move steadily on in a given direction of thought and feeling, each hymn and selection by the choir being helpful in itself, and also an advance in the line of worship and influence. In order to do this the minister must be familiar with his Hymn Book. He must study it as carefully as he does his Bible. He must familiarize himself not only with the words, but also with the music. We feel that this cannot be emphasized too strongly. We have known people to cry out against the Hymnal which they were using in Church or Sunday School, when it was in reality a sealed volume to them. Unless one studies his Hymnal he will limit his choice to a few favorite or familiar hymns, and ignore the need of his people and the riches of Christian hymnology. We recall one case where the ministers of a classis, impressed with the necessity of wider knowledge of their Hymnal, made a study of the words of their hymns, and then brought their organists and a few members of their choirs to a central church the pastor of which was well versed in hymnology. There they spent much time in singing hymns which their leader termed "beautiful but not generally used." It was an enjoyable experience to those who participated, and resulted in a richer use of the Hymnal in the worship of their Churches.

Some difficulties present themselves in the worship of sacred song. The first one is a wrong conception of Church music. There are some who consider it in the spirit of the concert hall. They listen to the choir as to a performance, and judge

it by its artistic merit or by the technique of the singers. Their attitude is a critical one, that which would applaud or condemn. They ignore or forget the breadth of invitation and command to the praises of the Church.

A second practical difficulty is the lack of musical training among the people. We experience the difficulty in the city Churches, and in rural districts it often becomes a serious handicap to the Church service. It is difficult to find trained voices for the choir, and just as difficult to find the taste and training among the people necessary for intelligent and worshipful singing.

The first difficulty can be overcome by the minister giving himself to teaching the importance and the purpose of the worship of song.

The second difficulty may be met by seeing to it that the people receive some systematic training in sacred music. The public schools give great assistance here; but all of our people have not had the advantage of public-school training. It is necessary that they receive training in some other way. Under these circumstances a chorister should be secured and a short meeting for rehearsal held either before or after the mid-week service. In this way there is a regular class taught through the winter months or throughout the year. A splendid opportunity for such work will soon present itself to our Church by the incentive offered by the new Hymnal. At any rate, something like this should be done. And we shall complain of hosannas languishing on our tongues and our devotion dying until a vigorous and continuous effort is made to teach our people to praise the Lord in sacred song.

"In all great movements of religion, the people have been inspired with a passion for singing. They have sung their creed. . . . Song has expressed and intensified to enthusiasm their new faith, their new joy and their new determination to do the will of God. Song has consoled their sorrows, and sustained their courage in time of danger. When a great assem-

bly has united in a mournful confession of sin, or a pathetic appeal for divine mercy, or an exultant thanksgiving for salvation, there has been created in a thousand hearts that vivid consciousness of sharing a common spiritual life which gives new energy to religious faith and new depth to religious emotion. When we find each other we are in the right way of finding God."

POTTSTOWN, PA.

## XI.

### MORAL SENSE IN THEOLOGY.

J. M. HANTZ.

One of the most noteworthy features in Holy Scripture is the manner in which it presents to us the cause of God's Providence as a fact to be believed, not as a theory to be comprehended. Though it comes in contact almost at every moment with the deepest mysteries of religious thought, the Infinite Personality of God—the origin and continuance of evil, free will and foreknowledge, the eternal purposes of God and the efficacy of the prayers of men, the inequality of men's spiritual and temporal advantages, the affliction of the righteous, the prosperity of the wicked, the transmission and inheritance of good and evil—we meet with no attempt to submit these things to the discussion and investigation by which human philosophy has so often attempted to deal with them; we find no answer to the question, which human curiosity is so often tempted to ask, How can these things be? We meet with no attempt on the one hand to explain away these difficulties by denying their reality, or, on the other hand, to admit their validity as stumbling-blocks in the way of the faith to which they seem opposed. They stand there as acknowledged facts, and as admitted trials to our faith; yet the duty of faith and confidence in God is not the less proclaimed in the midst of them and notwithstanding them. And in adopting this method of dealing with those difficulties with which it actually comes in contact, it indicates the principle and the spirit which should guide us in dealing with others which do not so directly come within its presence; such, for instance, as spring out of the statements of the revelation itself and their relation to those phases of human thought, which have come into existence subsequently to its delivery.

There is one Book of Scripture, however, which, while at first sight it may seem to furnish an exception to the above remarks, affords, on closer inspection, a confirmation and is, in some degree, an explanation of the feature which has given rise to them. The Book of Job has been described as an attempt on the part of the Jewish mind to construct, by dialectic reasoning, a theodicy or justification of the ways of God.<sup>1</sup> It should rather be described as an authoritative declaration by God Himself of the insufficiency of all such reasoning for such a purpose. The question which occupies the body of the book is indeed one of those with which this branch of philosophy attempts to deal; but the answer is given, not by the reasoning of the human disputants, but by the voice of God, speaking out of the whirlwind; and its import is such as to explain and justify the general course of the inspired writings in relation to such questions. It is an answer which every effort of human philosophy in subsequent ages has tended directly or indirectly, by its results or by its failures, to enforce and confirm—a declaration of the ignorance of man, and the unsearchableness of the ways of God. It tells us, too, that though we are unable to search out the mysteries of God's Providence and to solve the difficulties to which those mysteries give rise, there is, notwithstanding, a right spirit and a wrong spirit in which those difficulties may be met, a true and a false method, even of confidence in the divine righteousness. And the lesson thus taught is one which we may well lay to heart and turn to our profit now, if we will only apply ourselves to ascertain wherein lay the error of those men who did not speak of God the thing that was right, and how far their error is one which we, in these latter days, are in any danger of imitating.

Eliphaz and his two friends are not represented as unbelievers or irreligious men, nor as men who held low and degrading views of the nature and attributes of God. On the contrary, they appear as men jealous for the honor of God,

<sup>1</sup> See Bunsen's *Hyppolytus*, Vol. II, p. 7, quoted by Fleming's *Vocabulary of Philosophy*.

eager to vindicate His Providence from the slightest suspicion of inequality or respect of persons. They had a firm conviction that God's ways were just and righteous altogether, and that He rendered to every man according to his work. And so far they are right. But they sought further to apply this general conviction to such special cases as came under their own notice; they wished to determine how and in what manner God's justice was manifested in the particular circumstances of each man's life. And the criterion by which they attempted to judge of this was one which men are very apt to take, and which at first sight seems a right and reasonable one. They assumed that the rule by which we judge of the actions of men is an adequate standard and measure of the actions of God also. They assumed that the highest and best representation of God's Providence is that which supposes Him in every case to act as a good man would act under similar circumstances; that that exact apportionment of a man's happiness to his merits which forms the perfect exhibition of human distributive justice, cannot be the exact counterpart of divine justice also; and that where one term of this relation is known, the other may with certainty be inferred. In other words, they made the moral sense of man the sole and sufficient test of the moral government of God. Coleridge<sup>2</sup> speaks of Job's friends as "orthodox liars for God." In like manner Mr. Fronde, in his *Book of Job*, represents that their feeling belongs to Jewish orthodoxy. In point of fact, it belongs to a rationalism which is common to heathens and Christians as well as Jews. To the Jews there was a special promise of temporal blessings to themselves as the reward of obedience, but there is no general theory in Scripture of such a Providence to the world at large.<sup>3</sup> Butler, however (p. 56), allows that this government is not perfect in this life.

In consideration of this statement it is well to bear in mind that the ontology of morals is subject to the same limitations

<sup>2</sup> *Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit*, p. 36, ed. 1840.

<sup>3</sup> Compare Butler on *Moral Government, Analogy*, Chap. 3, p. 55.

with that of religion. If the standard of perfect and immutable morality is to be found only in the eternal nature of God, it follows that those conditions which prevent man from attaining to a knowledge of the infinite as such must also prevent him from attaining to more than a relative and phenomenal conception of morality. And, in truth, man's moral, like his religious consciousness, will vary according to his state of mental and moral culture; he may have higher or lower ideas of duty, as he may have higher or lower ideas of God. But it does not therefore follow, as was maintained by the sophists of old, that each man is the measure of all things to himself, and that morality is nothing more than the law which any man or nation chooses to enact for a certain time within a certain sphere. The very expression, a *higher* and a *lower* standard, imply that there are degrees of right and wrong, even in relative and limited morality—that one human conception of duty may be more perfect than another, even if none can attain to absolute perfection. There is such a thing as an enlightened and an unenlightened conscience; though no man may presume to say that his own conscience has attained to the greatest amount of enlightenment of which human nature is capable. It is a mark of the progressive character of natural morality and religion, that no new advance in knowledge contradicts the *principles* which have previously been acknowledged by the conscience, however much it may modify the particular acts by which those principles are to be carried out. To be zealous in God's service is a principle of religious duty common to Saul the persecutor and to Paul the apostle, though its result in action is at one time to destroy the faith, and at another to preach it. And it is a mark of the same character, that each fresh advance in moral and religious knowledge carries with it the immediate evidence of its own superiority, and takes its place in the mind, not as a question to be supported by argument, but as an axiom to be intuitively admitted. Each principle of this kind recommends itself to the minds of all who are capable of reflecting upon it, as true and irreversible



so far as it goes; though it may represent but a limited portion of the truth, and be hereafter merged in some higher and more comprehensive formula. The principles, for example, that virtue, relatively, to the human constitution, consists in observing a mean between two extremes, or in promoting the good of others, or in a reasonable self-love, all represent views containing a portion of truth; though none can be considered as exhausting the whole truth. While human nature is complex in itself, and susceptible of various relations and various duties arising out of those relations, it is not to be expected that all human virtue should be reducible to a single attribute, or capable of expression in a single formula. Yet its general character is not therefore doubtful because it admits of being viewed in various special aspects. Two men who differ in their definition of virtue will yet generally be agreed as to who is the virtuous man. "Let me die the death of the righteous, and let my last end be like his," expresses the conviction of one who, though far from righteous himself, was yet compelled to acknowledge the existence of a higher human standard than his own rule of conduct. "As much as it has been disputed," says Bishop Butler, "wherein virtue consists, or whatever ground for doubt there may be about particulars; yet in general there is in reality a universally acknowledged standard of it. It is that which all ages and all countries have made profession of in public; it is that which every man you meet puts on the show of; it is that which the primary and fundamental laws of all civil constitutions over the face of the earth make it their business and endeavor to enforce the practice of upon mankind—namely, justice, veracity, and regard to common good."

That a test of this nature, however imperfectly applied, does in fact lie at the bottom of those reasonings which seek to determine in a given case the exact merits of a man from the amount of happiness allotted to him, will appear if we turn aside for a moment to examine the argument of a great modern philosopher who devoted his profound speculative genius

to the attempt to construct a theory of religion on the sole basis of the moral reason. In that argument the evidence of the existence of God is made to depend upon the assumption that the practical reason imperatively requires us to suppose the existence of a supersensible world, in which the happiness of every reasonable being is exactly proportioned to his moral desert; and, consequently, of an omnipotent and omniscient Ruler to apportion exactly the one to the other.<sup>4</sup>

The correspondence which the modern philosopher assumed to exist in a supersensible world, these earlier reasoners sought for in the fact of sensible experience; but the assumption in the one reasoning and in the other is fundamentally the same, differing only in the field of its application.

Into this later application of the moral reason to theology, it is not my present intention to enter, further than to observe that its legitimate place appears to be the reverse of that assigned to it in the above argument; that what is there exhibited as a principle of reason might more properly be regarded as an act of faith—as the consequence, not the foundation, of our belief in the being and attributes of God, and from this point of view the great moralist, Bishop Butler, while maintaining, in common with the philosopher above mentioned, that the perfection of moral government consists in rewarding the righteous and punishing the wicked, in exact proportion to their personal merits or demerits, and acknowledging at the same time that this perfection is not exhibited in the present state taken alone,<sup>5</sup> expressly asserts also that the proper proof of God's perfect moral government rests on the teaching of religion, not on the course of nature alone, that the latter exhibits only the principle and beginning of that system of which the former bids us look for the completion hereafter.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, p. 627, ed. Rosenkranz. Cp. *Kritik der prak. Vernunft*, p. 264; for a criticism of Kant's theory see Müller's *Christian Doctrine of Sin*, Vol. I, p. 73, and other authorities quoted in Mansel's *Bampton Lectures*, Lec. 4, note 10. Also the writer's work on the *Human Mind*, p. 511.

<sup>5</sup> Butler's *Analogy*, Part II, Ch. 3, pp. 55, 56.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 81, 82.

But this conviction, when regarded as a religious belief, as an act of faith in that which we do not see, has a very different character from that which must be assigned to a similar assumption when made the ground of a judgment or criticism of that which we see. It is one thing to acknowledge that we see but a small portion, in extent and in duration, of the scheme of God's Providence, and to believe that much which to our imperfect vision may seem anomalous or unequal may not be so to those who can trace the same scheme through a broader field and a longer continuance; and it is another thing to insist on levelling all inequalities now, to assume the privilege of adding to or taking away from this or that portion of what we see in order to make it square with a preconceived standard of that Providence as it ought to be, and it is one thing to strive to guide our own actions aright by the aid of that moral consciousness which God has implanted in the hearts of all of us for that express purpose; while it is another thing to exalt that same consciousness into a judge of heaven and earth; to bring to its bar for judgment, not merely those human acts of which it takes direct cognizance to justify or to condemn, but the whole of that constitution of things of which itself forms but a limited part; all that Nature exhibits, and all that Revelation declares of the government and purpose of the Almighty.

In the antagonistic speeches of Job himself, the moral reason is likewise appealed to; but it is appealed to for a very different purpose. His own integrity, to which his own conscience directly bears witness, is maintained in the strongest manner; the righteousness of God is maintained also; but it is maintained not as a principle of the reason, which may be applied to and made to harmonize with the details of any given case, but as a conviction of faith, to be retained in the face of appearances which seem to tell against it.

This is the general character of that contrast between the right and the wrong use of man's conscience or moral reason in relation to his own conduct, and to God's dealing with him,

which is most clearly manifested in the adverse arguments of the speakers in this book, who are distinguished at the close of the discourse by the sentence of God Himself as having spoken respectively that which is right and that which is wrong concerning Him. And if this be so, we may learn from this early portion of God's word a lesson which whole ages of subsequent philosophy have failed to teach us, and which was never more needed than at this present moment in the midst of the wisdom and discernment of an enlightened and critical age.

The argument of Eliphaz and his friends amounts briefly to this: Divine justice must needs distribute happiness and misery in exact proportion to man's deserts; therefore the extraordinary sufferings of Job must be the consequence of some extraordinary guilt. The accusation is not indeed at once made in this direct form; but rather intimated by means of general reflections on the justice of God and the punishment of wicked men. "Remember, I pray thee, who ever perished, being innocent, or where were the righteous cut off? Even as I have seen, they that plow iniquity and sow wickedness, reap the same. By the blast of God they perish, and by the breath of his nostrils are they consumed."<sup>8</sup> Then follows an express allusion to the sufferings of Job in particular. "I have seen the foolish taking root; but suddenly I cursed his habitation. His children are far from safety, and they are crushed in the gate, neither is there any to deliver them. Whose Harvest the hungry eateth up, and taketh it even out of the thorns, and the robber swalloweth up their substance."<sup>9</sup> Then follows an exhortation to Job to submit to the chastisement of God. "Behold, happy is the man whom God correcteth; therefore despise not thou the chastening of the Almighty; For he maketh sore and bindeth up; he woundeth, and his hands make whole."<sup>10</sup> When this exhortation fails to produce the effect, the accusation is continued by the next

<sup>8</sup> Chap. 4: 7, 8, 9.

<sup>9</sup> Chap. 5: 3, 4, 5.

<sup>10</sup> Chap. 5: 17, 18.

speaker in a more direct manner. "How long wilt thou speak these things? How long shall the words of thy mouth be like a strong wind? Doth God prevent judgment? or doth the Almighty prevent justice? If thou wert pure and upright, surely now he would awake for thee, and make the habitation of thy righteousness prosperous."<sup>11</sup> On Job still remaining unconvinced, the language of the second speaker becomes still more pointed in its charges. "Should not the multitude of words be answered? and should a man full of lies be justified? Should thy lies make men hold their peace? and when thou mockest, shall no man make thee ashamed? Thou hast said, my doctrine is pure, and I am clean in thine eyes. But oh that God would speak, and open his lips against thee; and that he would shew thee the secrets of wisdom, that they are double to that which is! Know therefore that God exacteth of thee less than thine iniquity deserveth."<sup>12</sup> And finally, after the dispute has continued for a time in the same strain, the accusation assumes a still more definite character, and the ground of the punishment is yet more plainly declared. "Is not thy wickedness great? and thine iniquities infinite? for thou hast taken a pledge from thy brother, for nought, and stripped the naked of their clothing. Thou hast not given water to the weary to drink? and thou hast withdrawn bread from the hungry. Thou hast sent widows away empty, and the arms of the fatherless have been broken. Therefore snares are round about thee; or darkness that thou canst not see; and abundance of waters cover thee."<sup>13</sup>

In the language of Job, on the other hand, interspersed as it is with lamentation and bitter complaint, we yet trace the expression of two feelings which all his afflictions had not been able to destroy—a conviction, based on the witness of his own conscience, that though he was a sinner, as all other men are in the sight of God, he was yet innocent as regards that especial wickedness which his accusers laid to his charge; and a

<sup>11</sup> Chap. 8: 2, 3, 6.

<sup>12</sup> Ch. 11: 2-6.

<sup>13</sup> Ch. 22: 5, 6, 7, 9, 10.

feeling of trust and confidence in the righteousness of God, notwithstanding the seeming inequality of his dealings with men. Not all men are sinners in the sight of God, he asserts as strongly as his companions had done. "I know it is so of a truth; but how should a man be just with God? If he will contend with him, he cannot answer him one of a thousand. How much less shall I answer him, and choose out of my words to reason with him? When, though I were righteous, yet would I not answer, but I would make my supplication to my judge. If I speak of strength, lo, he is strong; and if of judgment, who shall set me a time to plead? If I justify myself, mine own mouth shall condemn me; if I say, I am perfect, it shall also prove me perverse. For he is not a man, as I am, that I should answer him, and we should come together in judgment. Neither is there any daysman betwixt us, that might lay his hand upon us both."<sup>14</sup> Yet while thus declaring his inability to contend with God or to justify himself in God's sight, he is no less ready to affirm his integrity in the sight of his fellowmen, his innocence of those especial sins which they thought fit to lay to his charge, in order to justify, as they imagined, the severity of God's judgment towards him. "Let me be weighed in an even balance, that God may know mine integrity; if my step hath turned out of the way, and mine heart walketh after mine eyes, and if any blot hath cleaved to mine hands; Then let me sow and let another eat; yea, let my offspring be rooted out. If I have withheld the poor from their desire, or have caused the eyes of the widow to fail; or have eaten my morsel myself alone, and the fatherless hath not eaten thereof; If I have seen any perish for want of clothing, or any poor without covering; If his loins have not blessed me, and if he were not warmed with the fleece of my sheep; If I have lifted up my hand against the fatherless, when I saw my help in the gate; Then let mine arm fall from my shoulderblade, and mine arm be broken from the bone."<sup>15</sup> Yet along with this vindication of himself, he yet retains his

<sup>14</sup> Ch. 9: 2, 3, 14, 15, 19, 20, 32, 33.

<sup>15</sup> Ch. 31: 6, 7, 8, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21.

confidence in God. He is assured that God's ways are just and righteous, though we know not how; and though to our imperfect sight they may at times seem to be otherwise. "Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him; but I will maintain mine own ways before him. He also shall be my salvation; for an hypocrite shall not come before him."<sup>16</sup> "Behold I go forward, but he is not there; and backward, but I cannot perceive him; On the left hand when he doth work, but I cannot behold him; he hideth himself on the right hand, that I cannot see him: But he knoweth the way that I take; when he hath tried me, I shall come forth as gold."<sup>17</sup> And at length, when the words of Job are ended, and the three men have ceased to answer him, comes the sublime appeal of the Lord Himself answering out of the whirlwind, wherein all the marvels of creation are called to witness to the infinite power and wisdom and goodness of their Creator; and the minute doubts and scruples which arise in the mind of man from the features of that small portion of God's Providence which he sees and deems that he knows are swallowed up in the contemplation of the boundless universe which he does not know. And at the end of this, when Job himself has confessed "I have uttered that I understand not; things too wonderful for me, which I know not"<sup>18</sup>—God Himself decides between the speakers who, on the one side and on the other, had canvassed and striven to judge of His ways, and declares that, though all alike had spoken in ignorance, yet that very ignorance, according to the spirit by which it is accompanied, may speak rightly or wrongly of the mysteries of the Divine Government; and that that right and wrong had been manifested in those who had just now spoken; the Lord said to Eliphaz the Temanite: "My wrath is kindled against thee and against thy two friends; for ye have not spoken of me the thing that is right, as my servant Job *hath*."<sup>19</sup> The distinction thus made may serve, among

<sup>16</sup> Ch. 13: 15, 16.

<sup>17</sup> Ch. 23: 8, 9, 10.

<sup>18</sup> Ch. 42: 3.

<sup>19</sup> Ch. 42: 7.



other purposes, to throw light upon a similar distinction of no small importance to us—that between the direct and the indirect, the proper and the improper uses of the moral sense in relation to men's actions and to God's dealings with men. In speaking of one of these uses as *indirect* and *improper*, I do not mean, as far as these epithets are concerned, to convey any censure of the use in question, as being necessarily either intellectually deceptive or morally culpable; I mean only to apply to the several employments of the moral sense, a distinction familiar and established in relation to the natural senses. There are certain things which are the especial and peculiar object of each one of our natural senses, and of which a knowledge can be obtained from no other source—thus it is through sight alone that we can gain any knowledge of the difference between light and darkness, or between one color and another; and it is through hearing alone that we can gain a knowledge of the difference of one sound from another; and to those who are devoid of these senses, the respective differences are as though they had no existence. And, on the other hand, there are other things which, though they may be known in a certain way, more or less accurately, by the exercise of various senses, yet can in no respect be said especially to belong to one sense rather than to another, or to the senses in general, rather than to other sources of knowledge. Thus, for example, the distance of an object may be roughly conjectured through sight, by the degree of distinctness in its colors and outline, and through hearing, by the nature of the sound which it emits; or its motion can be conjectured, through the one sense, from the apparent changes in its position and distinctions, or through the other sense, by the variations of the sound which we hear in successive moments; but neither distance nor motion can be considered as the especial object of sight or hearing, or as one on which the evidence of either of these senses has a claim to be believed in preference to any information gathered from other sources. The former class may thus be



distinguished as the *direct* or *proper*, and the latter as the *indirect* or *improper* objects of their respective senses.<sup>20</sup>

In a former article,<sup>21</sup> I endeavored to call attention to the distinction between the respective provinces of faith and reason, as exemplified in the primary and intuitive judgments exercised by our natural faculties or their proper objects, and the secondary and derived judgments which are the result of an inference, consciously or unconsciously performed, and liable to various degrees of accuracy or inaccuracy in the performance. At present, I desire to treat somewhat more fully of a particular application of this distinction, in the instance of the moral faculty, to point out the analogy which exists between it and the natural senses, as regards the proper and improper objects on which it may be exercised, and the authority due to its decisions with reference to the one and the other respectively. It is the more necessary to do this, inasmuch as a popular and not unnatural error in this respect—an error not the less dangerous from being but the exaggeration of a truth—is a prominent feature in the religious teaching of the present day. Now this distinction, which is acknowledged by all men as existing with regard to our natural perceptions of the material world, exists likewise with regard to our moral perceptions of spiritual things, though too often neglected by those who speculate on these subjects, and at no time more neglected than in our day. It is not unusual to appeal to the verdict of the moral sense in questions of religious belief, not as though it were an auxiliary, and a valuable one, which it undoubtedly is; but as if it were the supreme and unquestionable arbiter. If Holy Scripture presents us with a narrative of God's dealing with men of old, if it reveals to us certain portions of the method of His Providence in the government of the world, or of His Grace in the redemption of mankind, it is thought by some a sufficient reason for rejecting or evading its statements, if our moral sense is or appears

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *De Anima*, and Hamilton on Reid.

<sup>21</sup> *Reformed Church Review*, for April, 1911.

to be dissatisfied with them. From the manner in which this authority is sometimes appealed to, it would almost seem as if its advocates unwillingly confessed man's need of some infallible guide to religious truth; as if, in the very act of asserting the fallibility of the external revelation, they felt compelled to assume the infallibility of the internal sentiment. We are told of the unerring instincts of the supreme authority, of the moral sense or conscience;<sup>22</sup> and such expressions, when rightly understood, must be admitted to contain an important truth; but they are too often used without exactly ascertaining in what sense they are true; and without sufficiently distinguishing between their legitimate and their illegitimate applications. In estimating the evidence of the moral no less than of the natural sense, we must distinguish between its proper and improper, between its direct and indirect objects, between the facts to whose existence it immediately and certainly bears witness, and the inferences, legitimate or otherwise, to which those facts lead or appear to lead.

It is not for an instant intended to deny the existence of such a faculty, or to question its authority within its proper sphere. That man possesses a natural power of discerning right and wrong as such in themselves and not merely in their consequences is, I believe, a truth as certain as that he possesses a faculty of sight. But as it is one thing to admit the existence and the value of eyesight, and another to maintain that the eye is the proper judge of all objects on which it can possibly be exercised; so it is one thing to admit the existence and importance of a moral sense, and another to regard it as the supreme and final authority on all questions to which it is capable of being applied. The distance on the motion of a body may be conjectured, with more or less accuracy, by the eye; and such conjectures may be very useful when no better means of information are at hand; but no reasonable man would insist on trusting in these matters solely to the testimony of his eyesight, in opposition to the result of exact meas-

<sup>22</sup> See F. Farrar's *Norrisian Essay*, and Temple in *Essays and Reviews*, p. 43.

urement or scientific investigation. And it may also be the case that the moral sense, in addition to its primary and proper objects, may have a secondary province, in which its decisions may be roughly serviceable in the absence of a better guide; but in which they are not entitled to be accepted as infallible or to supersede other sources of knowledge.

The proper and immediate objects of the moral sense or conscience (the distinction which is sometimes made between these two terms is irrelevant to our present argument<sup>23</sup>) may be briefly described as our own voluntary actions in their relation to a moral law. "There is a principle of reflection in men," says Bishop Butler, "by which they distinguish between, approve and disapprove their own actions. . . . This principle in man, by which he approves or disapproves his heart, temper and actions, is conscience."<sup>24</sup> "The Author of Nature," he says, "hath given us a moral faculty, by which we distinguish between actions, and approve some as virtuous and of good desert and disapprove others as vicious and of ill desert."<sup>25</sup> The apparent extension of the province of the moral faculty, in this last passage, from our own actions to actions in general, needs a few words of comment. It is necessary to make a distinction (analogous to that which we have made in the case of the natural sense) between the office of the moral sense in relation to our own actions and in relation to those of other men. That which is the immediate and instinctive object of approbation or disapprobation—the act of will, the voluntary obedience or disobedience to a law of whose obligation we are conscious—is a thing which can be immediately perceived in ourselves; just as the impressions of visible objects are perceived only in their relation to our own organ of sight. That other men have the same faculties and the same perceptions as ourselves, and are to be judged by the same rules, is not a direct apprehension of the moral sense;

<sup>23</sup> For the distinction between moral sense and conscience, see Butler, Sanderson, *Praelect*, I, 22; Stewart, *Active Powers*, Part I, Ch. 2.

<sup>24</sup> Sermon I, p. 10.

<sup>25</sup> *Analogy*, Part I, Ch. 6, 138. Cp. Part. II, Ch. 8, p. 345.

but an inference of the reason from a general assumption—an inference which may indeed be trustworthy in the majority of instances; but still an indirect consequence, not a direct perception; and though true in its general statement yet liable to error in its special applications.

The same distinction may be applied to determine the further question concerning the character of the moral faculty as fallible or infallible. That any act which my own conscience at the present time condemns, as contrary to my convictions of what is right, is on no account to be done by me—that an act which the same authority commands as a duty ought at all hazards to be done by me—these are points concerning which the voice of conscience is supreme, and in relation to which it has an unquestionable claim on our obedience. And this claim is allowed by the Apostle St. Paul even in regard to things which in themselves are indifferent. “I know and am persuaded by the Lord Jesus that there is nothing unclean of itself, but to him that esteemeth any thing to be unclean, to him it is unclean.”<sup>26</sup> “Happy is he that condemneth not himself in that thing which he alloweth. And he that doubteth is damned if he eateth because he eateth not of faith; for whatsoever is not of faith is sin.” (That is to say, as St. Chrysostom explains, because he does not act according to his conviction, but believes that to be unclean which notwithstanding he eats.) It is our duty indeed to take all means in our power to enlighten and inform our conscience; and for any neglect to do so we are responsible in the sight of God; but the conscience of any individual man, even though it may be less enlightened than that of another, has authority over himself in that which it allows or condemns.

But the same authority which is supreme and absolute in judging of our own acts has but an imperfect and divided authority in judging of the acts of others. There is a natural tendency in all men to erect their own sense of moral obligations with a standard by which to judge of the actions of men

<sup>26</sup> Romans, 14: 14, 23.

in general; and in a great number of cases, such a standard may lead to results approximately, if not exactly, true. But that the rule in this case is very far from being infallible is manifest from the fact that different men do not always approve or condemn the same things; and that the judgments which we form of other men from our own observation of their visible acts may be considerably modified by what we may subsequently learn from their own statements of their own motives and intentions. The standard, in short, is one which in many, probably in most cases, has a good deal of rough practical utility, which in many may approach more or less nearly to the truth; but which cannot be implicitly trusted as possessing rigid scientific accuracy.

The same distinction is surely still more necessary to be observed when the moral faculty is employed, as it very often is employed, in relation to religious truths and to our belief concerning the ways of God. It is from the witness of our moral faculties that we are first led to a belief in the moral nature of God; it is the consciousness of duty and obligation which necessarily carries with it a belief in the existence of a Law-giver by whom that obligation is imposed. And probably, if we were left to construct a theology for ourselves solely by deduction from these primary ideas, the moral sense, as the source of those ideas, would furnish the principal, perhaps the only characteristics of our highest conception of God. But here, as elsewhere, a supplementary experience comes in to modify and correct our original impressions; we find that neither the facts of nature nor the statements of revelation can be wholly explained on the supposition that we are entitled to judge of the ways of God precisely as we should judge of the ways of men. No doubt such a judgment would in many cases be a true one; many, probably the great majority of facts, can be satisfactorily adjusted to such a supposition; but there undoubtedly remain others which cannot; and the conviction is forced upon us by experience that the moral faculty of man is but a partial and approximate, not a complete and exact, cri-

terion of things divine. To neglect the witness of the constitution of nature, to repudiate summarily the testimony of Scripture, because we cannot make it in all things agree with the judgments of our moral faculty, is as unwise as it would be to refuse to listen to any evidence or testimony concerning the distance of an object because it did not agree with the estimate formed from appearances presented to the eyesight.

It is not for a moment denied that the moral faculty may, in this case as in the former, furnish materials for judgments of considerable value as presumptions and as auxiliaries. Only let it be remembered that they are presumptions, not certainties, auxiliary to others, not sufficient of themselves. We protest not against the use, but only against the abuse of them. Only it cannot be denied that, with reference to certain times and certain aspects of prevalent opinion, the protest against the abuse may be more needed than the encouragement to the use; the duty of diffidence may be more important than that of confidence. In an age of intellectual cultivation and scientific advance, in which, from day to day, triumph after triumph rewards the labors of the inquirer in the field of nature, the mind of man seems, as it were, wandering through that enchanted hall of the poet, where on every door was written, "Be bold, be bold," till at last, at the upper end, is one whereon we read, "Be not too bold."<sup>27</sup> Now, as in the days of Job, it may be that those who do not speak of God the thing that is right may be earnest and religious men, jealous for the honor of God, and eager to vindicate His Providence from any appearance of anomaly. Yet the answer which was given to the first recorded attempt at a philosophical explanation of the ways of God may be also in spirit and in substance the answer befitting these latter days—"Ye have not spoken of me the thing that is right." And be it remembered that we have an aid to the inquiries and a corrective to the errors of our moral faculty which the men of that elder day possessed but imperfectly, if at all. They judged of the man-

<sup>27</sup> Spencer, *Faerie Queene*, Book III, Cant. 11.

ner of God's dealings with men principally, if not entirely, from the aspects of His natural Providence; we have as our guide, not merely the facts of nature, but that great harmony between the natural and the spiritual world made known to us by the teaching of Revelation. And in both alike, the general result which meets us is the same: sufficient evidence in both of the general goodness of God, but not sufficient to enable us to give an exact explanation of particulars. In a word, our reason is permitted to act in relation to divine things; but it must act in conjunction with our faith; we are allowed to see much in order that we may believe more. Working together, each may supply what is lacking in the other; working apart, either may destroy the edifice which it is their duty jointly to construct. Our confidence in that which we know is strengthened, not weakened, by submission as regards that which we do not know. The lawful dominion of the approving or condemning conscience over our own actions is strengthened, not weakened, by the coöperation of a different spirit in relation to the hidden things of God; the duty of judgment and scrutiny, on the one hand, is not superseded, but rather enforced by that of belief and trust, on the other. We may confidently and safely give to reason the things that are reason's, if we will only remember also to give to faith the things that are faith's. Every enlargement of our knowledge of ourselves and of the world around us serves but to make this mutual interdependence more clear and manifest; each closer examination of the respective functions of faith and reason serves but to exhibit more exactly the mutual relation to and mutual need to each other of those sister powers of the soul whose joint action is expressed in the words of the Patriarch, "Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him; but I will maintain mine own ways before him."

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## XII.

### THE ARGUMENT FOR A FINITIST THEOLOGY.

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*(Continued from page 551, Reformed Church Review, October, 1917.)*

## III.

### THE DOCTRINE OF A FINITE GOD.

The monistic theories make a grudging admission of the individual and particular facts of life. The pluralistic theories, on the other hand, emphasize these facts and take their departure from them. For the pluralistic theories the particular and the individual constitute the true reality. The dirt and grime of actual experience must not be forgotten or ignored in the thought of an Eternal Reality which is supposed, in some mysterious or very imperfectly understood manner, to be perfect, though including imperfection. Sin and suffering are not illusions which are overcome in an Eternal Now, or fragmentary experiences which together form the perfect Whole of existence. On the contrary, the victory of the Good is not yet achieved; the world is not completed; the process of evolution is a reality. God is not all-powerful; but he is a Struggler, who is hindered and thwarted, at least for the time being, by necessities which are beyond his control. The time process is required for the accomplishment of his good purposes.

In other words, by those who hold the pluralistic view of the world, the tradition that God is Absolute, Infinite, Omnipotent, Omniscient, Immutable, etc., is definitely and consciously abandoned; and, if the belief in God is retained, he



is thought of as a *finite* being, one among many, yet supreme above all.

This, in broad outline, is the doctrine of God expounded by John Stuart Mill, William James, and other philosophical radicals.<sup>27</sup> They were not afraid of unorthodox phraseology, they were not much influenced by the mere form and sound of words. Most theological and religious writers, on the other hand, and many philosophers, manifest a curious reverence for words and phrases that have been hallowed by long use and a corresponding reluctance to accept new forms of expression. They are, accordingly, disposed to shy at such a word as *finite* when it is employed as an adjective modifying the term *God*; and yet many of them are not in principle so far as they seem from the view suggested by the phrase formed of these two words. Thus many monistic idealists have held that suffering must be a genuine experience of the Absolute; and it has become a commonplace of moral and religious exhortation to say that we are co-workers with the Omnipotent. We may question the logical consistency of Absolutist philosophers and religious exhorters, and yet rejoice that, even in opposition to the logical implications of their systems, they have sought to be loyal to the facts of human experience.

In the fifth chapter we shall consider the arguments of those who have arrived at a finitist theology by a logical analysis of the notion of the realized infinite. These thinkers have come to the conclusion that it is impossible without logical inconsistency to say that anything that *is*, is infinite. Therefore neither God nor the world can be said, if we speak strictly, to be infinite. In this and the immediately following chapter, we shall restrict our attention to what may be called the *ethical* argument for the doctrine that God is finite.

This argument is essentially a *theodicy*, an attempt to justify the ways of God to men in view of the manifest evil and

<sup>27</sup> For more recent expositions of the finitist doctrine, see H. G. Wells, *God the Invisible King*, and E. H. Reeman, *Do We Need A New Idea of God?*

What is revealed  
thereby

imperfection of the world. In brief, the argument is this: God can not be thought to be at once omnipotent and perfectly good. If we say that he is omnipotent, that his sovereignty is complete, that all events that occur are willed by him; then it follows that he is responsible for the actual world, which is partly evil, and, accordingly, that he is not perfectly good. If we begin at the other end, and say that God is perfectly good, then we must deny that he is omnipotent.

John Stuart Mill may be taken as a representative of this general tendency. His argument rests upon the evident cruelty and recklessness of Nature, from which he infers the limited power of the Author of Nature. "Next to the greatness of these cosmic forces, the quality which most forcibly strikes everyone who does not avert his eyes from it, is their perfect and absolute recklessness. They go straight to their end, without regarding what or whom they crush on the road. . . . In sober truth, nearly all the things which men are hanged or imprisoned for doing to one another, are nature's everyday performances. Killing, the most criminal act recognized by human laws, Nature does once to every being that lives. . . . Nature impales men, breaks them as if on the wheel, casts them to be devoured by wild beasts, burns them to death, crushes them with stones like the first Christian martyr, starves them with hunger, freezes them with cold, poisons them by the quick or slow venom of her exhalations, and has hundreds of other hideous deaths in reserve, such as the ingenious cruelty of a Nabis or a Domitian never surpassed. All this, Nature does with the most supercilious disregard of mercy and of justice. . . . Next to taking life is taking the means by which we live; and Nature does this, too, on the largest scale and with the most callous indifference. A single hurricane destroys the hopes of a season; a flight of locusts, or an inundation, desolates a district; a trifling chemical change in an edible root, starves a million of people. . . . Everything in short, which the worst men commit either against life or property is perpetrated on a larger scale by

natural agents. . . . All which people are accustomed to deprecate as 'disorder' and its consequences, is precisely a counterpart of Nature's ways. Anarchy and the Reign of Terror are overmatched in injustice, ruin, and death, by a hurricane and a pestilence."<sup>28</sup>

The main thesis of the *Essay on Nature* is that it is "irrational and immoral" to "make the spontaneous course of things the model" of man's voluntary actions.<sup>29</sup> The incidental conclusion of the essay is the position which has been stated by way of anticipation, namely, that it is absurd and irrational to hold that God is perfectly good and also all-powerful. "The only admissible moral theory of Creation," says Mill, "is that the Principle of Good *cannot* at once and altogether subdue the powers of evil, either physical or moral. . . . Those who have been strengthened in goodness by relying on the sympathizing power of a powerful and good Governor of the world, have, I am satisfied, never really believed that Governor to be, in the strict sense of the term, omnipotent. They have always saved his goodness at the expense of his power."<sup>30</sup> Recurring to the same thought in the essay on the *Utility of Religion*, Mill contends that "one only form of belief in the supernatural—one only theory respecting the origin and government of the universe—stands wholly clear both of intellectual contradiction and of moral obliquity. It is that which, resigning irrevocably the idea of an omnipotent creator, regards Nature and Life not as the expression throughout of the moral character and purpose of the Deity, but as the product of a struggle between contriving goodness and an intractable material, as was believed by Plato, or a principle of evil, as was the doctrine of the Manichæans."<sup>31</sup>

Mill shows that all the attempts that are made to escape this conclusion are futile, and tacitly presuppose it. "That much applauded class of authors, the writers on natural the-

<sup>28</sup> *Three Essays on Religion*, pp. 28 ff.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 64.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 39 f.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 116.

ology, . . . have exhausted the resources of sophistry to make it appear that all the suffering in the world exists to prevent greater—that misery exists, for fear lest there should be misery: a thesis which, if ever so well maintained, could only avail to explain and justify the works of limited beings, compelled to labor under conditions independent of their own will; but can have no application to a Creator assumed to be omnipotent, who, if he bends to a supposed necessity, himself makes the necessity which he bends to. If the maker of the world *can* all that he will, he wills misery, and there is no escape from the conclusion.”

If we nevertheless attempt to escape by saying that “the goodness of God does not consist in willing the happiness of his creatures, but their virtue,” Mill replies that “if the Creator of mankind willed that they should all be virtuous, his designs are as completely baffled as if he had willed that they should all be happy.”<sup>32</sup>

“But, it is said, all these things are for wise and good ends.” It may be said that “we do not know what wise reasons the Omniscient may have had for leaving undone things which he had the power to do. It is not perceived that this plea itself implies a limit to Omnipotence. When a thing is obviously good and obviously in accordance with what all the evidences of creation imply to have been the Creator’s design, and we say we do not know what good reason he may have had for not doing it, we mean that we do not know to what other, still better object—to what object still more completely in the line of his purposes, he may have seen fit to postpone it. But the necessity of postponing one thing to another belongs only to limited power. Omnipotence could have made the objects compatible. Omnipotence does not need to weigh one consideration against another. . . . No one purpose imposes necessary limitations on another in the case of a Being not restricted by conditions of possibility.”<sup>33</sup>

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 37.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 179 f.

Therefore "the notion of a providential government by an omnipotent Being for the good of his creatures must be entirely dismissed."<sup>34</sup> If we believe that God is all-powerful and that Nature is his handiwork, our "worship must either be greatly overclouded by doubt, and occasionally quite darkened by it, or the moral sentiments must sink to the low level of the ordinances of Nature: the worshipper must learn to think blind partiality, atrocious cruelty, and reckless injustice, not blemishes in an object of worship, since all these abound to excess in the commonest phenomena of Nature. . . . He who comes out with least moral damage from this embarrassment, is probably the one who . . . confesses to himself that the purposes of Providence are mysterious, that its ways are not our ways, that its justice and goodness are not the justice and goodness which we can conceive and which it befits us to practise. When, however, this is the feeling of the believer, the worship of the Deity ceases to be the adoration of abstract moral perfection. It becomes the bowing down to a gigantic image of something not fit for us to imitate. It is the worship of power only."<sup>35</sup>

*How limited?*  
*By inf.*

The very argument which has been chiefly relied upon to prove the existence of God, namely, the argument from design, far from establishing his omnipotence, is easily shown to be incompatible with it. "It is not too much to say that every indication of Design in the Kosmos is so much evidence against the Omnipotence of the Designer. For what is meant by Design? Contrivance: the adaptation of means to an end. But the necessity of contrivance—the need of employing means—is a consequence of the limitation of power. . . . Wisdom and contrivance are shown in overcoming difficulties, and there is no room for them in a Being for whom no difficulties exist. The evidences, therefore, of Natural Theology distinctly imply that the author of the Kosmos worked under limitations; that he was obliged to adapt himself to conditions independent

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 243.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 112 f.

of his will, and to attain his ends by such arrangements as those conditions admitted of."<sup>36</sup>

A creed like this makes human life significant. "A virtuous human being assumes in this theory the exalted character of a fellow-laborer with the Highest, a fellow-combatant in the great strife; contributing his little, which by the aggregation of many like himself becomes much, towards that progressive ascendancy, and ultimately complete triumph of good over evil, which history points to, and which this doctrine teaches us to regard as planned by the Being to whom we owe all the benevolent contrivance we behold in Nature."<sup>37</sup>

Mill's position is enthusiastically endorsed by William James in his volume on *A Pluralistic Universe*. "When John Mill said that the notion of God's omnipotence must be given up if God is to be kept as a religious object, he was surely accurately right; yet so prevalent is the lazy monism that idly haunts the region of God's name, that so simple and truthful a saying was generally treated as a paradox. God, it was said, *could* not be finite. I believe that the only God worthy of the name must be finite."<sup>38</sup> With all its ambiguities and inconsistencies, the common conception of God is at bottom that of a finite Being. The God of David or of Isaiah, the Heavenly Father of the New Testament, is not the Absolute. "*That* God," says James, "is an essentially finite being *in* the cosmos, not with the cosmos in him." "The God of our popular Christianity is but one member of a pluralistic system. He and we stand outside of each other, just as the devil, the saints, and the angels stand outside of both of us."<sup>39</sup>

Mill's polemic is directed against the doctrine of omnipotence as held by traditional orthodoxy; that of James is directed against the conception of the Absolute, which has been supposed by its adherents to solve difficulties such as those

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 176 ff.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 117.

<sup>38</sup> James, *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 124.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 110 f.; see also *The Will to Believe*, pp. 116 and 134 f.

raised by Mill.<sup>40</sup> "The absolute," insists James, "taken seriously, and not as a mere name for our right occasionally to drop the strenuous mood and take a moral holiday, introduces all those tremendous irrationalities into the universe which a frankly pluralistic theism escapes, but which have been flung as a reproach at every form of monistic theism or pantheism. It introduces a speculative 'problem of evil' namely, and leaves us wondering why the perfection of the absolute should require just such hideous forms of life as darken the day for our human imaginations. If they were forced upon it by something alien, and to 'overcome' them the absolute had still to keep hold of them, we could understand its feeling of triumph, though we, so far as we were ourselves among the elements overcome, could acquiesce but sullenly in the resultant situation, and would never just have chosen it as the most rational one conceivable. But the absolute is represented as a being without environment, upon which nothing alien can be forced. . . . Its perfection is represented as the source of things, and yet the first effect of that perfection is the tremendous imperfection of all finite experience."<sup>41</sup>

To this the partisan of the Absolute will, of course, object that the imperfection of the finite is a logically indispensable condition of the perfection of the Infinite. And not only the monistic idealist, but the defender of traditional theology may take this position. Thus St. Augustine long ago taught that evil does not disturb the order and beauty of the universe; for "as a painting with dark colors rightly distributed is beautiful, so also is the sum of things beautiful for him who has power to view them all at one glance, notwithstanding the presence of sin, although, when considered separately, their beauty is marred by the deformity of sin. God would not have created those angels and men of whom he knew beforehand that they would be wicked, if he had not also known how they

<sup>40</sup> *Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 453; *Sources of Religious Insight*, pp. 240 ff.

<sup>41</sup> *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 117.



would subserve the ends of goodness." "The whole world thus consists, like a beautiful song, of oppositions."<sup>42</sup> Or, to employ an illustration of the Platonic-Augustinian doctrine which is repeated by Royce, "as one looking over the surface of a statue with a microscope, and finding nothing but a stony surface, might say, *how ugly!* but on seeing the whole at a glance would know its beauty; even so one seeing the world by bits fancies it evil, but would know it to be good if he saw it as a whole. And the seeming but unreal evil of the parts may be necessary in order that the real whole should be good."<sup>43</sup>

This, however, is not precisely the view of Royce himself. He is not content to say that the evil must exist to set the good off by way of contrast. He maintains that the "evil will is a conquered element *in* the good will, and as such is necessary to goodness." "Goodness . . . has as its elements the evil impulse *and* its correction. The evil will as such may be conquered in our personal experience, and then we are ourselves good; or it may be conquered, not in our thought considered as a separate thought, but in the total thought to which ours is so related, as our single evil and good thoughts are related to the whole of us. . . . As the evil impulse is to the good man, so is the evil will of the wicked man to the life of God, in which he is an element."<sup>44</sup>

The doctrine which we have found in the earliest of Professor Royce's books is found also in those which appeared shortly before the end of his life. Thus in *The Sources of Religious Insight* he writes of evils "which cannot, yes, which in principle, and even by omnipotence, could not, be simply removed from existence without abolishing the conditions which are logically necessary to the very highest that we know. Life in the spirit simply presupposes the conditions that these ills exemplify. . . . Such sorrows, such idealized evils, which are so interwoven with good that if the precious grief were wholly removed from existence, the courage, the fidelity, the

<sup>42</sup> Ueberweg, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, 161 f.

<sup>43</sup> *Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 265.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 455 f.



spiritual self-possession, the peace through, in, and beyond tribulation which such trials alone make possible, would also be removed, surely show us that the abstract principle: 'Evil ought to be abolished,' is false."<sup>45</sup>

Royce holds that a world like the one we know, which contains courage, fidelity, etc., and the evils which make these noble human qualities possible, is ethically preferable to a world which would contain no evil and therefore none of the virtues which presuppose it. For him the ideally perfect whole is *not* composed of none but perfect parts. On the contrary the imperfection of some of the parts is a logical condition of the complete perfection of the whole. To such reasonings, James replies that "the *ideally* perfect whole is certainly that whole of which the *parts also are perfect*—if we can depend on logic for anything, we can depend on it for that definition." Is then a whole that consists of parts all of which are themselves perfect ethically preferable to a whole the perfection of which includes some imperfection, and, indeed, consists at least in part in the overcoming of imperfection? Here we have the issue between the pluralistic and the monistic ethics in a nutshell. In the next chapter we shall consider this issue in so far as it is relevant to the problem of theodicy.

#### IV.

#### THEOLOGICAL FINITISM AS THE OUTCOME OF A RATIONAL THEODICY.

If the world is conceived in a pluralistic or dualistic fashion, the case for theological finitism is complete. Mill's argument is unanswerable. If we think of God as a Person who stands in moral relations with other persons, then, even if we assume these others to be his creatures, it is impossible

<sup>45</sup> *Sources of Religious Insight*, pp. 250 ff. See also *The Problem of Christianity*, I, 308 and elsewhere.

to hold that he is omnipotent and at the same time perfectly good. The notion of omnipotence is, in itself, logically unobjectionable: it is *logically* possible to hold that the Supreme Being is omnipotent. But, if he is omnipotent, he is either malevolent or else non-moral. The Supreme Being might be one who would take pleasure in the sufferings of his creatures, only doling out to them sufficient satisfactions to induce them to continue the business of living; or he might be wholly indifferent to their joys and sorrows. Such a being, however, would not deserve to be called God; for God, we say, is good. But if God is good, then he is not omnipotent.

1. *The Failure of Monistic Theodicy.*—In this section I propose to show that, if we think of the world *monistically*, a rational theodicy is impossible. Let us then, for the present, ignore the logical and psychological difficulties of monistic idealism, except as we shall find them to be bound up with its ethical difficulties. Let us assume the monistic theory of the world and inquire concerning its treatment of the problem of evil.

It is one of the merits of Royce's discussion that he insists upon finding a solution that shall be *rational*. He does not demand the right to make mutually contradictory statements about God, on the ground that it is about God that he is speaking. He is not satisfied with saying that in some way that is wholly mysterious to us partial evil may be universal good. The Platonic-Augustinian analogy of the beautiful picture which is composed of dark as well as light colors<sup>46</sup> is not satisfactory to him. It gives us no enlightenment as to why just these particular evils are necessary to make the perfection of the whole. It suggests an ethics of quietism; for it logically implies that the distinction between good and evil is mere appearance and not genuinely valid.

For Royce, then, evil is not merely "an illusion of the partial view; . . . but . . . seems in positive crying opposition to all goodness." "We do not say that evil must exist to set

<sup>46</sup> See Chapter III.

the good off by way of contrast. . . . We say only that the evil will is a conquered element in the good will, and is as such necessary to goodness." "The good act has its existence and life in the transcending of experienced present evil." "Goodness as a moral experience is for us the overcoming of experienced evil; and in the eternal life of God the realization of goodness must have the same sort of organic relation to evil as it has in us."<sup>47</sup> According to the theory of monistic idealism, then, evil has its place in the perfect world. It is the condition of the possibility of the good. Even the worst conceivable evil, the deed of a traitor, may be the condition of an atoning deed by which the world is so re-created and transformed that it is "better than it would have been had all else remained the same, but had that deed of treason not been done at all."<sup>48</sup>

Now no one will question the reality and importance of the experiences and social situations employed to illustrate the "overcoming" of evil. Physical pain sweetens and sanctifies the life of those who accept it resignedly, and bear it patiently. One who meets his troubles bravely may thus make them stepping-stones to a level of character which he could not otherwise have attained. As we study the record of human progress, we frequently meet cases in which an act of sin seems to have been the indispensable condition of great good. The conception of the "overcoming" of evil is then undoubtedly a conception of great significance. Nevertheless, the theodicy offered by monistic idealism is not satisfactory. The monistic theodicy fails for two reasons: (a) It does not account for *all* evils; and (b) its account of evil tacitly presupposes a pluralistic view of the world.

(a) If the only evil were an *evil will*, and the only good a good will, then the notion of the "overcoming" of evil would be much less unsatisfactory. Let us grant for the sake of the argument, that the will may be good or evil in itself, that is to

<sup>47</sup> *The Religious Aspects of Philosophy*, pp. 456 ff.

<sup>48</sup> *The Problem of Christianity*, I, 308.

But for some  
that can be  
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say, without reference to the consequences likely to flow from its choices (a theory which is, however, very hard to understand). But, even if we grant that *will* may be good or bad *per se*, there is no reason to hold that there are no other goods and evils. The enumeration of "goods" is a sort of personal confession of faith. No *ultimate* rational ground can be given for calling anything good or bad. The perception of values is a presupposition of all reasoning about right or wrong, good or bad. Certainly, no one will claim that the goodness or badness of *will* can be logically demonstrated. And all that I am insisting upon here is, that, if we recognize good or bad *will*, we are also justified in speaking of other "goods" and "evils."

One of these other goods is pleasure, and one of these other evils is pain. Now it is true that in many cases pain subserves a good purpose, and that the patient endurance of pain (and, still more, I should say, the effort to relieve and destroy it in oneself and in others) evokes some of the most admirable human qualities; but no one has proved that all pains are productive of sufficient good to justify their existence, and, as we shall see below, this attempted justification of pain presupposes a non-monistic view of the world.

Another "good" is life, considered apart from its pains and pleasures. The corresponding "evil" is death, especially premature death. An earthquake destroys a thousand men; a child, previously strong and healthy, falls a prey to a contagious disease, in consequence of the ignorance or carelessness of its parents and the negligence of the community. If the life of the person has ceased, he cannot be said to have been strengthened or ennobled by the misfortune that has befallen him. If, on the other hand, we assume that the person is immortal, and that his moral development continues in spite of what we call death, there is no reason for holding that his character has been improved by his unfortunate experience, or that it was in any sense good for him that his entrance into the next world should have been hastened through human

ignorance and sin. In either case, there is no reason for believing that the perfection of the Absolute requires the termination of human lives in this manner.

Another "good" is sound intelligence, and the corresponding "evil," insanity. *This presents an especially difficult case* for the monistic idealist. The physical life continues, but all opportunity for moral achievement is cut off. The evil is surely not overcome in the individual, and there is no reason for supposing it to be overcome in the Absolute, unless, indeed, one is willing to hold that mere variety of content is to be so highly esteemed, that the content of the perfect Mind must be assumed to include the insane delusions of these unfortunates. Very similar considerations confront us when we think of those cases in which men's wills have been weakened by disease; or in which immature moral agents are compelled by economic conditions to live in an environment that is conducive to sin.

Now so long as there remains a *single* evil that cannot rationally be supposed to be "overcome," or even that cannot be rationally *shown* to be overcome, we must conclude that the monistic theodicy has failed. It is, of course, possible to find a great many cases in the life of the race, as also in the experience of the individual moral agent, where evil seems to have been thus overcome. But these cases may be matched with others where just the contrary seems to be true. The "treason" of the sons of Jacob led eventually to the elevation of their brother to the virtual kingship of Egypt, and to the preservation of the whole Israelite clan from famine; but the assassination of Abraham Lincoln led to bitter days in the life of the American people, which, there is reason to believe, might have been shortened or prevented, if the great President had been permitted to live a few years longer. To be sure, we do not *know* what the course of events would have been, had Lincoln served out his second presidential term; but neither do we *know* what the course of events would have been, if

the brethren of Joseph had never sinned, or if Judas had not betrayed his Lord.

As we look back over our lives, we see temptations overcome and difficulties bravely met and conquered; but what shall we say of the temptations that were *not* overcome, of the difficulties that were not conquered?

Professor Royce himself speaks of a class of evils that, so far as we can see, are not overcome. "Pestilence, famine, the cruelties of oppressors, the wrecks of innocent human lives by cruel fortunes—all these seem, for our ordinary estimates, facts that we can in nowise assimilate, justify, or reasonably comprehend. . . . To such evils, from our human point of view, the principle: 'They ought to be simply driven out of existence,' is naturally applicable without limitation."<sup>49</sup>

These evils, then, are not seen to be necessary to the perfection of the universal good. They are not yet "spiritualized." But, then, with respect to all such evils, the theodicy is not *rational*. Unfortunately, philosophy must be written "from our human point of view." So far as *these* evils are concerned, we are no farther on than were Plotinus or Augustine. All we can say is that, in spite of certain ugly black spots, the picture *may* be beautiful as a whole for a Mind that can behold it thus.

(b) Our second reason for rejecting the monistic theodicy is that it tacitly presupposes a pluralistic view of the world. What can we make of the claim that evil is "fragmentariness"? Is fragmentariness, as such, evil? Then nothing is really good except the Whole; and the contrast of "good" and "bad" is identified with the contrast between the "more inclusive" and the "less inclusive." But why the more inclusive should be regarded as better, and the all-inclusive as best of all, is by no means clear.

Well, then, does "overcoming" mean more than the mere relation of Whole to part? If it is to have any ethical significance, it certainly must mean more than this. Some parts

<sup>49</sup> *Sources of Religious Insight*, p. 233.

of the Absolute, to wit good men and good impulses, are "good"; others are "evil"; and this difference is not a difference of size, or of complexity of organization. There is here a genuine difference of character; and therefore if the notion of "overcoming" is to have any moral significance at all, the evil that is overcome must be not merely a *part* of the Absolute, but a something *other* than the Absolute. For this reason James is right in saying that *the ideally perfect whole* is that whole of which the parts also are perfect.<sup>50</sup> It may not be true that the ideally perfect *world*, or the ideally perfect *group* of moral agents, is that world or group *all* the parts of which are perfect; but this is true of a *whole*; for within a whole it is logically impossible for good and evil to come into conflict. Moral "overcoming" implies a conflict of persons, or at least of numerically distinct forces, tendencies, or impulses; and not merely a contrast of parts with one another or with their Whole.

Furthermore, if monistic idealism is not to give us an ethics of acquiescence, if the notion of "overcoming" is to be taken seriously, we must assume the reality of temporal succession. All the illustrations of the overcoming of evil, the case of the traitor and all cases in which a person is strengthened and ennobled by misfortune, imply the notion of time. If it were possible to assign any meaning at all to the notion of a timeless act, it might be possible to think of an eternal *prevention* of evil; but not of an eternal *overcoming* of evil.

2. *The Outline of a Finitist Theodicy.*—In so far, then, as the conception of "overcoming" is valid and morally significant, it presupposes a finitist theology. If we no longer try to think of God as all-inclusive, and no longer think of him as omnipotent, then this conception of the logical necessity and practical value of evil is a conception of great importance. But we need not affirm that *all* evils are necessary for the perfection of the world. We may admit the reality of stern and opaque necessities, which can not be transcended,

<sup>50</sup> *The Pluralistic Universe*, p. 123.



which are not completely understood, it may be, by the Supreme Person himself.

The theological finitist may say without logical inconsistency that it is better that there should be sin than that no opportunity should be afforded for freedom and personality.

He may say that it is better that the operations of Nature should be uniform, than that Nature, like an over-kind nurse, should be continually stepping in to shield us from the results of ignorance, recklessness, or indolence.

He may say that some of the evils which we endure are the condition of the prevention of greater evils. He may, therefore, without inconsistency, explain much of our physical pain as a warning against courses of action that would lead to greater misery.

He may expatiate upon the educative function of suffering of every description, and show how its patient endurance, when it is irremediable, will produce a beautiful and saintly character.

In short, the theological finitist may take over into his system of thought all the particular instances of "compensation," but need not attempt to show that the "compensation" is complete or universal. Many evils exist which ought to be "simply destroyed"; but God is not strong or wise enough, and certainly we are not, to destroy them *immediately*. In other words, the finitist may take seriously the thought of evolution or *progress*—a conception which the absolutist is logically forbidden to entertain.

"We have found a thought," says Royce in his first philosophical book, "that makes this concept of progress not only inapplicable to the world of the infinite life, but wholly superfluous." "Progress in this world as a whole is therefore simply not needed."<sup>51</sup> For the theological finitist, on the contrary, the concept of progress, far from being "superfluous," is of immense significance. He hopes for, and believes in the possibility of, a better world; and, while lamenting the logical

<sup>51</sup> *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, pp. 464, 466.



inconsistency of his monistic brother, works by the side of the latter in the effort to hasten the coming of this better world.

V.

LOGICAL FINITISM AND THE IDEA OF GOD.

In the preceding chapters we have come to the conclusion that it is impossible to think of God as infinite in the first of the two senses of the word. (See Chapter I, Section 4.) The hard facts of human experience forbid us to say that God is the Whole of reality, or that he is omnipotent. In the present chapter I wish to discuss the arguments of a school of thinkers who have maintained the logical absurdity of holding that God is infinite in the *second* of our two senses. According to these thinkers we cannot say without self-contradiction that God (or the world, or anything) consists of or includes an infinite multiplicity of elements, or perdures through an infinite sequence of moments. While this theory and the view which I have called "ethical finitism" do not imply each other, inasmuch as they deny the infinity of God in two different senses, yet these two kinds of finitism are mutually compatible, and support one another, since both are opposed to monistic idealism, which maintains that God, or the Absolute, is infinite in both senses.

The founder of this school of thinkers was Charles Renouvier (1815-1903), who is said by James to have been the "strongest philosopher of France in the second half of the nineteenth century."<sup>52</sup> As important disciples we may name F. Pilon, F. Evellin, and E. Boutreux. Henri Bergson, France's most eminent living philosopher, has been greatly influenced by Renouvier, but it would scarcely be just to call him a disciple.<sup>53</sup>

"Neocriticism," as the Renouvierist philosophy is called in

<sup>52</sup> *Problems of Philosophy*, p. 163. This, the last book of William James, is dedicated "to the great Renouvier's memory."

<sup>53</sup> Thilly, *History of Philosophy*, pp. 511 f.

recognition of its historic relation to the system of Kant, is characterized by Windelband as a synthesis of Kant and Comte. Renouvier, however, while no doubt influenced by Comte, always emphasized the difference between his own philosophy and positivism. Positivism begins with a discussion of the natural sciences and of the implications of scientific method, and is led to a rejection of the notions of being-in-itself and transitive cause. Neocriticism reaches a similar conclusion by a different road. It "begins with the logical investigation of mental phenomena, . . . and completes the Humian critique of the concepts of substance and causality by means of an apriorism related to that of Kant: in mental phenomena we have to seek 'essentially' the laws of all being. Thus neocriticism is indeed phenomenism, but not empiricism."<sup>54</sup>

1. *The Finitist View of the World.*—The best introduction to the philosophy of Renouvier is a study of the Kantian "antinomies." According to the first of these it can be proved that the world has a beginning in time and limits in space; and it can be proved with equal cogency that it has no beginning and no limits. The second antinomy affirms that every compound substance consists of simple, that is indivisible, parts; and also that there is nothing simple, but that everything is infinitely divisible. The third and fourth antinomies treat in the same way the issue of causality *versus* freedom, and the question of the existence of an absolutely necessary Being.<sup>55</sup>

There are certain obvious weaknesses or oversights in the demonstration. Yet it is possible so to revise Kant's arguments as to make them much more cogent.<sup>56</sup> If, then, the demonstration of both thesis and antithesis, in the case of each or only of some of these examples of the conflict of reason with

<sup>54</sup> Windelband, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie*, S. 515; Feigl, *Der Französische Neokriticismus*, S. 9.

<sup>55</sup> Kant, *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*, A, 426-461 (Mueller, pp. 344 ff.).

<sup>56</sup> See Renouvier, *Critique de la Doctrine de Kant*, pp. 29 f. Cf. *Les Dilemmes de la Métaphysique Pure*.

itself, be regarded as valid, the natural outcome might seem to be a thoroughgoing scepticism, an utter despair of the possibility of attaining the right to be certain about anything. For if the human reason thus falls into necessary self-contradiction, what ground have we for trusting it even in those cases in which no contradiction is discoverable? Such a complete scepticism, however, is *practically* impossible; and, accordingly, it is more common for those who hold that both the theses and the antitheses are valid to argue that the existence of these antinomies constitutes a reason for the subordination of the human reason to the authority of the Church or the Bible. From these necessary conflicts they conclude that human reason has its limits, that we are not always safe in refusing to believe some propositions, even though they appear to us to be logically absurd or self-contradictory. Difficulties and even self-contradictions may be found in the historic creeds, if we look for them; but the same is true of some of the most commonly received conceptions, such as the notions of space and time. Therefore, these thinkers argue, we are justified in believing "mysteries," that is to say, in holding to the truth of propositions that are logically inconceivable.<sup>57</sup>

In one of his earliest philosophical works, *Le Manuel de Philosophie moderne* (1842), Charles Renouvier himself had thought it possible to believe both the theses and the antitheses of these antinomies.<sup>58</sup> But the *Essais de Critique générale* began a polemic against this position;<sup>59</sup> and, in his mature philosophy, logical conceivability, that is to say, freedom from self-contradiction, became the criterion, not only of all valid thinking, but also of real existence. Thus it is a cardinal principle of the neo-criticist school that one of the two sides of each of the mathematical antinomies must be false. There is no meaning in saying that *both* are true. As Evellin puts it, "To say *yes* and *no* of the same thing at the same time

<sup>57</sup> See Mansel, *The Limits of Religious Thought*; Newman, *The Grammar of Assent*; Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics*.

<sup>58</sup> Arnal, *Philosophie Religieuse de Charles Renouvier*, p. 29.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 33.

and under the same point of view, this is contradiction; and for the understanding contradiction is death."<sup>60</sup>

Accordingly the neo-criticists recognize the principle of contradiction as the fundamental principle of thought. Moreover, they refuse to exempt any topic of discussion whatever from the sway of this principle. You can't appeal to it in order to demolish the theories of other people, and then refuse to admit its universal validity when it threatens to demolish some pet theory of your own. This principle, they insist, is essential, not only to human intelligence, but to intelligence as such. You may speak if you will of an intelligence that is higher than human; but, unless the principle of contradiction is a principle of this higher intelligence also, the phrase "higher intelligence" is a phrase without meaning. Or, if you say that you believe in "truths above reason," which on the plane of human reason take the form of self-contradictory propositions, they will tell you that you are the dupe of words. Each of the words of a self-contradictory proposition may indeed have a perfectly clear and definite meaning when taken separately, but the combination has no meaning, and the so-called proposition is, strictly speaking, no proposition at all, but merely a succession of words. You may believe that you believe it; but in reality you do not believe it, for it is neither true nor false but meaningless.

The principle of contradiction is thus the corner-stone of the Renouvierist philosophy. Next in importance, and, as Renouvier and his disciples maintain, a necessary consequence of it, is the "principle of number." This is the principle that an *infinite number* is a self-contradictory notion, and that there can therefore be no *actual infinite*. Again and again in his voluminous writings<sup>61</sup> Renouvier recurs to this point, and seeks to establish it in various ways, but especially by an examination of the properties of the series of cardinal numbers.

<sup>60</sup> Evellin, *Infini et Quantité*, p. 19. Cf. Renouvier, *Les Dilemmes de la Métaphysique Pure*, pp. 2 f.

<sup>61</sup> See *Les Dilemmes de la Métaphysique Pure*, pp. 122-125; *Nouvelle Monadologie*, p. 35; *Logique Générale*, I, pp. 46 f., 57, and elsewhere.

A typical illustration of the absurdity of supposing that an infinite unumber may actually be given is borrowed from the writings of Galileo. It runs as follows:

"Suppose the series of natural numbers to be given. We can then form another sequence composed exclusively of the squares of the first, for it is always possible to find the square of a number. Thus, by hypothesis, the second sequence will have a number of terms equal to the number of terms of the first. Now the first contains all the numbers, squares as well as not-squares, while the second contains only the squares. The first has, therefore, a number of terms greater than that of the second, since, containing all the numbers, it contains all the squares, and it contains besides the numbers that are not squares. But by hypothesis or construction, these numbers of terms are equal. Therefore there are some equal numbers of which one is greater than another. But this consequence is absurd. Therefore it is absurd to suppose the natural series of numbers to be actually given."<sup>62</sup> Now if the natural series of numbers were given, it would of course be an actually infinite multitude. But we have seen that it is absurd to suppose that the entire series of cardinal numbers is given; and, if this is true of the series of numbers, it is obviously true of every infinite series, since the terms of any series may be numbered "one," "two," "three," etc. Therefore the notion of an *actual infinite* is absurd. In other words, every multitude has a number; but the notion of an infinite number is logically impossible; and therefore it is impossible that there should be any actually existing infinite multitude.

Here, however, an important distinction is to be made. We should discriminate between the notion of an infinite which is merely potential and that of an infinite in the absolute sense of the term. "The first consists in this: that, however great or small we assume a given entity to be, and however much we imagine it to be increased by repeated multiplications, there

<sup>62</sup> Renouvier, *Les Principes de la Nature*, p. 37; also *Année Philosophique*, 1890, pp. 83 ff.

must still be thought to be something greater or smaller. The second infinite consists in this: that a thing has actually and absolutely so much magnitude or smallness that one can not imagine more of it."<sup>63</sup> The first infinite is called by Renouvier and his disciples the *indefinite*. Now the indefinite is a clear idea; but of the absolute infinite it is psychologically and logically impossible to form any conception. It is evident from the above definition of the indefinite that it never *is*, but always *becomes*. Accordingly the indefinite may also be called the *potential* infinite.

2. *The God-Conception of the Logical Finitist.*—Some of the theological implications of logical finitism are discussed by Pillon in the *Année Philosophique* for 1890, in an article entitled "La Première Preuve Cartésienne De L'Existence De Dieu et La Critique De L'Infini." In this article, from which several citations have already been made, Pillon reminds us that Descartes, after removing the doubt of his own existence by the help of the *cogito ergo sum*, seeks to escape from egoistic idealism by means of the idea of infinity or perfection. The truth of our ideas about an external world is inferred from the existence of God; and the existence of God is inferred from our possession of the *idea* of God.

"Among my ideas there is one which represents a God, sovereign, eternal, infinite, immutable, omniscient, and universal creator of the things which are outside of him." This idea, says Descartes, must have a cause; and Descartes assumes that there must be at least as much "reality" in the efficient cause as in its effect. No idea can contain more objective reality than the formal reality of its cause. Now, the only cause adequate to the production of this idea of God, which we find in our minds, *is* God. Therefore God exists. Therefore the external world is a real world. Such is Descartes's reasoning.

Pillon remarks that, in assuming the general proposition that the effect can not be superior to the efficient cause, Des-

<sup>63</sup> *L'Année Philosophique*, 1890, p. 56.

cartes reveals a failure to make his original doubt as universal as he supposed he had made it.<sup>64</sup> If, with the school of Renouvier, we hold that there may be first beginnings, that is to say, uncaused events, it is evident that there is no necessity for believing that the effect can contain no more "reality" than the cause. For, in so far as the scholastic principle is regarded as demonstrable, it rests upon the assumption that every event must have a cause. The scholastic philosophers reasoned, and after them Descartes, that if the effect contained more reality than the cause, then, assuming that both effect and cause are divisible into parts, some parts of the effect would be uncaused, since the more real being would have the greater number of parts. If, however, we assume that there is no necessary connection between the notion of a beginning and that of an effect, the scholastic principle assumed by Descartes sinks to the level of a pseudo-axiom. Accordingly, even if we *do* possess the idea of an infinite and perfect being, we are not justified in arguing from the fact of its possession to the existence of such a being.

Moreover, says Pilon, Descartes confused the notions of infinity and perfection. Descartes assumes the synonymy of the words "infinite" and "perfect." But, "the idea of the perfect, which Descartes and after him Malebranche, Fenelon, Leibniz, all the spiritualist philosophers of the eighteenth century, as all those of our time, have always confounded with that of infinity, should be rigorously distinguished from it. This distinction is one of the fundamental theses of the phenomenalist criticism."

"Perfection is a general idea, formed from the ideas of diverse qualities of an excellence such as we contemplate with unmixed satisfaction, and to which we judge nothing that we can imagine of the same order to be preferable. These qualities are intellectual or moral or even physical: Such are knowledge, wisdom, justice, goodness, happiness, beauty, etc. A perfect being is a being in which these qualities are united,"

<sup>64</sup> *L'Année Philosophique*, 1890, p. 161.



and so fittingly and harmoniously combined that there is no occasion for "reproach or desire." "The ideas relative to perfection and those which concern mathematical magnitude form, in reality, two separate and irreducible categories." These categories rest upon two kinds of comparison: Comparison of quantity and comparison of estimation or preference.<sup>65</sup> The notion of perfection is then one which we can make for ourselves. Consequently, we do not need to assume the existence of a perfect being in order to explain the presence of the idea in our minds.

The notion of infinity, *i. e.*, of infinity in the absolute sense, we can not make. But, says the neo-criticist, we do not really possess this notion, because it is logically contradictory. The causal relation of our notions of infinity is just the opposite of that supposed by Descartes. "It is not the idea of the real and absolute infinite impressed in our soul by this infinite, which explains the formation of our ideas of potential infinities. It is our ideas of potential infinities drawn from ourselves, which have conducted us by a process logically illegitimate, but psychologically natural, to the idea of the real and absolute infinite. It is the infinities, apparently actual, of the spatial and temporal world that have led us to the divine attributes."<sup>66</sup>

We can not, therefore, have any valid conception of infinity in the absolute sense. The world is finite and God is finite.

3. *The Attributes of the Finite God.*—The idea of God which was supposed by Descartes to have been impressed by the Creator upon every human mind represented God as "sovereign, eternal, infinite, immutable, omniscient, omnipotent." The neo-criticist "principle of number," as we have seen, compels a revision of this idea.

By Pillon, as by Royce,<sup>67</sup> *omnipotence* is treated as the typical attribute of Deity. We may justify this method of procedure on the ground that, in the first place, omnipotence

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 51, 111 ff.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 110.

<sup>67</sup> See Chapter II.



implies omniscience; knowing is only a particular kind of doing. Not to know and not to be able to find out would be not to be able to do. In the second place, and conversely, omniscience implies omnipotence. That knowledge is power is attested by the etymological affinity of the German *können* and *kennen*, and the English *can* and *cunning*, and by the uses of the French verb *savoir*. To know how is the same thing as to be able. An omniscient being, accordingly, will know how to do all things, that is to say, will be able to do all things, will be omnipotent; and, on the other hand, if logic forbids us to think of God as omniscient, then we can not logically think of him as omnipotent either.

Pillon approaches the discussion of the divine omniscience from the side of perfect foreknowledge. The problem is to reconcile the idea of perfect foreknowledge with the neo-criticist principle of number, and this reconciliation is, of course, impossible.

Objection has frequently been made to the idea of a foreknowledge of "free" acts. But the objection which Pillon is urging holds against the foreknowledge of determined events as well. For "these necessary or determined future events do not form a whole, a determined number, since they are supposed to produce themselves in a time which has no limits. It is an endless series, not simply of possibles, but of necessities. It is necessary to say that the potential infinity of these future events finds itself in some manner realized in the divine understanding; or else it is necessary to reject the perfect and absolute foreknowledge even when it is a question of necessary future events."<sup>8</sup>

Yet we may distinguish two sorts of omniscience, or in the special case just now in question, of perfect foreknowledge, corresponding to the distinction previously made between the absolute, or actual infinite and the potential infinite. There is, accordingly, a sense in which it is *logically* unobjectionable to speak of perfect foreknowledge. "Does it follow then,"

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 174.

concludes Pillon, "that one ought to regard as impossible the perfection of foreknowledge? Yes, assuredly, if one makes this perfection consist in the knowledge of an infinite number of future realities. No, if in place of attributing to the being who is supposed to be perfect a "single infinite and eternal thought," one admits that his intelligence differs from ours by its extent, and not in respect of its nature; that it proceeds like ours by separate and successive acts of thought; that it is free to push back successively the limits of its horizon, but that it is always obliged to have a horizon. Thus understood omniscience presents no contradiction."<sup>69</sup> In other words God might, so far as the purely logical argument is concerned, be assumed to be omniscient, in the sense of knowing all that is at any given moment knowable, even if he is finite in the sense of the neo-criticist.

Accordingly, the view of Mill and James and of the previous chapter is not logically bound up with that of Renouvier and Pillon. Logical finitism suggests and makes room for, but does not in itself require ethical finitism. As has already been said, our reasons for denying the divine omnipotence and omniscience are not merely logical; they are chiefly ethical. Yet the neo-criticist argument prepares men's minds for the acceptance of this ethically grounded argument. Both arguments presuppose loyalty to the principle of contradiction, and both presuppose a certain freedom from the traditional preference for such *words* as "infinite," "omniscient," "omnipotent," etc., when employed as adjectives modifying the word "God."

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 179.

(*To be concluded.*)

### XIII.

## "THE KINGDOM OF HEAVEN" AND "THE KINGDOM OF GOD"

W. A. KLINE.

It has always appeared strange to me that the writers on the Old Testament, and especially those on the New Testament, should make no distinction between the two expressions used by St. Matthew, namely, "The Kingdom of Heaven" and "The Kingdom of God," but either speak of them as used interchangeably, and if not exactly as synonymous terms, at the most, as nothing more than identical expressions to convey the same fundamental conception of spiritual truth; or else simply pass them by without making mention of them at all, and throw them around loosely in their writings.

The more one studies these expressions in their various relations with each other and with the circumstances and incidents with which they are connected, and the occasions upon which they were uttered, the more must he come to believe that they are not synonymous terms, or even identical, but that each has a meaning peculiar to itself, separate and distinct from the other, and, indeed, very different from it.

It is the purpose of this paper to show the difference of meaning, if there is any, between these two expressions by what we think is the proper exegesis and interpretation of them where they occur in the Gospel of Matthew in connection with the context, and also by cross references to other portions both of the Old and New Testament scriptures, where these terms may appear, and where they may be of value and throw light upon the subject under consideration.

But whilst I have tried to give a fair interpretation and exposition with the use of the Lexicon, holding in mind the

two main laws of exegesis, the original text, and the context, I have not hesitated to call to my aid and assistance such recognized authorities as Alford, Tholuck, Osterzee, Beyschlag, Weiss, Bruce, Meyer, Lange, Schaff and all other sources of information bearing upon the subject that were available and that could be utilized.

As the expression "The Kingdom of Heaven" (*ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν*) is peculiar to Matthew alone and only in four cases<sup>1</sup> does he depart from it and use "The Kingdom of God" (*ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ*), whereas this latter expression is used exclusively by the other evangelists, it will be necessary before entering into a discussion of our subject to take a cursory glance at the four Gospels, and note a few of their peculiarities and learn for whom they were written.

#### THE GOSPELS

##### *Matthew*

The Gospel of Matthew was probably written in Palestine, and certainly for Jewish Christians. Writers are nearly all agreed on this point and internal evidence confirms this inference. Perhaps a better way to state it is to say that it was written for Jewish Christians in Palestine.

"Here we have fewer interpretations of Jewish customs, laws and localities than in the two other Gospels. The whole narrative proceeds more upon a Jewish view of matters and is concerned more to establish that point which to a Jewish convert would be most important—that Jesus was the Messiah prophesied in the Old Testament."—Alford.

Matthew, at the same time, pays little attention to chronological order, especially when compared with Mark and Luke, but is more concerned about recording the *things done*, and the *exact sayings* of our Lord, than the precise order in which they occurred.

Again permit me to use the words of Dean Alford, who says, "It is in this principal duty of an evangelist that Matthew

<sup>1</sup> Matt. 12: 28, 19: 24, 21: 31 and 43.

stands preëminent, and especially in the report of the longer discourses of our Lord. It was within the limits of his purpose in writing to include all the descriptions of the state and hopes of the citizens of the Kingdom of Heaven which Jesus gave during his ministry. This seems to have been the peculiar gift of the Spirit to him—to recall and deliver down in their *strictest verbal connections*, such discourses as the Sermon on the Mount, etc."

Dr. Bruce, in his work entitled the *Kingdom of God*, p. 10, argues very learnedly in favor of the originality of Matthew's reports and says that critics on the whole favor it. He then shows this to be true in the Sermon on the Mount, where the phrases of Matthew are certainly to be regarded the more original and that Luke made substitutions for the purpose as Weizsacker<sup>2</sup> puts it, to meet the demands of the times and the needs of the people with whom he had to deal, so that eventually "*explanations became texts.*"

It is also agreed by nearly all writers on the New Testament that Matthew wrote first among the evangelists, and thus does his Gospel form a closer connecting link between the Old and New Testament scriptures.

### Mark

Of this Gospel and the two others that follow, little more need be said than to state for what class of people they were written and note briefly one or two of their chief characteristics.

It is clear from internal evidence that Mark wrote his Gospel for Gentile Christians. This is evident from the absence of citations from the Old Testament, the explanations of Jewish customs, etc.

Mark relates comparatively few discourses, but dwells particularly upon the life of our Lord in relation to the *future necessities* of the Church and thus is his Gospel full of the Spirit of the Holy Ghost.

<sup>2</sup> Bruce, *K. of G.*, p. 6.

Because of this fact, that he looks more to the future Church, he always speaks of "The Kingdom of God" (*ἡ Βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ*) and at the same time gives due prominence to that other familiar expression "The Son of God" (*ὁ υἱὸς θεοῦ*), whereas on the other hand Matthew speaks of "The Kingdom of Heaven" (*ἡ Βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν*) and always closely connected with it he uses the expression "The Son of Man" (*ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*).

#### Luke

We find universality the prevailing characteristic of this Gospel. There is no marked peculiarity given to Jewish customs and manners as in Matthew; nor is it especially adapted to Gentile readers as that of Mark. If it inclines more to one side than the other it is certainly toward that of the Gentiles. "Commentators have noticed that Luke principally records those sayings and acts of our Lord by which God's mercy to the Gentiles is set forth." Alford, however, chooses to assign universality to this Gospel and says that "it was designed for the general use of Christians, whether Jews or Gentiles." It is also to be inferred from Luke's own statements that he was not himself an eye witness to that which he wrote, but that he *compiled* his Gospel from other sources in a careful and systematic manner.

Whether he relied much upon the Gospel of Matthew and Mark for his information it is not the purpose of this paper to discuss.

#### John

"This Gospel presupposes readers already Christians and was written to build them up and confirm them in the faith." —Alford.

It is perhaps more spiritual than the synoptics and shows on its very face that the writer was more influenced by reflection on the words of Christ than by the literalness of the expressions themselves. If, therefore, we are desirous to ascertain exactly what Christ taught we must study the Synoptic Gospels rather than that of John. He is more concerned with

the spirit of the law than with the law itself. Spirituality and devotion are its chief characteristics.

Having thus briefly stated some of the characteristics of the four Gospels and for whom and what purpose they were written, we are now prepared to begin the discussion of our subject proper.

The first time we meet with the expression "The Kingdom of Heaven" in the New Testament is in Matthew 3:2. It then becomes a favorite theme of his and is used throughout his Gospel with the exception of four times, as has already been indicated in this paper, where he makes a departure and uses "The Kingdom of God."<sup>3</sup>

"The Kingdom of Heaven" or "The Kingdom of God," as used by the evangelists in the New Testament, is no new thing so far as the idea or conception itself is concerned. The organic commonwealth which had its principle of existence in the will of God had already been established in the Jewish theocracy. It is this Kingdom that Isaiah frequently speaks of, but more especially and clearly is it set forth in Dan. 7: 13, 14, 18 and 22, where God is represented as taking the Kingdom upon himself by a visible Representative, in which connection is also used "The Son of Man." But this Kingdom was very imperfectly realized by the Jews under the old dispensation, and, therefore, we can fully agree with Van Osterzee, in his New Testament Theology, when he says that the Kingdom is "something new" (relatively).

The Kingdom in the Old Testament is confined within the limits of a single nation. They saw the reflection of it as we sometimes see the glimmering light of the sun when he is obscured from our vision by thick dark clouds that hang over our heads. We know the fact that the sun is, and we firmly believe, indeed, there is not the least spark of a doubt on our part but that he will soon disperse the clouds and shine forth again to illumine the world. Just so in the language of Tholuck, that "although in Israel the principle of a Divine theocracy was restricted within the narrow limits of its own

<sup>3</sup> Matt. 12: 28, 19: 24, 21: 31 and 43.

nationality there was yet among the people a certain consciousness of the truth that the principle itself was of universal application. And as it was evident that the Mosaic religion, as such, could never become the religion of all nations—to mention only one circumstance, it was plain that all nations of the earth could not come up to the Temple at Jerusalem to celebrate the feasts—they believed that the time would come when the spirit of this theocratic principle would be delivered from the symbolical and local forms of Judaism."

But what is this Kingdom of God? This question has nowhere been expressly answered, not even by Christ himself. "The idea," says Dr. Weiss,<sup>4</sup> "is regarded as one quite familiar to the people. In fact, no one in Israel which was from the first to be a Kingdom whose Supreme Lord and King was Jehovah could thereby understand anything else than a Kingdom in which the will of God is fulfilled as perfectly upon earth as by the angels in Heaven."

This is almost the exact language of Beyschlag,<sup>5</sup> but in addition to this he says, "according to this, the Kingdom of Heaven or the Kingdom of God would be the perfect original order of things which has its home in heaven, in order to come down from thence and realize itself on earth—that ideal condition which humanity and history are to reach, that God may in his inmost essence, as eternal Spirit and holy love, fill all and condition all that is in the world."

From this we at once see that the Kingdom is a growth or development. It is not the product of a day, nor even a year, viewed from an historical or human standpoint, but it unfolds itself gradually through the ages. It has its germ in the Old Testament and by a slow, but, nevertheless, sure process it becomes a healthy growing plant in the New, not, however, as having yet arrived at maturity, but destined for a grander and more sublime existence in the future.

This is evidently Christ's teaching and preaching of the

<sup>4</sup> *New Testament Theology*, Vol. I, p. 63.

<sup>5</sup> *New Testament Theology*, Vol. I, p. 43.



Kingdom. Whilst he declares that the Kingdom, which men expected should come with Him, was really present, He at the same time intimates that it is also future.

When "Jesus came into Galilee, preaching the Gospel of the Kingdom of God, and saying, The time is fulfilled and the Kingdom of God is at hand,"<sup>6</sup> He speaks of the promise as being fulfilled already in this life, but perfectly in the perfected Kingdom of God in the life to come.<sup>7</sup>

The developed doctrine of the "Kingdom of God" discloses to us the end which the prophets saw dimly; but if we believe Christ to have been invested with prophetic power and authority, which I trust no one will question, and thus to have foreseen the fulfillment of the Kingdom which He founded, we need have no doubt but that He always keeps it before His eyes when He speaks and declares it to be present.

Thus far we have endeavored to develop our subject in a general way, and have tried to show an historical growth that finds its root far back in the Old Testament dispensation. We have made no attempt to show any distinction or difference, as yet, between "The Kingdom of Heaven" and "The Kingdom of God," but have purposely used the one broad term or appellation Kingdom, or more often, Kingdom of God.

At this point we are prepared to take up our subject and treat it more specifically by showing from facts already produced, and others that are yet to follow, that St. Matthew is not so careless a writer as to throw terms around loosely, and to use one expression to convey one meaning and quite a different expression to set forth the same fundamental truth. On the contrary, we desire to show that he is one of the most careful and exact writers of the New Testament, and that when he uses the two expressions, "The Kingdom of Heaven" and "The Kingdom of God," at certain times and on different occasions, he does it for a purpose, and that these two expressions are not synonymous terms, but that each variation from his favorite theme (*ἡ Βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν*) is full of meaning and significance.

<sup>6</sup> Mark 1: 14 and 15.

<sup>7</sup> Tholuck, *Sermon on the Mount*, p. 81.

I. "THE KINGDOM OF HEAVEN" AND "THE KINGDOM OF  
GOD" AS FOUND IN THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO  
ST. MATTHEW

In the first place, we have shown that Matthew's Gospel is the earliest, and, therefore, is more closely connected with the old covenant law than the others. In other words, it forms a connecting link between the Old and New Testament Scriptures. Again we have shown that The Kingdom is a growth or development. That it begins in embryo in the Old Testament and gradually unfolds itself through the ages. It is also true that the Jewish theocracy was not to be destroyed, but that it was to give place to, and be supplanted by something which was more far-reaching in its embrace, something that was to be universal or world-wide in its limits.

It is this universal organization of Christian believers, otherwise known as the Christian Church established upon the earth, that St. Matthew means when he speaks of "The Kingdom of Heaven," or better that Christ Himself means when He uses the words recorded by Matthew. Christ came not to destroy, but to fulfill the law. He does not, therefore, put away everything that is old and at once start *de novo*, but He takes up the thread of the Old dispensation and carries it into the New, not, however, without some radical changes. He has the same people to deal with that constituted the theocracy. They have their same external forms and ceremonies. They cannot at once be led into the spiritual Kingdom, nor even be made to understand it except through the visible. This visible is the Christian Church which Christ established upon the earth and which was to take the place of the Jewish theocracy. This He calls "The Kingdom of Heaven," and when He speaks of "The Kingdom of God" He means "The Kingdom of Heaven" perfected, when "Kingdom of Heaven" and "Kingdom of God" will mean one and the same thing.

"The Kingdom of God" is something spiritual, and in Matthew it nearly always points to the future, and when "The Kingdom of Heaven" has been fully realized upon the earth,

that is when the Church shall have performed her full mission and purpose there will be but one Kingdom, "The Kingdom of God." Nothing appears more absurd than to think that Christ would at once stop the process of growth that had started in the Old Testament and establish a perfectly developed Kingdom, and call it "The Kingdom of God." This earth was not the place for such a Kingdom in the time of Christ nor were the people with whom He had to deal fit subjects for such a Kingdom.

Thirty-two times does St. Matthew use the expression "The Kingdom of Heaven" (*ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν*)—Matt. 3:2, 4:17, 5:3, 10, 19, 19 and 20, 7:21, 8:11, 10:7, 11:11 and 12, 13:11, 24, 31, 33, 44, 45, 47 and 52, 16:19, 18:1, 3, 4 and 23, 19:12, 14 and 23, 20:1, 22:2, 23:13, 25:1—whereas but four times does he use "The Kingdom of God" (*ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ*)—Matt. 12:28, 19:24, 21:31 and 43.<sup>8</sup>

Now if we examine the expression "The Kingdom of Heaven" closely in the references given, in connection with their context, we find that it refers more to the present than to the future, and if so, then certainly more to the visible than to the invisible Church. Especially would we call attention to Chapters 13, 16, 18 and 19 where Christ Himself gives a full exposition of what He means by "The Kingdom of Heaven." And although He does not say in so many words that He means the organization of believers, who would be so stupid as to interpret Matt. 13:24 and 31 as meaning anything else but the visible Christian Church established upon the earth? What could be meant by the wheat and the tares growing together until the harvest if it does not mean the true and the false members of the Kingdom upon the earth mingling with each other, and so far as outward forms and ceremonies, so far as external appearances are concerned, all members of one common brotherhood of believers, the visible Church?

In Chapters 16 and 18, where Christ speaks of "The Kingdom of Heaven" and says in the very same connection—and

<sup>8</sup> These references are from the Greek and not from English translations.

certainly no one would separate the two clauses—that "whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven," all good commentators with one accord agree that this refers to the discipline to be exercised in the New Kingdom by Peter and the Apostles, or those who were vested with such authority. As some one says, "binding" and "loosing" in the new organization signified the authority to declare who might be admitted, and what the members of the new order could, and could not, properly do. This is the exegesis and interpretation of such recognized Biblical scholars as I have quoted in the beginning of my paper.

"The Kingdom of Heaven" in the 19th chapter will be discussed in connection with "The Kingdom of God" in the same chapter, where the two phrases are used side by side, as it were, by Jesus when speaking to his disciples, and where they certainly cannot mean one and the same thing.

However, before leaving "The Kingdom of Heaven" I shall call attention to two other references in the Gospel of Matthew, one to prove that "The Kingdom of Heaven" in the connection in which it stands can mean nothing else than the visible Church, and the other used by the opponents of this view as an objection against it.

The first is Matthew 22:1-14. For a good exposition and interpretation of this portion of Scripture, I shall quote from an article entitled "The Kingdom of Heaven" and "The Kingdom of God" in the March number, '95, of *Our Hope*, a monthly magazine devoted to the study of prophecy and Messianic Judaism. Says the writer of this article: "Some will be gathered into 'the Kingdom of Heaven' and afterwards cast out. Into it the servants sent out gathered bad and good as many as they found, but some are rejected; but into the marriage feast of the Lamb of God<sup>9</sup> the Servant (the Holy Spirit) is sent out to compel them to come in and they are brought in by that exceedingly great power which He (God) wrought in Christ when He raised Him from the dead;<sup>10</sup> and

<sup>9</sup> Luke 14: 23.

<sup>10</sup> Eph. 1: 19 and 20.

that same power will quicken the sleeping saints at the last trump, and change the living without any possibility of mistake. Some may lose a part of their reward, or lose their crown, but not one will be turned back. Conditions of motherhood, or seasons of the year, or Sabbath-day limitations of travel (Matt. 24) while they may imperil the safety of those going into 'the Kingdom of Heaven' will have no effect upon those who are gathered into 'the Kingdom of God.'"

Nothing more need be said upon this portion of Scripture, for this, as well as the others that have been discussed, has, so far as I know, never been viewed in any other light even by those who are not in harmony with the theory advanced. There is, moreover, a stock objection raised against holding this view of "The Kingdom of Heaven," by certain so-called critics, which needs to be met. Their proof text is Matt. 8:11, the only one that has come under our observation. This then is our second reference to which we desire to direct attention.

This text militates against the objectors themselves and doubly confirms our position. They forget that Jesus uses this expression in a symbolical sense, and that, therefore, it cannot be explained according to the strict interpretation of the letter. In keeping with Jewish ideas, one of the main elements in the happiness of the Messianic Kingdom was the privilege of participation in splendid festive entertainments along with the patriarch of the nation, and when Jesus has occasion to speak in figures, He uses such language as would be understood by those to whom he addressed Himself (Meyer).

But again, if interpreted literally, it can refer to nothing else than the millennial time between the first and second resurrection when the saints shall meet together upon the earth for a season, when Satan shall be bound, and when the Church temporal shall have universal sway. This is the strong passage of Scripture to support Millenarianism and if taken literally cannot be argued away. Says the writer in "The Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia" on Millenarianism: "There are, how-

ever, some passages (Matt. 8:11) which, if interpreted strictly and exclusively according to letter, afford some ground for the Millenarian doctrine." However, we are not arguing for Millenarianism now, but to show that whichever way this passage is interpreted, it supports our position instead of being a proof text against it.

Time and space forbid to take up the thirty-two passages of Scripture in which "The Kingdom of Heaven" is used in the Gospel of Matthew and give their true meaning and interpretation, and for this reason I have referred especially to those examples which bear their interpretation upon their very face and where there can be no question as to their meaning, whilst at the same time I have tried to clear up the comparatively few so-called questionable passages.

On the other hand let us examine carefully the phrase "The Kingdom of God" as used by St. Matthew.

Since he uses this expression but four times, we can take up each one separately and determine its meaning in connection with its surroundings, and we shall endeavor to do this with an unbiased mind, willing to bow in humble submission to scholarship, time, place and circumstances of the narrative and the words it contains.

The first time we meet with the expression "The Kingdom of God" in the Gospel of Matthew is in Chapter 12:28, where Christ says: "But if I by the Spirit of God cast out devils, then is the *Kingdom of God* come upon (*ἐν*) you." He is speaking of spiritual things and certainly would not use "The Kingdom of God" as referring to something visible, and thus confound spiritual things with temporal things. He speaks of "The Kingdom of God" as *coming upon them* and not as *entering into (eis) the Kingdom* as when He uses the phrase "The Kingdom of Heaven." Here it corresponds exactly to His use of the same words in another place where He says The Kingdom of God is not here, nor there, but within you.<sup>11</sup> Now whilst we cannot refer this to the future Church

<sup>11</sup> Luke 17:21.

pure and simple, at the same time they are the same so far as the spiritual and invisible are concerned, in contradistinction to the temporal and visible which we hold is true in regard to "The Kingdom of Heaven."

But whilst we take this view of "The Kingdom of Heaven" we would not be misunderstood as trying to make a great separation between the visible and the invisible Church ("The Kingdom of Heaven" and "The Kingdom of God") and leave a wide gulf between them; but, on the contrary, we firmly believe that there is just as close a connection between the Church of true believers on the earth and the future Church in heaven, as there is between the physical life and the spiritual life in man; and that just as no one can draw the dividing line separating the two or even showing where the physical stops and the spiritual begins, so no one can definitely and explicitly draw a boundary line between Church temporal and Church spiritual. And whilst it is absurd to believe that the visible church does, or can, save any one, it is at the same time inconsistent and out of accord with the teaching of the New Testament, to say that the Church is not a means, and, if not an absolute requirement, at least, an enjoined condition to salvation.

This discussion leads us on to the next place where we meet with "The Kingdom of God."<sup>12</sup> There is undoubtedly no better place in the whole Bible to compare the two expressions, "The Kingdom of Heaven" and "The Kingdom of God," than just here, for Jesus, in speaking to His disciples, uses both phrases and certainly with a purpose that cannot be mistaken or misunderstood. When He declares that "it is hard for a rich man to enter into the Kingdom of Heaven," is it not natural, reasonable and consistent with the context to interpret "The Kingdom of Heaven" as meaning the body or organization of Christian believers? Furthermore, is it not good common sense to look at it from this point of view, and has such not been the history of the Church from the begin-

<sup>12</sup> Matt. 19: 23 and 24.



ning, and is it not so at the present time? But if this is the meaning of "The Kingdom of Heaven," what does Christ mean when He says almost in the same breath "And again I say unto you, it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter into the Kingdom of God"? In the one case it is "hardly" a possibility. In the other case, according to the best commentators, an impossibility. Indeed, certainly, an impossibility so long as he has set his heart upon riches. This then can mean nothing else than that if a man who has set his heart upon riches and this world's goods may, perchance, be brought into the Church, or may choose to come in himself, unless he renounces the world and uses his riches for the glory of God and the good of his fellow-men, in other words, unless he changes his whole manner of life and ways of thinking, and centers his heart upon things spiritual, he can in no wise enter heaven. This may be a strong statement but it is the teaching of Christ and His apostles and is recorded for our edification, improvement and guide in life.

Again I venture the assertion that if these two portions of Holy Scripture, standing side by side, and used by our Savior in giving direction and instruction to His disciples, spoken at the same time and in almost the same breath, but yet in different language and to convey a different meaning, shall be understood as interchangeable terms to express the same meaning, I have reason to be apprehensive for the inspiration of the Scriptures.

Why should Christ use the phrase "The Kingdom of Heaven" at one time to convey His meaning to His disciples, and at the same time and in the same connection use that other expression "The Kingdom of God" to convey the same meaning? Or if these are simply terms peculiar to the evangelist alone, what right has he to change the words of Christ, and then record them in his Gospel as those of the Master?

Once more we would refer to Matt. 21:31 and 43, where the phrase, "The Kingdom of God," is used, and in both cases as pointing to the future or heaven.



In the former Jesus says, "verily I say unto you, that the publicans and the harlots go into the Kingdom of God before you." Publicans and harlots are represented by the first son mentioned; for previous to John, the Baptist, they refused to obey the Divine Call through the law and the prophets, but when John appeared they changed their manner of life and believed his preaching and thus devoted themselves to the service of God.

The Sanhedrin is represented by the second son, who had so hardened their hearts that not only did they turn a deaf ear to the teaching and preaching of John, but even mocked at and reviled Christ Himself. The meaning then is clear—that heaven was opened to those who, although at one time numbered with the transgressors, yet had now repented and entered the service of God, while those who were living within the light of the Gospel message, and who refused to accept its call, were debarred from entering the future Kingdom or "The Kingdom of God" (Heaven).

In the latter reference (Matt. 21:43) I again desire to quote from the same article in *Our Hope*, referred to before. "Matthew," says the writer of the article, "uses the term the 'Kingdom of Heaven' all through his Gospel, as he wrote especially of the kingly character of Christ, but he varies from it four or five times and uses the 'Kingdom of God' and each time the variation is full of meaning and significance. One bears directly on this subject. The Lord says to the Jews (Matt. 21:43): 'The Kingdom of God shall be taken from you and be given to a nation bringing forth fruits thereof.' This nation is the one referred to by Peter, 'ye are a chosen generation, a royal priesthood, a holy nation,' etc. Moses speaks of it in Deut. 32, in his song: 'They have moved me to jealousy by that which is not God. . . . I will move them to jealousy by those which are not a people, a foolish nation'—a nation of no account. This will be the real turning-point for the return of Israel to their God. Paul tried to provoke them to jealousy, but he failed; but when they see the Church taken

away, and find out the Gentile believers have obtained what might have belonged to them, they will be moved to jealousy." When then will they see that the Church has been taken away and when will they be moved to jealousy? Certainly not until the visible and the invisible Church shall be one, or when "The Kingdom of Heaven" shall be so perfectly realized, as stated before, that there will be but one Kingdom, "The Kingdom of God."

Such then is our argument from the interpretation of the passages of Scripture in which our subject is found. We shall now take up a new line of argument based upon the expressions, "The Son of Man" and "The Son of God," as used by the different evangelists.

## II. "THE SON OF MAN" AND "THE SON OF GOD"

Along with Matthew's favorite theme, "The Kingdom of Heaven," he uses another expression, "The Son of Man," which is a marked characteristic of his Gospel. And while this same expression is also used by the other evangelists, by no means do they give such prominence to it as he, nor do they use it so often throughout their entire writings, but speak of "The Son of Man" and "The Son of God," apparently without special reference to time, place or circumstances of events. We, therefore, at once see that the expression, "The Son of Man," in a manner, runs parallel with "The Kingdom of Heaven" in the Gospel of Matthew which is again worthy of our observation and investigation. Especially would we refer to Matt. 11:19, 13:37 and 41, 16:13, 27, 28 and 19:28, where the two expressions are so closely connected that we cannot help but think that they belong together. On the contrary we find that the phrase "The Son of God"<sup>13</sup> is never used in connection with "The Kingdom of Heaven."

Keeping this in mind, we are again prepared to take up our argument from an historical point of view and trace it back to the Old Testament. The Jews expected and were looking

<sup>13</sup> Matt. 4: 3 and 6, 8: 29, 14: 33, 26: 63, 27: 40, 43 and 54.

for a Messiah who should set up an earthly Kingdom and deliver them from the galling yoke of oppression under which they were chafing. "The hope of a King of Salvation," says Beyschlag, "springing from the house of David had stamped itself upon the minds of the prophets as early as the days in which the theocratic state was contending with the powers of Western Asia." Whilst this hope was at times faint, yet it was never lost sight of, and increased in strength immediately before the coming of Christ. We find the expression, "The Son of Man," used frequently in the Old Testament, so that we can again say, as in the case of "The Kingdom of God," that it is not new when we find it in Matthew, so far as the expression itself is concerned, and yet it is new in its realization. If we turn to Dan. 7:13 we find these words: "I saw in the night visions, and, behold, there came with the clouds of heaven one like unto the Son of Man, and he came even to the ancient of days, and they brought him near before him. And there was given him dominion that all the people, nations and languages should serve him; his dominion is an everlasting dominion which shall not pass away, and his Kingdom that which shall not be destroyed." This passage from Daniel evidently forms the golden key that unlocks the intricacies to the problem why Christ designated Himself "The Son of Man." Here, again, we see Him fulfilling the law even to the very letter and thereby giving the people that for which they were so ardently longing, a Messiah or Savior. "All these widely diverging utterances," says Beyschlag, speaking of "The Son of Man" and in connection with Him, Lord of the Sabbath, Messiah, etc., "have one thing in common, they all treat of the official sufferings and doings of Jesus; they all speak of Him in so far as He has the task of setting up the Kingdom of Heaven upon the earth."

This is the very point, conceded by him, for which we have been arguing that "The Kingdom of Heaven" in Matthew means the Kingdom established by Christ upon the earth, and that "The Son of Man" is that same Christ sitting upon the

throne of his father David in Jerusalem. It is with this "Son of David" that St. Matthew begins his Gospel,<sup>14</sup> and, as has already been said, it is this "Son of Man" that forms the silver cord that runs throughout his entire writings.

"The Jesus of the Synoptics puts on no grand airs, but is a meek and lowly man. The meek and lowly mind of Jesus found its verbal symbol in the oft-used self-designation *Son of Man*. For there can be little doubt that it is in this direction we must look for the true meaning of the name. Jesus nowhere defines its meaning, any more than He defines the name He gave to God. Here, as always, He defines only by discriminating use. We must listen attentively as He calls Himself *Son of Man* and strive to catch the sense of the title from the tone and accent of the speaker. To do this successfully wants a fine, sensitive, sympathetic ear, unfilled with other sounds which blunt its perceptive faculty. For lack of such an ear men may get very false impressions, and read all sorts of meanings into the simple phrase, meanings laboriously collected from Old Testament texts or suggested by systems of theology. To my ear the title speaks of one who is sympathetic and unpretentious; loves men and advances no ambitious claims. . . . The *Son of Man* is the Man, the brother of men, loving humanity with a passionate love which fits Him to be the world's Christ and His attitude is that of one who says: 'Discover what is deepest in me and draw your own inference.'

"The faithful preservation of this name, bearing such an import, by the synoptical evangelists is a service deserving the gratitude of Christendom. It is not to be found elsewhere in the New Testament, at least in the same sense. It is entirely absent from the Epistles. It occurs frequently in the fourth Gospel, but in novel connections of thought, as a foil to the Divine nature of the Logos, as the name for the human aspect of Deity incarnate, theological rather than ethical in its construction. We worship the *Son of Man* of the fourth Gos-

<sup>14</sup> Matt. 1: 1.

pel as we worship the Lord of St. Paul, but we love as our brother the lowly, gracious, winsome, comrade-like *Son of Man* of Matthew, Mark and Luke. We refuse not the worship, but we wish to begin with fellowship on equal terms, as if we belonged to the inner Jesus circle, to the band of men who were the companions of the *Son of Man*."—Dr. Bruce in December number, '95, of the *Biblical World*.

Dr. Bruce has evidently cleared up the subject nicely, and in a very able and scholarly manner so far as he has developed it; but why does he speak of "The Son of Man" occurring in "novel connections of thought," of "the human aspects of Deity incarnate," and of the Lord that we worship as belonging to the Gospel of John alone? Do we not find the same "Son of Man" in Mark and Luke that we do in John, the one who alone is worthy of our highest reverence, and the one whom we adore and worship more as the Lord from heaven than the God-man upon the earth? It is to the Gospel of Luke that we turn to find the Holy Child Jesus, who alone merits the homage of the angels, the adoration of the Magi from the East, and the worship of all the earth. But when we study the Gospel of Matthew, then do we find the words of Bruce strikingly and singularly fitting and appropriate, when he says: "We love as our brother the lowly, gracious, winsome, comrade-like *Son of Man*." In this the Gospel of Matthew is unique, in that it emphasizes and lays special stress on Christ as a man, mingling with his fellowmen, teaching them, giving them admonition and warning, suffering pain, hungering and thirsting, and enduring hardships with them. This we believe to be "The Son of Man" in the Gospel of Matthew.

But now, on the other hand, let us examine the expression "The Son of God." We have already stated the fact that as "The Son of Man" correlates with "The Kingdom of Heaven" in the Gospel of Matthew, so "The Son of God" and "The Son of Man" are used interchangeably, or better, without special reference to "The Kingdom of God" in the other Gospels, and as Matthew begins his Gospel with "The Son of

David," so Mark begins his with "The Son of God." This expression Christ again borrows from the Old Testament, which is used there in a figurative sense and denotes the elect object of divine love and thus belongs to the Messiah in an eminent sense.

Bruce, in his *Kingdom of God*, p. 178, says: "The title Son of God expressed the Messianic consciousness of Jesus Godwards. It might conceivably have been used by Him in four distinct senses: as expressing a relation to God common to Him with other men and based on the simple fact of being a man; as a Messianic title of dignity; as denoting moral likeness to and intimate fellowship with God; and as implying possession of the Divine nature. The four senses may be discriminated as the *human*, the *official*, the *ethical* and the *metaphysical*. Of the first sense no example can be cited. We do not anywhere find Jesus calling Himself Son of God merely in virtue of His being a Son of Man."

This confirms our argument, for we have shown that according to the Gospel of Matthew "The Kingdom of Heaven" and "The Son of Man" are correlatives, and such being the case if, according to the statements of Bruce—which we firmly believe and will further support by stronger evidence—the one expression refers to the human or temporal, the other must certainly do the same for they cannot be separated.

Dr. Weiss, in his *New Testament Theology*, Vol. I, p. 78, puts it in much stronger language when he says, "In the earliest tradition Jesus nowhere uses the name Son of God as interchangeable with that of Son of Man, where He speaks of the position which He had among men in virtue of His calling and of His duties and destinies which were conditioned thereby."

Now, again, if Dr. Weiss's statement is true, and we believe that it is, that Jesus nowhere in the earliest traditions uses the name "Son of God" as interchangeable with the "Son of Man," why should he use the expressions "Kingdom of Heaven" and "Kingdom of God" interchangeably, as it is

generally acknowledged he does in Matthew's Gospel, when as we have shown the phrase "Son of Man" alone is used in connection with "The Kingdom of Heaven," while the phrase "Son of God" never is, but always points to the future or God-ward as all the New Testament writers affirm, and which we have endeavored to prove is also true of "The Kingdom of God"?

This argument would be conclusive to us that there is a difference, such as we have shown between "The Kingdom of Heaven" and "The Kingdom of God" in the Gospel of Matthew, had we no more proofs to offer; but there yet remains something to be said about the other evangelists not using the expression, "The Kingdom of Heaven," in order to meet some objections that arise from this source.

### III. WHY IS "THE KINGDOM OF HEAVEN" NOT USED BY THE OTHER EVANGELISTS?

Why does Matthew alone use both expressions, "The Kingdom of Heaven" and "The Kingdom of God," while the other evangelists use the phrase "Kingdom of God" exclusively, and never mention "The Kingdom of Heaven," although oft-times relating the same circumstances and events that Matthew records?

This, say certain persons, is a proof that the two expressions are used interchangeably. But let us investigate the case.

We have called attention to the fact, under the Gospel of Matthew, that he wrote expressly for Jewish converts in Palestine, and also that he is without a doubt the most exact writer of all the evangelists, being more concerned about the *ipsissima verba* of Christ than the precise order or chronological arrangement in which the events occurred.

We have also authoritatively stated that Mark, Luke and John wrote either for Gentile converts, or for Christians in general, and thus is universality stamped upon their writings. We have also quoted Weizsäcker, who says in his work, *The*



*Apostolic Age*, that "collections of Christ's sayings began to be formed, not in an historical spirit, but simply to meet the practical needs of disciples desirous of guidance in life, so that, eventually, explanations become texts."

Again we have noted that in the Sermon on the Mount, Luke, evidently, makes substitutions, from the original, to become more intelligible to those for whom he was writing.

Now what do all these facts mean? To my mind they are conclusive evidence that the writers of the Gospels adapted themselves to the needs and demands of the people with whom they had to deal. In the language of St. Paul, to the Jews they became as Jews that they might gain Jews; to them that were under law, as under the law, not being themselves under the law, that they might gain them that were under the law; to them that were without law, as without law, not being without law to God, but under law to Christ, that they might gain them that were without law. To the weak they became weak, that they might gain the weak. All things to all men that they might by all means save some.<sup>15</sup>

This then is the most natural and common-sense view of the matter, and one that best answers the question we asked in starting this topic.

Matthew writing for Jews had a peculiar people to deal with. They were well versed in the law and the prophets and consequently when he quotes from the Old Testament he must be exact in his terminology and expressions that he uses, or in other words, he must quote the exact words of Christ who borrows these expressions from the Old Testament. Suppose Matthew, in writing to the Jews, would have used the expression "Kingdom of God," when he meant "Kingdom of Heaven," or "Son of God," when he meant "Son of Man," what impression would he have left upon that people who had heard so much about the Kingdom, and the Messiah, who was to deliver his people from oppression? The Jewish mind was one susceptible to the finest shades of distinction and difference

<sup>15</sup> 1 Cor. 9: 20-23.

to any variation that would be made concerning "The Kingdom of God," and any one who is acquainted with the language of the Hebrews will know how exact they are in their expressions. Christ did not desire to stem the tide of thought, of external forms, at once, and thus bring on a mighty revolution. He does not make great innovations and abruptly speak of the spiritual Kingdom (Kingdom of God), before He has prepared the minds of those to whom He came by setting up for them an earthly Kingdom of which He is the head, namely, "The Kingdom of Heaven." The history of the human race shows that God, in all His dealings with His people, has always worked in this way. He never acts rashly, or brings about great changes on the spur of the moment as man often does, but gradually through the ages does He unfold His plan and His purpose with such exactness and silence that it is often almost imperceptible.

On the other hand, what use would there have been for Mark or Luke or even John to use expressions that would not have been understood by those to whom they were writing? There is certainly no use to draw hair-splitting lines of difference for those who cannot see them. The Gentiles were not concerned about the theocracy of the Old Testament, about the types and symbols, the external forms and ceremonies, nor even the prophecies of the Old Covenant. As regards the Gentiles there was no need of gradually turning them away from the Mosaic laws and customs that had become part of the very nature of the Jews. Why God should at one time enjoin and command certain rites and ceremonies upon His chosen people in worship, and at another time institute a new order of things was not a question to be solved for, or by, the Gentiles. They had their idols, and when they became converts what they needed to be taught was that God is a spirit, and hence they are at once made acquainted with "The Kingdom of God." Christ and Him crucified is what St. Paul, the great apostle to the Gentiles, is continually preaching to them. That He died for their sins and rose again for their justification, and

that He is their mediator, pleading and interceding for them with the Father, not upon the earth but in heaven.

Beyschlag, in his *New Testament Theology*, Vol. I, p. 42, in speaking of "The Kingdom of Heaven," says: "For the first Gospel is the earliest and was composed before the destruction of Jerusalem, and though in it the appearance of the Kingdom is expected from heaven, it is by no means transferred to heaven—Matt. 4:17, 24:30, 26:64. The probability rather is that the expression comes from the oldest source, the Logia of Matthew, and was the one that Jesus Himself preferred to use. Its enigmatic and peculiar Old Testament impress may, as in the case of the expression 'Son of Man,' have hindered its transference to Gentile Christian usage, and therefore to the second and third Gospels."

This much then is evident, that notwithstanding the fact that the other evangelists do not use the expression, "The Kingdom of Heaven," it is no proof or even an argument that the two terms are used interchangeably in the Gospel of Matthew. If there is any argument one way or the other the burden of proof certainly falls on the side we have taken, for if the two terms are used interchangeably by Matthew why do not Mark, Luke and John use them in the same way?

It is hardly necessary to say more in this connection, in reference to the absence of "The Kingdom of Heaven" in the other Gospels, or even to carry our discussion of the whole subject to any greater length, since time will not permit us to make further investigations.

In concluding this paper, we feel that we have not done full justice to such an important theme by confining it within the limits of so small a scope. The subject is an inexhaustible one and large books have been written upon it. Of this fact, however, we are conscious, that in our research, investigation and study, we have received new light, and our belief, in the theory set forth in this article, and which we have held for several years, has been strengthened, and not only strengthened but, indeed, confirmed, so that it no longer remains a theory to us but an established fact.

In our extensive reading and study of the subject, another revelation has dawned upon us for which we feel amply repaid for our labors that we have put forth. In starting out to develop this theme along a line altogether different from any of the Biblical writers, even those who have written much upon it, we thought that it might look like presumption on our part to walk where scholars feared to tread, or whither they were not yet prepared or inclined to launch forth. Yet we have found this to be true, that those who have written most upon this subject have, in their latest writings, if not thrown out suggestions as to a difference between "The Kingdom of Heaven" and "The Kingdom of God," at least given strong hints in that direction.

Not only that, but none of the recent writers, with whom we have met, make such radical statements as are made by the older writers, namely, that "The Kingdom of God" and "The Kingdom of Heaven" are used interchangeably, or as synonymous terms.

This then is the revelation to which we refer. We also trust that the preparation of this paper may not only have confirmed our position on "The Kingdom of Heaven," but that the same arguments here advanced may bring some light to others who have been thinking upon the subject and who have not yet arrived at a definite conclusion.

COLLEGEVILLE, PA.

#### XIV.

#### NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

**THE SIGN OF THE COVENANT:** Ten Papers on the Sabbath. By John R. Webster. The Standard Publishing Company, Cincinnati. Price \$1.25.

This book is one of the fruits of the modern Adult Bible Class movement. The author has for twenty-five years been the teacher of the Webster Bible Class in the First Baptist Church, Omaha, Neb. As he tells us in the preface, when the class recently came to the Decalogue in the International Sunday-School Lessons, he found so many things with which he was unacquainted that he suggested a digression for a few Sundays to study the whole Sabbath question. He then set to work, with such resources as were at his command, to prepare these ten papers, which were first read to the class, and then, at their request, put into book form. The papers "were prepared in the midst of an active business life, with limited time and rather meager sources of information within reach."

One would hence hardly expect a scholarly or scientific treatment of the subject under discussion. Scientific treatises do not originate under circumstances such as those under which this book was written. Yet both the book and the effort which produced it are to be commended. It manifests a deep earnestness on the part of both Mr. Webster and his Bible Class; and it helps to refute the charge so often made against our modern Sunday-school work, namely, that it is superficial and barren. Where a teacher and his class manifest such interest in Bible study as to undertake and successfully carry out such a series of studies, it is evidence that efficient and faithful work is being done. And work similar to that which this class has done is, no doubt, being done by many others all over the land. We therefore hail this effort as an evidence of the growing efficiency and success of present-day religious education. What the Church needs is more of this same kind of searching the Scriptures. Even if the result should not be up to university requirements, the study and the research required will do any one a world of good.

WILLIAM C. SCHAEFFER.

**THE MINISTER A MAN AMONG MEN**, with a Biographical Sketch of Rev. Charles F. McCauley, D.D. By Rev. Rufus W. Miller, D.D. Heidelberg Press, Fifteenth and Race Streets, Philadelphia, Pa.

This volume consists of four lectures, delivered before the Faculty and Students of the Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church, Lancaster, Pa., on the basis of the Reverend

Charles F. McCauley Lectureship on Pastoral and Practical Theology. The lectureship, as is well known, was founded by Mrs. Harriet A. McCauley Schnebley, of Mercersburg, Pa.; and the lectures before us are the first to be given on this foundation.

The occasion of the establishment of this lectureship is interesting and is thus given in the Foreword of this volume: "The occasion of the establishment of the Rev. Charles F. McCauley Lecturship on 'The Minister as a Student of Human Nature, Clerical Manners and as an Executive,' it is fair to say, arose from the fact that Dr. McCauley frequently said in the home circle that he wished theological students were required to study 'Miller on Clerical Manners.' This statement had reference to a book long since out of print, entitled 'Letters on Clerical Manners and Habits,' addressed to a student in the Theological Seminary of Princeton, New Jersey, by Samuel Miller, D.D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History and Church Government in the said Seminary. Published in 1827."

The writer of this notice well remembers hearing Dr. McCauley say, that, if he had the means, he would like to establish a Professorship on Ministerial Manners in our Theological Seminary. The subject seems to have been much on his heart and mind; and the establishment of this lectureship by his daughter, Mrs. Schnebley, is hence not simply a beautiful and appropriate memorial to her sainted father, but the realization of one of his own most cherished desires.

It is hence peculiarly appropriate that the first of this series of lectures should be introduced by a sketch of the life of the Rev. Charles F. McCauley, D.D. Dr. McCauley was himself one of the most courteous, one of the most gentlemanly, one of the most lovable, and one of the most saintly men whom the Reformed Church in the United States has produced. He was a model of clerical manners, always dignified, always affable, always gracious and kind. To those who knew him, his memory lingers as a benediction. His life was the best possible illustration of the subject which this lectureship is intended to teach; and it is to be regretted that the entire volume was not given to a fuller elaboration of his life, especially of his pastoral activities and of his pulpit ministrations. While the introductory lecture gives a faithful and vivid sketch, a more detailed description of his ministerial career would have been a blessing to our younger ministers. May we not express the hope that Dr. Rufus W. Miller will yet find time to write a complete life of Dr. McCauley?

The remaining lectures in the course are on the following topics: The Minister's Personality and Manners; The Minister as a Man in His Relation to and with Others; The Minister as a Man in Relation to the Church. The lectures contain much that is interesting and profitable especially for young ministers and

students for the ministry. The course is a fitting introduction to what promises to be a valuable feature in the curriculum of our Theological Seminary. The lectureship will make it possible for the Seminary to secure for its students the ripe fruit of the experiences of the best and most successful ministers of the Church. The volume is heartily commended to the ministers and members of the Reformed Church.

WILLIAM C. SCHAEFFER.

THE LIFE OF JESUS. By Harris Franklin Rall. The Abingdon Press, New York and Cincinnati. Price 75 cents net.

This is one of a series of "Study Courses for Adult Classes, Preparatory Schools and Advanced Groups in Weekday Religious Instruction." It is to be followed by another volume of the same general character on the teachings of Jesus by the same author. Of the purpose with which this book was written the author says, "The character of this volume is to be understood in the light of its purpose. It does not aim to include every item of the Gospel records. It does not try to give all possible knowledge about customs and places. It seeks to utilize assured critical results, but it does not give critical studies. Though interested in spiritual values, its purpose is not that of a devotional handbook. Nor is its chief concern the attempt to arrange all the Gospel incidents in chronological order."

Any one who undertakes to study this book (and it is a book for *study* and not simply for *recreational* or even *devotional reading*) needs to bear this fact in mind. It is prepared primarily for young people of high-school and preparatory-school age; and the author evidently does not intend to confuse the young mind with a discussion of critical problems. As is abundantly evident, he has utilized what he regards as assured results of modern critical study; but he allows these to remain in the background.

As a result of this method, the author has given us a series of very interesting studies in the life and work of Jesus. These are more or less closely connected; and they give a fairly consistent and a tolerably accurate portrait of Jesus. As the author himself warns us, there is little attempt at chronological arrangement; and, among other things, the student will find it difficult, if not impossible, to decide, from the account here given, how long the public ministry of Jesus lasted. And if he should stop with the study of this book he would inevitably remain in blissful ignorance of many of the vexed problems which confront us in the study of the life of Jesus.

That, however, at once raises the question as to the wisdom of the method here adopted. Just as the ostrich can not escape danger by hiding its head in the sand, so can the teacher not shield his pupils from intellectual difficulties by simply passing by cer-



tain facts. Can an intelligent and inquiring young student, with the New Testament in one hand and this book in the other, help asking why nothing at all is here said about the birth of Jesus, about many of his most striking miracles, such as the feeding of the multitude, the raising of Jairus's daughter, the widow's son, or Lazarus, or about the feasts at Jerusalem, which, according to John, Jesus attended? While we think the author does well in trying not to disturb young minds by the introduction of critical discussions, we question the wisdom of simply passing by the facts which might suggest such discussions.

It is far easier to approve this book in what it says than in what it leaves unsaid. The author evidently tries to avoid the difficulties of the Johannine problem; and yet he feels that he can not quite ignore the Johannine narrative. He evidently believes in a Judean ministry, but he disposes of the early Judean ministry in less than a dozen lines; and all the rest, except the last week, he passes by entirely. So the author tries to escape the difficulties connected with the nature miracles; and he passes by the feeding of the five thousand, the walking on the water, the raising of the dead, and the cursing of the barren fig tree. As a result, we have a life of Jesus, based almost exclusively on the synoptic narrative; and even that is emasculated. While we find much in the book to admire, and while we in the main agree with the positive positions taken, we question the wisdom of this ostrich-like method of simply trying to keep all difficulties out of sight. The weakness of the book lies in what it fails to say.

WILLIAM C. SCHAEFFER.

**JOHN AND HIS WRITINGS.** By D. H. Hayes, Professor of New Testament Interpretation in the Graduate School of Theology, Garrett Biblical Institute. The Methodist Book Concern, 150 Fifth Ave., New York. Price \$1.75 net.

This volume belongs to the Biblical Introduction Series now being published by the Methodist Book Concern. It deals with questions of Introduction to the five New Testament books, which are usually ascribed to John. It is a new, interesting and able study of the Johannine problem. The author's position is conservative. He holds that these five books are from the same author; and he believes that the author is John, the Apostle, the Son of Zebedee.

The contents of the book are given in five parts: The Apostle John; The Most Remarkable Gospel, the Gospel according to John; The First Epistle of John; The Minor Epistles of John; and The Apocalypse.

Part I is a very interesting study of the character and personality of the Apostle John. The author starts out by calling attention to the fact that much less is known of him than is often

supposed. Then he gathers up the data concerning John's life which may be gleaned from the New Testament and from tradition. This is followed by a unique and interesting discussion of the meaning of the title, which was given to John and his brother James, the Son of Thunder. Finally, under the caption "Saint and Seer," there is given a delightful analysis of the personality and character of John. Would that every student might read this excellent study of the character of "the disciple whom Jesus loved"!

Near the close of this characterization the author thus summarizes what he has said: "John was a Boanerges, a man of intense convictions and ardent affections, and absolutely fearless in the expression of these in action and speech. He was no molly-coddle; he was a militant saint. He had real reverence for genius and fervent love for holiness. He had a natural delicacy and refinement of manner. He was of a modest and retiring disposition. He was simple as a child in his character. You could look through him and find no obstruction to clear vision. His eye was clear, his heart was pure, his soul was single. He had an oceanlike depth of nature which could apprehend the sublimest vision and the profoundest revelation of the Christian faith."

Professor Hayes believes John to have been the last and the greatest of the apostolic company—the last to come to a commanding position in the Church. While the past and very largely the present belong to Paul, the future will be John's.

The most interesting as well as the most important portion of this entire study is that found in Part II, on the Most Remarkable Gospel. After collecting some of the remarkable estimates of this Gospel, beginning with Origen and ending with Dr. A. T. Pearson, the author lays down this Gospel alongside of the Synoptics and he points out the similarities and differences, the omissions and the new features. Next the Gospel is studied as a work of art, and other remarkable characteristics are pointed out, such as its contemplative character, its spirituality, its mysticism, its simplicity of expression, its clearness and profundity of revelation, and its remarkable literary style. All of this is interesting, and much of it is exceedingly well put.

The most important sections in Part II deal with the vexed question of authorship. After giving a resumé of the traditional arguments against the authenticity of the Gospel, the author plunges into a discussion of the present-day positions. He shows how the more recent discoveries of long-lost documents have forced the critics to push back the date to the very time into which, according to tradition, John lived. Then he tells how the critics changed their position and tried to show that John died a martyr in Palestine, and so never can have lived to a great old age in Ephesus. He literally riddles to pieces the three arguments on

which this contention is usually made to rest; and by quoting the whole of the passage from Georgius Hamartolus, in which he quotes Papias as saying that James and John were slain by the Jews, he proves beyond the peradventure of a doubt that the said Georgius Hamartolus can not have meant what modern critics have tried to make him mean. For the passage begins with the statement, "after Domitian, Nerva reigned one year; and he, having recalled John from the island, dismissed him to live in Ephesus." As Nerva reigned A.D. 96-98, George the Sinful can not have meant that John became a martyr at Jerusalem in 44 A.D., when James was put to death.

The most unsatisfactory feature of this treatment of the Fourth Gospel is its failure to estimate at its true worth the polemical aims and the apologetic character of the Gospel. As is now pretty generally conceded, besides the principal aim stated in 20:30, 31, the author of the Gospel had several pretty clearly defined polemical aims; but of these Professor Hayes has little or nothing to say. And so he has very little to say on the historicity of the Gospel narrative. As is pretty clear from the statement in 20:30, 31, the Gospel is, at least, quite as much an interpretation of Jesus as it is a history of his life. This question of the historicity and character of the Gospel is really more important than the question of authorship. The Gospel is what it is, no matter who wrote it; and the other question of historicity and character remain the same. And before any one can be prepared to interpret the Gospel, he must be clear in his own mind as to whether it is primarily history or interpretation. Yet on this point the author of this book gives the student little or no help. This we regard as the most serious defect of the whole volume.

Professor Hayes is, we think, entirely right in insisting that the Gospel and the First Epistle belong together. Such is the similarity of style, such the sameness of doctrine, such the likeness in the personal characteristics of the author and such is the agreement in their method of dealing with error and of presenting the truth that it is well-nigh impossible to escape the conviction that the two have come from the same hand. And when to these marks of identification there is added the fact that "there are at least thirty-five passages in which the thought is closely parallel in the two books, and that in some of these cases the same words and phrases are used," what seemed a strong probability becomes almost a demonstrated certainty.

As Professor Hayes looks upon the Fourth Gospel as better than any one of the Synoptics, so he regards the First Epistle of John as better than any of the Epistles of Paul. This is the contrast which he finds. "The difference in their writings marks the difference in the men. Paul is the greatest of the Scribes, learned in the law; John is the greatest of the Seers, learned in

love. Paul deals with syllogisms; John deals with intuitions. Paul argues and convinces; John sees and declares. Paul is an advocate; John is a prophet. Paul proves with inevitable logic; John proclaims with irrefutable insight. Paul's proofs press upon each other like waves dashing over fortifications of sand on the beach. John's thought moves calmly and majestically like ripples which spread in ever-widening circles till they are lost to sight, when you drop a pebble into the dimpling surface of the sleeping lake."

The part which deals with the Apocalypse is the longest and the least satisfactory in the volume. While the author says much that is true and helpful in the study of this mysterious book, he can hardly be said to have added anything new, nor to have made any material contribution to the interpretation of its various symbols. Nor do we think that he has made out his contention that this book is from the same hand as the Gospel and the First Epistle. He frankly confesses that he does not know how to explain the remarkable divergencies of style; and yet, though he uses the agreement of style as an argument to prove that the Gospel and Epistle are from the same hand, he does not seem to be at all shaken in his belief that the Apocalypse is from the same author by this acknowledged difference.

Altogether we take pleasure in commending this volume to all students of the Johannine literature. It is a noteworthy contribution to New Testament study. One may not at all points agree with the author's persistent conservatism; yet no one can read the book without profit and without having his admiration for the Johannine type of thought heightened.

WILLIAM C. SCHAEFFER.

THE OLD TESTAMENT MANUSCRIPTS IN THE FREER COLLECTION. Part II. The Washington Manuscript of the Psalms. By Henry A. Sanders. With 1 single and 5 folding plates. New York, The Macmillan Company. Pp. 105-357, 4to, paper covers. \$2.00.

The Washington manuscript of the Psalms was bought by Mr. Freer in Egypt in 1906. With much patience and skill Mr. Sanders separated the leaves and copied the surviving portions of the text. He found that parts of two different Greek Psalters, both written in uncial letters, had been combined to form the complete codex. The first and larger part (Psalms 1-141, 8) was written in the fifth century, the other in the eighth. The general tendency of both is to agree with the Psalter text against the Complete Bible text, though the first part has many unique readings and also isolated agreements with the Codex Vaticanus. This first part is now the oldest representative of the Psalter text, and therefore an important witness to the exact form in which the Psalms were read in Greek by early Christians. In an intro-

duction Mr. Sanders gives complete paleographic data, and discusses in detail the peculiarities and affinities of the text. In his reprint of the text he has supplied in brackets from the Swete text missing lines or parts of lines, and has placed at the foot of the page all the variations of the Swete text from this manuscript. With this apparatus and the specimen pages of the original given in the plates, the scholar who has this book will have no occasion to examine the original. It is indispensable that such work as this should be done, though the results will be used by only a few specialists. In this instance the work of editing and publishing has been very well done.

C. N. HELLER.

LINCOLN'S GETTYSBURG ADDRESS. By Orton H. Carmichael. The Abingdon Press, New York, 1917. Cloth, 12mo, 116 pages, 19 illustrations, \$.85 net.

"This little volume," says the author in his foreword, "is the result of an attempt to state briefly in logical order such well-attested facts, both old and new, as bear upon the writing, the delivery and the revision of this address by Mr. Lincoln, together with an account of some of the incidents and circumstances connected with his visit to Gettysburg at the time the address was made." Everything of importance to the main purpose of the book is clearly and pleasingly presented. The opening chapters, on the Background of History and on the Story of the National Cemetery, are the proper introduction to a full account of Mr. Lincoln's visit to Gettysburg, while the scenes and ceremonies on the day of the dedication of the cemetery are described in sufficient detail to surround the delivery of the Gettysburg Address with the life and emotions of the occasion. Of special interest is the chapter on the Evolution of the Address; after weighing all the facts presented here, one who has at times been disconcerted by variations in the published text will welcome and approve the adoption by the Lincoln Memorial Commission of the version made by Mr. Lincoln himself on March 11, 1864. A concluding chapter discusses the training and genius that combined to make Mr. Lincoln a master of literary expression. Underlying everything that is said about him in this book is the conviction that the essence of his political thinking is condensed into the Gettysburg Address, and that this great utterance is America's message to the world, pointing all peoples to a more excellent way than the way of blood and iron.

A few slips and minor inaccuracies occur. At the time of the battle Gettysburg was a town not of thirteen hundred people, but of about twice that many. Mr. Wills wrote his first letter to Governor Curtin on July 24, not on July 17, and the dedication of the cemetery was first appointed for October, not September, 23.

On the way to his first inauguration Mr. Lincoln passed through Baltimore on the night of February 22, 1861. In his speech to the crowd on the evening of November 18, Mr. Seward did not express "the hope of an early return of peace." Pickett's division (not brigade) led the Confederate assault on July 3. The description (on p. 90) of the first draft of the Gettysburg Address contradicts the accompanying facsimile, but suits Mr. Nicolay's reproduction, in which the last three words of Mr. Lincoln's first page are crossed out and the word "we" is present in his correction. It is scarcely just either to Hooker or to Meade not to remind the reader that Meade superseded Hooker only three days before the Battle of Gettysburg.

These small blemishes are to be regretted in a book that aims at historical accuracy, but they do not impair its merits as a whole. It is to be hoped that this volume will be widely read by Americans, young and old. Good printing, attractive binding, and well-chosen illustrations make its form worthy of its substance.

C. N. HELLER.

WINNING OUT. By Charles H. Stewart. The Little Book Publisher, Arlington, N. J., 1917. Cloth, 12mo, 100 pages. \$.75.

This little book by the pastor of a church in Newark, N. J., is for the heartening of those who in moments of impatience or of mental confusion are tempted to conclude that the religion of Jesus is failing to prove itself the saving and redeeming force in the life of humanity that He confidently expected it to be. After showing that Jesus did not look for the immediate success of His kingdom, but understood that its progress in the world was to be slow and the spiritual results often disappointing, the author maintains that Christianity is "winning out along the lines of His expectation." Facing squarely the most alarming features of the present situation, he establishes, by an appeal to the long view of human progress and by a discerning estimate of the influences now operating, that the leaven of Christianity is really at work, that men are becoming more humane and Christ-like in spirit, and that on the whole the world is becoming a better place to live in. Even in the throes of the present war the world is looking toward Christ and His ideals as the one hope of humanity, while in the lives of countless individuals the power of the spirit of Jesus is the one ultimate certainty of the Christian faith. In the near future the author expects not an ebbing of the benign influence of Christianity, but tremendous and permanent changes for the betterment of humanity.

The book is enlightening, inspiring, and edifying. Written in an excellent popular style, it may be read with pleasure and profit by boy, girl, or man in the street, as well as by teacher or preacher.

C. N. HELLER.



JAMES MONROE BUCKLEY. By George Preston Mains. The Methodist Book Concern, New York. Crown, 8vo, pp. 305. Price, cloth, \$1.50 net.

To put into a volume of 300 pages a biography of such a man as James Monroe Buckley, D.D., LL.D., L.H.D., is not an easy task, but Dr. Mains does it well. Dr. Buckley was for at least thirty years the acknowledged leader in the councils of the Methodist Episcopal Church. Nor were his fame and power confined to the limits of his own Church. Dr. Mains traces the wonderful power and work of this great leader back to its sources and on through the varied fields in which they were manifested. James M. Buckley was the son of a Methodist preacher of no mean ability, whose career ended by death at the early age of thirty-seven, leaving the young lad of less than six years to the care of his mother. Fortunately for him, his mother was a woman of unusual force of character and to her Dr. Buckley owes much of his great success in life. Forced by ill health to leave Wesleyan University, Middletown, Connecticut, before he had completed the first half of his course, the young man entered the ministry of the Methodist Episcopal Church in 1859. Then followed an eminently successful career as a minister, during which he filled the pulpits of some of the largest churches of his denomination. The early years of this ministry witnessed a heroic "Fight for Life," detailed by Dr. Mains in a chapter bearing that title, in the course of which the young preacher, given up by physicians to die as a victim of pulmonary consumption, by sheer force of will won his fight against the dread disease which had carried away his father and a long line of relatives. He lived much in the open air, took long walks, practiced deep breathing and exercised vigorously, and to these methods he ascribes his victory. In 1880 Dr. Buckley was elected editor of *The Christian Advocate*, the official weekly paper of the Methodist Episcopal Church, and for the unparalleled term of thirty-two consecutive years he remained the editor of that paper, making it, by his vigor and versatility, a leader in American religious journalism. It was during these years, as related by Dr. Mains in the chapter, "Debater and Parliamentarian," that Dr. Buckley became such a commanding leader in his denomination. In the General Conference, the highest legislative body in the denomination, Dr. Buckley's voice was heard more often than that of any other man, and his support or opposition to any proposal was a force to be reckoned. It was during these same years, as related in two succeeding chapters—"Traveler" and "Author"—that Dr. Buckley contributed to *The Christian Advocate* several series of travel letters and wrote a number of books which have added to his fame. The next chapter relates the academic honors and official positions which Dr. Buckley's great ability brought to him. The amount of administrative work for which he found time and strength was remark-



able. Another chapter, "Chautauqua—Wit and Wisdom," presents interestingly specimens of the platform deliverances of Dr. Buckley at Chautauqua which indicate, in part, why he was in such constant demand at that great center and elsewhere. The book closes with a discriminating chapter—"The Man"—in which Dr. Mains adds to his own estimate of Dr. Buckley those of several others, from which it is possible to get some idea of the personality of this wonderful man who now, at more than four-score years, "awaits the summons which shall one day call him to the splendors of the Endless Morning." Altogether the biography is thoroughly readable and presents a good picture of a most remarkable man whose life story ought to be an inspiration and help to all who learn it—to none more than to young men who have given their lives to the work of the Christian ministry. Dr. Buckley was a man who, as Dr. Mains shows, in the face of initial odds, worked prodigiously and made full and free use of his great powers for the glory of God and the welfare of his fellow-man.

E. A. BAWDEN.

MISSIONARY EDUCATION IN HOME AND SCHOOL. By Ralph E. Diffendorfer. The Abingdon Press, 1917. Pages 407. Price \$1.50 net.

The publishers state that this book contains the results of fifteen years of study and work in the field of missionary education. The dedication, to one "who loves and understands a little child," indicates the reverent attitude of the author to his subject. This combination of devotion and industry has produced a manual which is itself a happy union of high ideals and practical methods. First the aim of missionary education is discussed. The qualities which it is desired to cultivate in the mind of the child are friendliness, sympathy, helpfulness, coöperation, generosity, loyalty and justice, and these are treated in detail. After a review of the materials used for missionary education, plans for the various grades from little children to adults are described in succession. The author seems to be a master of the principles of psychology as applied to education. It is very significant that a prominent Methodist can write as Mr. Diffendorfer does: "The high-pressure emotional religion affected by the individualist churches of former generations is passing away. The changed intellectual and moral atmosphere is fast making it impossible. Some who cannot discern the signs of the times are still striving to stir the old fervors, but the failure is becoming more and more abject. . . . And this does not imply that men are becoming less religious, but that religion is taking on another and better form." Verily, the world is moving. We of the Reformed Church who are so proud of our record in the way of educational religion have much to learn from these later-day Methodist brethren. The writer has been humbled

by the perusal of this book. Not only is it the product of the last fifteen years; it is a book that no one could have written fifteen years ago.

CHRISTOPHER NOSS.

CHILDHOOD IN THE MOSLEM WORLD. By Samuel M. Zwemer, F.R.C.S. Fleming H. Revell Company. Pages 274. Price \$2 net.

Dr. Zwemer needs no introduction as the foremost authority on present-day conditions in the Mohammedan world. This will be to many the most significant of his publications. For in the long run a religion stands or falls according to its treatment of the little ones, and an honest inquiry into the facts with regard to the life of the 80,000,000 children in the domains of Islam promises much to the student of missions. The author's study of the subject is based on wide induction. He acknowledges indebtedness to seventy-odd correspondents in all parts of the Mohammedan field, from Morocco to Java and from Manchuria to South Africa. The beautiful illustrations that adorn the book could not have been gathered without the coöperation of very widely scattered and most capable assistants. They are beautiful or pathetic, as the case may be, reflecting either the charm of childhood, which is the same the world over, or the evil that spoils that charm far too early in life. The material assembled in the text under the heads of environment, infancy, education, morals, religion and the impact of the West, is abundant and very interesting. Dr. Zwemer presents a strong case against Islam, fortified by a great array of witnesses. We do not doubt that his presentation is substantially correct, but to a discerning reader it would be more convincing, perhaps, if he seemed less a special pleader and more ready to recognize the good qualities of the thing that he attacks. Moreover he is too masculine, too scientific, to deal altogether adequately with such a delicate subject as the mind of a child. He well says in his preface, "This is not a book for children, but about children." He renders a great service by telling about some of the terrible things that are about Mohammedan children. Some time a missionary lady who knows how to talk with them in their own language will tell us what they are.

CHRISTOPHER NOSS.

POPULAR ASPECTS OF ORIENTAL RELIGIONS. By L. O. Hartman, Ph.D. The Abingdon Press. Cloth, pages 255. Price \$1.35 net.

This is a readable account of six Asiatic Religions, of Animism as it appears in Korea, the Taoism and Confucianism of China, and Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam and Parseeism as they appear to a traveller in India, with a glance at the Buddhism of Japan. Dr. Hartman endeavors to set forth these religions as they affect the lives of the people rather than the contents of their sacred

books. His materials were gathered by careful personal observation and supplemented by a great deal of reading. There is a pleasing alternation of description and exposition, and in one case the points are brought out in the form of a dialogue, between a Parsee and a Christian. The author is sympathetic in his attitude toward the faiths of Asia, but equally positive in his conviction that Christianity is the truth and will prevail. As a popular introduction to the subject the book may be heartily commended.

CHRISTOPHER NOSS.